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the Soviet Proposals. The United States Proposal was made on June 14. On June 19 the Soviets proposed a convention calling for the immediate outlawing of the production and use of atomic weapons and the destruction of all stocks of atomic weapons within a period of three months thereafter and the enactment of national enforcement legislation within six months. This was to be followed by further consideration by the Commission of means of exchanging information and of possible methods of control.
2. ELABORATION OF UNITED STATES PROPOSALS
The second phase ran from June 25 through July 15, during which the United States Delegation presented a series of three memoranda, which elaborated the provisions that might be contained in the treaty and the charter establishing the Authority, its detailed powers and functions, and the relations between the Authority and the organs of the United Nations. It was proposed that the international control body should have a degree of autonomy commensurate with its responsibilities, but that to the extent possible this body should be brought into close relationship with the United Nations structure. As regards relations with the Security Council, it was urged that a formula should be found which would not diminish the general powers of the Security Council relating to the maintenance of international peace and security but which would not subject the Authority to infaction through the use of the veto. The treaty should define specifically certain acts as international crimes and should provide for swift punishment of violators. It was stated that all parties to the treaty and all peoples of the world should have protection of a final and dependable character against the terrible consequences of the destructive use of atomic energy. Such protection required international machinery which could and would function quickly—machinery which would not permit an offender to be protected by his own or another's obstruction.
It was pointed out that a provision that the veto would not apply in the field of atomic energy matters would in no wise involve any compromise of the principles of unanimity of action as applied to general international peace and security problems or to particular situations not foreseeable and, therefore, not susceptible of advance unanimous agreement in the treaty. Concerning the right of self-defense under article 51 of the Charter, it was suggested that the term “armed attack” might be redefined in a manner appropriate to atomic weapons
* These memoranda are contained in International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy, Department of State publication 2702.
so as to include not only the actual dropping of an atomic bomb but also certain other steps which in themselves would be preliminary to such action.
With regard to the International Court of Justice it was suggested that the Authority might be authorized to request advisory opinions of the Court on legal matters arising within the scope of the Authority's activities, that the Authority might be authorized to be a party in cases before the Court involving legal disputes arising under the treaty, that the treaty might include provisions that the Authority and the signatory states would be bound to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court in legal disputes defined in the treaty, and that in such cases the judgment of the Court might be enforced by the Security Council.
3. ELABORATION OF SOVIET PROPOSALS
The third phase of discussion extended from July 24 through August 6. It developed that the Soviet Proposals envisaged national control of atomic energy activities in the several countries, coupled . with a convention outlawing the production and use of atomic weapons. It was proposed that the Security Council would handle any cases arising in this field which might constitute a threat to international peace and security in the same way that other threats would normally be handled by that body. No provision was made for inspection to insure compliance nor for any international machinery for control and enforcement, beyond action by the Security Council under the terms of the United Nations Charter. At this stage in the discussions, the Soviet Representative took the position that the United States Proposals were not acceptable "as a whole or in their separate parts”.
In the discussions that followed the Soviet presentation, a number of the delegates expressed doubt that the Soviet Proposals would be effective, emphasizing that there was urgent need for a system of control which would foster the beneficial uses of atomic energy while preventing its diversion to destructive ends. It was felt that a convention which would merely provide for punishments after bombs were dropped would not be enough and that emphasis should be put on a fully effective system which would prevent diversions.
4. STUDY OF THE FEASIBILITY OF CONTROL
With the views of the several delegates having been developed in some detail, the Commission turned to the Scientific and Technical Committee for a report on the technological feasibility of control. During this fourth phase further discussions of policy were suspended.
In a series of some twenty meetings, most of which were informal,
the Scientific and Technical Committee prepared its report. As unanimously approved, the Scientific and Technical Committee report concluded that, on the basis of the available scientific facts, there was no reason for supposing that effective control was not technologically feasible. No attempt was made to evaluate the political feasibility of any system or systems by which effective control could be achieved. The report was a presentation of the basic scientific and technical facts in the field of atomic energy which demonstrated that the same atomic energy activities might lead either to peaceful or to destructive ends, and that these peaceful and destructive possibilities were so intimately interrelated as to be almost inseparable. It analyzed the principal activities involved in the peaceful use of atomic energy and described the points of danger and the character of the dangers which would exist at each point unless appropriate safeguards were established against the use of atomic energy for destructive ends.
5. STUDY OF SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS
Upon receipt of this report on October 2, the Commission entered the fifth phase of the negotiations by undertaking to discuss in detail the types of safeguards that should be devised in order to meet the facts presented by the Scientific and Technical Committee report. These discussions, which were carried on in the Committee on Controls, were organized around three broad phases: 1. measures to prevent diversion of uranium and thorium and
their fissionable derivatives to destructive uses; 2. measures to prevent clandestine operations; and
3. measures to prevent seizure of plants and facilities. Within these three categories the Committee discussed the various steps in the production of fissionable material and its use for peaceful purposes, starting with raw materials. More than twenty meetings-nearly all of which were informal-were held with various technical experts participating in the discussions.
The Committee on Controls completed its study on December 26 when it adopted its report by a vote of 10-0. Poland abstained, while the U. S. S. R. was recorded as not having participated in the adoption of the report.
The report of findings of the Committee on Controls was adopted by the Atomic Energy Commission as a part of its year-end report to the Security Council. The Committee reached the important con
• The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council is in process of publication by the United Nations. The findings, in full, of the Committee on Controls will appear as part V of that Report.
clusion that an international control agency must be responsible for the system of safeguards and control. While indicating the types of safeguards that should be applied at various stages by the international control agency in the production of atomic energy, the Committee was careful to point out that its findings were not definitive but rather indicative of the types of safeguards required. The findings do not, therefore, represent a comprehensive plan for atomic energy control but only some of the elements which should be incorporated in any complete and effective system.? 6. ADOPTION OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE
UNITED STATES PROPOSALS As the Committee on Controls was proceeding with its work, the Atomic Energy Commission entered upon the sixth phase of discussion when it decided on November 13, 1946 to submit to the Security Council by December 31, 1946 a year-end report of its proceedings, findings, and recommendations.
Aware that many aspects of atomic energy control involved political considerations which could be acted upon only by the Commission itself rather than its subcommittees, the United States Representative on December 5, 1946 put forward for action by the Commission at a later meeting a series of general findings and recommendations for incorporation into the report to the Security Council.8
Meanwhile, the General Assembly had begun consideration of the general problem of disarmament. In the debates that were held on this matter, the statements made by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. V. M. Molotov, indicated that a greater measure of agreement on atomic energy control than had appeared likely earlier might now be possible.
On December 17, 1946 the Commission adopted the principles on which the United States general findings and recommendations were based, with the proviso, as put forward by the Canadian Representative, that the wording should be conformed to the pertinent wording of the General Assembly disarmament resolution of December 14, 1946.10
'The introduction to and the text of the findings of the Committee on Controls as summarized in The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council appear in the supplement.
* The speeches of the United States Representative before the Commission on Dec. 5, 1946 and on Dec. 17, 1946, as well as the general findings and recommendations as finally incorporated in the report to the Security Council are found in the supplement. .See chap. I, General Assembly. See supplement.
The sixth phase of the Commission's work was ended on December 30, 1946 when by a vote of 10 to 0, with the U. S. S. R. and Poland abstaining, the Commission approved a report to the Security Council including, in slightly amended form, the general findings and recommendations of the United States Representative.10 As accepted, these findings and recommendations constitute the basic principles of the Proposals that have been consistently advocated by the United States.
Summary of Progress In the work of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission the United States, owing to its unique position in the field, has taken the lead in providing the information essential to a reasonable understanding of the problem of control and of its Proposals. None of the information provided has been of a secret character and the requirements of national security have been scrupulously guarded.
The United States has proceeded in the belief that, once the facts of the problem are adequately known and understood, the necessity for, and the requirement of, a fully effective system of control accompanied by adequate safeguards to protect the world against the dangers of atomic warfare will be agreed to by all Members of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.
That this program of factual analysis and discussion has borne fruit is evidenced by the progress which the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission has made thus far. After the Scientific and Technical Committee had found that there was no reason to believe that control of atomic energy was not scientifically and technologically feasible, the Committee on Controls agreed upon a series of specific safeguards which would have to be included as a part of any effective system of control and concluded that an international control agency must be responsible for the system of safeguards and control. By its action on December 30, the Commission agreed on certain general findings and recommendations which are in essence the basic principles of the United States Proposals.
While the Commission has still a long way to go before a treaty can be drafted to establish a fully effective international system of control, the progress made to date is heartening. Guided by the basic principles and findings which it agreed to on December 30, the Commission can now proceed with its more detailed study of the requirements of such a system.
Unanimity has not yet been achieved, but several statements made recently by representatives of the U.S.S.R., notably the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. V. M. Molotov, in the debates on the General
* See supplement.