governments. The president of the General Assembly appointed a committee of seven member states (Canada, Egypt, France, India, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay) to negotiate with United Nations members and nonmembers to secure voluntary pledges to cover the costs of both the Korean relief program and the Palestine refugee program. A subcommittee of the Economic and Social Council estimated that the Korean program would cost approximately $250,000,000 for 1951 and the early part of 1952. The Agency is to be administered by an agent general appointed by the Secretary-General after consultation with the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and the advisory committee provided for in the same resolution to advise the agent general with regard to major financial, procurement, distribution, and other economic problems. The agent general is to commence the operation of the program in Korea at such time as may be agreed upon by the Unified Command, the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and the agent general. 3. Other Questions Concerning China QUESTIONS ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH AGGRESSION IN KOREA The Question of Formosa Formosa, an island off the mainland of China, came into the focus of international attention when the North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea in June 1950. In a resolution adopted on June 25 the Security Council took the first step toward restoring peace. On June 27 the President of the United States stated that the North Korean forces had "... defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. "Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations." The Chinese Government announced its acceptance of the neutralization measures in respect of Formosa. However, the Chinese Communist regime protested vigorously and on August 24, in a cable to the president of the Security Council, alleged that these measures were a "direct armed aggression on the territory of China" and asked Security Council condemnation of the United States. Following his original statement on June 27 regarding Formosa, the President repeated and amplified his earlier statement of American objectives there. In a special message to the Congress on July 19 he stated that "our action in regard to Formosa was a matter of elementary security." As to American intentions regarding Formosa, the President stated that "the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations." In a communication to Ambassador Austin, the President stated again at some length the American position with respect to Formosa. Among other things, he stated that "the action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland." He denied that the United States had encroached on the territory of China or had taken aggressive action against China. The American action, he said, was "an action designed to keep the peace and was therefore in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations." In the General Assembly, Secretary of State Acheson, speaking during the general debate, reaffirmed earlier statements of the President that the United States has no territorial ambitions and seeks no special privileges with respect to the island of Formosa. He expressed the belief that the problem of Formosa and the nearly eight million people who inhabit it should not be settled by force or unilateral action and that the international community has a legitimate interest and concern in having this matter settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. He proposed that the General Assembly direct its attention to the solution of this problem under circumstances in which all parties concerned would have a full opportunity to express their views and would agree to refrain from the use of force until a peaceful and equitable solution was found. Having already explained the neutralization measures in the Security Council, the United States asked that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly. In its memorandum supporting the request, the United States Delegation traced the recent history of the island, which only a few years before had been used by Japan as a base for aggression in the Pacific area. It recalled that in 1943 the President of the United States, the British Prime Minister, and the President of China had stated at Cairo that it was their purpose that Formosa and certain other territories be restored to the Republic of China. They had reaffirmed this purpose in the terms for Japanese surrender defined at Potsdam on July 26, 1945. These terms had been accepted by Japan, and General Order No. 1 of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, issued pursuant to the terms of surrender, had provided for the surrender of the Japanese forces in Formosa to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The formal transfer of Formosa to China, the memorandum pointed out, was to await the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan on some other appropriate formal act. Since 1945 Chinese authority had been exercised over the island. The Assembly placed the matter on its agenda. By the time the First Committee, to which the item had been referred, reached this question on its agenda, large-scale intervention by Chinese Communist forces in Korea had created an entirely new situation. The United States representative, reaffirming the view that the international community had an interest in the peaceful settlement of the Formosa question, pointed out that the massive intervention of the Chinese Communists had created a new and closely related problem both for the United Nations and for the United States. He suggested a deferment of the Formosan question until later in the session in the hope that the situation would be further clarified and that the question could then be freely discussed as a long-range problem without the danger of complicating the task of the Security Council. The Committee acceded to this request by a vote of 53, with no opposing votes, and 5 abstentions. Action had not been completed when the General Assembly recessed on December 15. Chinese Communist and Soviet Charges of Aggressive. CHINESE COMMUNIST COMPLAINT IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL RE GARDING FORMOSA Following announcement by the United States of measures neutralizing Formosa, the Chinese Communist regime in a communi cation of August 24 to the Security Council charged the United States with "direct armed aggression of the territory of China" and proclaimed its determination to "liberate" the island. It demanded that the Security Council condemn the United States and bring about the "withdrawal" of United States forces. The United States representative denied that any aggressive action was being taken against China. He explained that the impartial neutralization measures with respect to Formosa were taken not to acquire a special position for the United States but to prevent the Korean crisis from spreading so as to threaten the security of the United Nations forces in Korea. He favored discussion of the charges in the Council and expressed approval of a full United Nations investigation. The question was placed on the agenda of the Council under the heading "Complaint of Armed Invasion of Taiwan (Formosa)." However, before the Security Council began to discuss it, the General Assembly, acting on a request of the Soviet Union, had placed on its agenda an overlapping item entitled "American Aggression Against China," which, according to the Soviet explanatory memorandum, included among other charges this same complaint. When the Security Council began consideration of the Chinese Communist complaint regarding Formosa, the Soviet representative demanded that the Chinese Communist regime be permitted to participate as a complainant party. In this demand he received support from a number of other members of the Security Council. However, China proposed that the Security Council cease the consideration of this item pending the consideration of the identical charges in the General Assembly. The United States, while repeating its willingness to support an investigation by the General Assembly or the Security Council, opposed the invitation to the Chinese Communists. The United States representative suggested the establishment of a commission of investigation as the most effective method for evaluating the charges. Ambassador Gross indicated that such a commission might hear the Chinese Communists, thus giving complaining parties an appropriate hearing without allowing the Security Council to be abused for propaganda purposes. He noted that the Soviet proposal would have the Council condemn the United States for aggression and intervention in the internal affairs of China without having made any inquiry into the facts. On September 28, 1950, the Council rejected the Soviet proposal to invite the Chinese Communists to participate at once as complainant party in the Council proceedings. However, as a compromise, it adopted the following day a proposal of Ecuador to postpone the entire matter in the Security Council until November 15, 1950, by which date the General Assembly could have completed its action on the same charges. In the same resolution the Council decided to invite a representative of the Chinese Communists to be present when debate on the question was resumed. He would, however, participate not as a complainant party but under a rule of procedure allowing the Council to invite any person who might provide it with useful information and assist it in dealing with matters before it. The resolution was carried by a vote of Ecuador, France, India, Norway, the U. S. S. R., the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia, with China, Cuba, and the United States opposing and Egypt abstaining. The representative of China claimed that his negative vote prevented the adoption of the resolution, because, he argued, it involved a decision of substance and not of procedure and thus was subject to the veto. The Security Council rejected this effort to apply the veto. In a vote taken on the question whether or not the matter was procedural, China cast the sole negative vote, with nine members voting in the affirmative and Cuba abstaining. Thus the Security Council for the first time decided to disregard an attempted veto in a question which was clearly of a procedural character within the meaning of the Charter and therefore not subject to the veto. The United States voted against the Ecuadoran resolution while maintaining that it was procedural in character. Ambassador Gross stated with great precision the United States position. He stated that it was based on what we consider to be the law of the Charter and that any interpretation in our view would apply equally to all members of the Council or to none. He was careful to separate the strong views of the United States in opposing the resolution on its merits and at the same time supporting the view that it was a procedural resolution. He referred to the Charter, the four-power declaration of San Francisco, and the precedents of the Security Council which treat this type of resolution as procedural. He referred also to the views of the General Assembly, based upon an Interim Committee study, which recommended that the Security Council treat such a resolution as procedural and that the members govern themselves and conduct their business accordingly. In response to the invitation of the Security Council a representative of the Chinese Communist regime took a seat at the table when the Council resumed its discussion of this problem on November 27, 1950. By that time a grave situation had developed for the United Nations forces in Korea as a result of the massive intervention of military forces of the Chinese Communists. Since this situation required its urgent attention, the Security Council decided to consider Formosa and the general question of Korea together. |