that [it] rests not upon general promises which are kept by some states and ignored by other states. [and that it] is accompanied by effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means under international control which will protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions.

"We must see to it that these safeguards are so clear and explicit that there will be no question of the right of complying states, veto or no veto, to take immediate action in defense of the rule of law. "No disarmament system which leaves law-abiding states weak and helpless in the face of aggression can ever contribute to world peace and security.

"In meeting the problems of disarmament first things should come first. The first task which must be undertaken is the control of atomic energy to insure that it will be used only for human welfare and not for deadly warfare. . .

SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SURVEY OF TROOPS ON FOREIGN TERRITORY

Discussion of the disarmament problem was complicated by a Soviet proposal, originally presented without success in the Security Council, providing that Members of the United Nations report to the Council the number and location of their armed forces in foreign states, with the exception of former enemy territories.

Throughout the discussion of this proposal the United States emphatically rejected any implication that its troops stationed in friendly foreign territories-all of whom were there with the consent of the governments concerned-endangered international security or justified uneasiness among the peoples of the world. The United States made it plain that it had no desire to conceal information of the type sought in the Soviet resolution. Indeed, in his speech of December 13, 1946 the Secretary of State disclosed that fewer than 550,000 of the 5,000,000 American troops overseas on VJ-day remained outside United States territory. The great majority of them, he stated, were in Japan, Korea, Germany, Venezia Giulia, and Austria. The only combat troops remaining in friendly countries at that time were 30,000 in the Philippines, 15,000 in China, and 1,500 in Panama. Half of the combat troops in China were scheduled to return home. In Iceland we had less than 600 non-combat military personnel; in the Azores about 300.

Since the proposal was presented to assist in carrying out the terms of article 43 of the Charter, the United States and the United Kingdom insisted in the debate that the survey cover all military forces in active service wherever stationed, including those in ex-enemy areas and at home. The United Kingdom also proposed that the

information supplied should be verified on the spot. The U.S.S.R. agreed to include personnel located in ex-enemy territory but maintained that if reports were to be requested on troops at home they should be requested on all armaments as well.

The United States took the position that information on armaments should be supplied only in connection with a comprehensive international inspection and control system. It also opposed any attempt to improvise a hasty verification procedure for the troop survey.

The Political and Security Committee of the General Assembly recommended for consideration by the Assembly a resolution along the lines favored by the United States, but in a plenary session the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union again raised the issues of verification and the inclusion of armaments in the troop survey. This led to an extended debate which resulted in an impasse. Since the essential issues had already been resolved in the agreement on the disarmament resolution, the great majority of Delegations supported, instead of the plan for a troop survey, a simple resolution proposed by M. Spaak, President of the Assembly, recommending that the Security Council determine as soon as possible the information which the Members should furnish to implement the general plan for the regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Probably no single issue related to the activities of the United Nations has aroused more sustained public controversy than the question of voting in the Security Council. Defended by the permanent Members of the Council as essential to the successful functioning of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, the general rule of unanimity of those Members on important matters,1 which is embodied in article 27 of the Charter, has been criticized by other states as a major barrier to the creation of an effective system of collective security.

The debate on three items on the General Assembly's agenda provided a full opportunity for certain states to express their dissatisfaction with the operation of the Security Council under the unanimity principle during 1946. The first item, proposed by Australia, called for consideration of the application of article 27 of the Charter in the proceedings of the Security Council, including exercise of the "right of veto." The second and third, introduced by Cuba, in effect suggested that the General Assembly call a general conference of the Members of the United Nations under article 109 of the Charter, with

1See chap. III, Atomic Energy Commission.

a view to amending the Charter to eliminate the veto. The proposals were considered simultaneously by the General Assembly.

With regard to these matters the United States took a position which may be briefly summarized as follows:

(1) The principle of the unanimity of the permanent Members of the Security Council is of the highest importance for the success of the United Nations, and the reflection of this principle in article 27 of the Charter, based on the voting formula agreed to at the Yalta Conference, is valid.1 The maintenance of world peace and security rests upon the unity of those nations which formed the core of the victorious coalition against the Axis. It follows that the chief decisions affecting the maintenance of international peace must be made with the consent of those states.

(2) While it, therefore, opposes the amendment of article 27 at this time, the United States believes that the failure of the permanent Members of the Security Council to agree upon important issues before the Council frustrates the carrying out of the principle of unanimity.and leaves unsettled questions the solution of which is required in the interests of peace and security. The United States also considers that the responsibilities imposed upon the permanent Members of the Security Council under the Charter require them to make every effort to reach agreement on substantive questions before the Security Council.

(3) The United States hopes that the five permanent Members of the Security Council may find it desirable at some time in the future, in full agreement among themselves and with other members, to support modification of the unanimity requirement in its application to matters arising under chapter VI of the Charter, dealing with the pacific settlement of disputes.

(4) The United States hopes that the voting formula by which the Security Council operates may be clarified in the light of experience and practical need through the development by the Council of suitable practices and procedures which will reduce uncertainties and differences of opinion regarding its application. The United States has certain proposals to make concerning such practices and procedures but believes that the Security Council itself is the appropriate forum for their discussion.

'In his address to the General Assembly on Oct. 30, 1946 Senator Austin declared: "I wish also to make clear that the position which I am taking today in regard to the unanimity of the permanent Members of the Security Council is entirely consistent with the position taken by the United States Representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, who repeatedly has made clear that the United States proposals regarding control of atomic energy do not attack the general requirements for unanimity of the permanent Members in the Security Council."

The General Assembly conducted an extensive discussion on the problem of voting in the Security Council. Virtually all the Member states expressed their views either in the plenary sessions or in committee discussions. Many suggestions were made which may in géneral be divided into three groups:

(1) A small group of states advocated either amendment of the Charter or basic changes in the practices and procedures of the Security Council. For example, Cuba proposed to eliminate the veto completely, while the Philippine Republic advocated the elimination of the veto and the substitution therefor of some system of weighted voting.

(2) At the other extreme the U.S.S.R. favored at the most a very general resolution which would in the main express confidence in the Security Council. It opposed any reference to the divergencies in the Security Council which gave rise to the discussions and any specific suggestions for lessening those divergencies.

(3) The overwhelming majority of the Assembly, including some of the states that were willing to vote affirmatively on resolutions reflecting the above views, strongly supported a position in general accord with the views of the United States. This position, embodied in a resolution originally introduced by the Delegation of Australia and amended at various times during the discussions, was passed by the General Assembly with 36 votes, 6 negative votes, and 9 abstentions.

The resolution, after taking notice of the divergencies in regard to the application and interpretation of article 27 of the Charter, “requests the permanent members to make every effort in consultation with one another and with fellow members of the Security Council to ensure that the use of the special voting privilege of the permanent members does not impede the Security Council in reaching decisions promptly". It goes on to recommend the early adoption of practices and procedures to reduce the difficulties in the application of article 27 and to recommend further that the Council, in developing its practices and procedures, take into consideration the views expressed in the General Assembly.

Informal discussions were held among the permanent Members of the Security Council, in conjunction with the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York, in an effort to resolve certain differences of view among the permanent Members on these questions. These discussions did not produce the desired result of complete accord among the permanent Members.

There is reason to believe, nevertheless, that the discussions in the General Assembly have served to clarify the problem and that the

resolution adopted may be helpful in pointing the way toward improvements in the operation of the Security Council.

RELATIONS BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED NATIONS

In his oral report to the General Assembly on October 24, 1946 the Secretary-General noted that the Spanish question had repeatedly claimed the attention of various organs of the United Nations and remarked that as long as the Franco regime remained in Spain it would continue to be "a constant cause of mistrust and disagreement between the founders of the United Nations". The problem of relations between Spain and the United Nations was placed on the Assembly's agenda at the request of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, and Venezuela. On November 4 the Security Council removed the Spanish question from its agenda, clearing the way for unimpeded action by the General Assembly.

It was apparent that a fundamental difference of views existed on the measures which should be taken to secure the replacement of the Franco regime. The most radical suggestions, recommending a break in diplomatic relations with the Spanish Government and the imposition of economic sanctions against it, were made by Poland and the Byelorussian S. S. R. respectively.

A large group of delegations, including that of the United States, objected to any attempt to use sanctions against Spain or to intervene in Spain's internal affairs. It was the opinion of the United States that such measures would not achieve the desired objective but would merely tend to unite the Spanish people behind General Franco, and if carried sufficiently far, to produce hardship, civil war, and chaos. The United States Delegation agreed that the totalitarian regime of General Franco should be replaced by a democratic government but maintained that as long as the regime did not constitute a threat to the peace this change should be accomplished by the Spanish people themselves, and by peaceful means. The Representatives of the United States therefore urged the adoption of a resolution which, by avoiding coercive recommendations, might permit the General Assembly to act unanimously in order to produce the greatest moral effect within Spain.

In support of its position, the United States introduced in the Assembly a draft resolution which contained two positive proposals. First, it recommended that the United Nations banish the Franco regime from the organized community of nations by debarring it from membership in international agencies set up at the initiative of the United Nations and from participation in conferences or other activities arranged by the United Nations or by those agencies. Secondly, it invited the Spanish people to establish the eligibility of Spain for