national community functions. Because of the force of public opinion generated by its debates it exerts a marked influence on the policies of the Member states. It sets the goals or objectives toward which the Organization is to progress, and through its general powers of surveillance it serves to some extent as a balance wheel, tending to regulate the limits and the pace of all United Nations activities.

The United States Delegation

Like the United States Delegation at the First Part of the First Session of the General Assembly, on which some of its personnel had served, the United States representation at the Second Part of the Session was bipartisan and broadly representative of the nation as a whole. Members of both Houses of Congress and important figures in public life were included in the Delegation. The Honorable Warren R. Austin of Vermont, now United States Representative at the Seat of the United Nations, acted as chairman. The other Representatives were Senator Tom Connally of Texas, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Representative Sol Bloom of New York. The four alternate Representatives included two members of Congress, Representatives Charles A. Eaton of New Jersey and Helen Gahagan Douglas of California, and the Honorable John Foster Dulles of New York and the Honorable Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois.

The Delegation was assisted in New York by Mr. Benjamin V. Cohen, Mr. Charles Fahy, and Mr. John C. Ross, serving as senior advisers; by a principal adviser, Mr. Durward V. Sandifer; and by advisers and assistants drawn from the Department of State and other agencies of the Government.

Role of the United States in Major Substantive Questions Considered by the General Assembly

The scope of the deliberations of the Second Part of the First General Assembly, together with a summary of United States policy on each important problem, is indicated below. The texts of the principal resolutions passed by the Assembly are reproduced in the Documents Supplement which forms Part II of this Report.

1. POLITICAL

ISSUES

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE REGULATION AND REDUCTION OF

ARMAMENTS

The unanimous adoption by the General Assembly of a comprehensive resolution on the principles governing the regulation and

reduction of armaments constitutes an outstanding achievement. The attainment of unanimity was the product of long and earnest efforts, through debate and discussion, to reconcile conflicting views.

The first action taken by the General Assembly in connection with the control of armaments was the passage on January 24, 1946, during the First Part of its First Session, of a resolution establishing the Atomic Energy Commission and formulating its terms of reference. On October 29, 1946 Mr. V. M. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, introduced in the General Assembly a draft resolution stating that the Assembly considered a general reduction of armaments necessary and that a primary objective of such a reduction should be the prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes. The Soviet draft resolution recommended that the Security Council take steps to provide for the achievement of these purposes. It made no mention of the Atomic Energy Resolution of January 24, 1946 or of the terms of reference of the Atomic Energy Commission, which included other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction as well as atomic weapons."

On October 30 Senator Austin welcomed on behalf of the United States the Soviet initiative in proposing further action by the Assembly on the regulation of armaments. He insisted, however, that in any system for the regulation of armaments emphasis must be placed on the creation of effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions. No general system of regulation could be effectively planned, he indicated, except in relation to the progress of the peace settlements and the establishment of collective security. One essential step was the conclusion of the military agreements called for under article 43 of the Charter so that the Security Council would have at its call the armed forces and military facilities to enforce its decisions. During the debate in committee on this subject Canada, Australia, and the United States, as well as the U.S.S.R., introduced basic proposals, and amendments were submitted by the representatives of several other countries. The draft presented by the United States on November 30, 1946 was subsequently adopted as a basis for discussion on the initiative of the Soviet Union, which ceased to press for adoption of its own resolution and offered instead amendments to the United States draft.

In its original form the United States proposal stressed three principal points: first, that the Security Council should give prompt consideration to working out the practical measures, according to their priority, which are essential to provide for the regulation and reduction of armaments and to assure that such regulation and reduction will be generally observed by all participants; secondly, that

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the Council should give first consideration to the report of the Atomic Energy Commission in order to insure that the regulation of armaments is directed toward the major weapons of modern warfare and the essential establishment of international control of atomic energy; and thirdly, that the provision of practical and effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions is essential to the regulation and reduction of armaments.

While a wide area of agreement existed on the subject of the control of armaments, it was necessary to reach accord on four essential points in the ultimate formulation of a satisfactory resolution:

(1) International Control and Inspection. The United States and other countries maintained that any resolution on the regulation of armaments should provide for the establishment of an effective system of inspection and control not subject in its operations to the unanimity rule in the Security Council. The Soviet Delegation's position that armaments control commissions should be established "within the framework of the Security Council" appeared at the outset to imply that the unanimity rule should apply in their operation. During the course of the debate in committee, however, Mr. Molotov stated that, once the commissions had been set up, they should carry out their work in accordance with the rules drawn up for them by the Security Council and that the Security Council veto would not apply.

"It should be quite obvious," he declared, "that the question of the well-known principle of unanimity operating in the Security Council has no relation at all to the work of the Commissions themselves. Consequently, it is entirely wrong to consider the matter in the light that any government possessing the 'right of veto' will be in a position to hinder the fulfilment of the control and inspections. Every attempt to obstruct the control or inspection carried out in accordance with the decisions taken by the Security Council will be nothing other than a violation of the decisions of the Security Council. That is why talk about a 'veto' in connection with control and inspection is devoid of foundation."

In view of the Soviet assurances in this regard, it was considered unnecessary to include in the text of the resolution language referring specifically to the veto.

The Assembly's resolution' therefore states only that the special organs for control and inspection established within the framework of the Security Council shall derive their powers and status from the convention or conventions under which they are established.

Thus, for the first time, the Soviet Union formally agreed to inter

national control and inspection in the regulation of armaments and to the operation of international organs of control without regard to the veto. Agreement on these two points did much to facilitate the unanimous adoption of a resolution on the regulation and reduction of armaments.

(2) Atomic Energy. Another crucial question concerned the relationship between the mechanism to be established for the control of atomic energy and any general system of arms control. The Soviet Delegation laid the greatest stress on the prohibition of the production and use of atomic weapons and advocated the conclusion of a special convention for that purpose. The United States, supported by the United Kingdom, France, Canada, and others, was insistent that there should be no interference with the work of the Atomic Energy Commission which, under the General Assembly resolution of January 24, 1946, was given a mandate to make specific proposals for the control of atomic and "all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction", and also of atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes. In the resolution as finally adopted, the Assembly urged the expeditious fulfillment by the Atomic Energy Commission of its terms of reference and recommended that the Security Council should expedite consideration of the reports to be made to it by the Atomic Energy Commission and of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspection of atomic energy.

(3) Procedure for Establishment of System. In the opinion of the United States Delegation it was desirable that the plans worked out by the Security Council for the regulation of armaments should be embodied in international agreements which would have to be approved by the states concerned in accordance with their constitutional processes. The Soviet Delegation at first suggested that the system of disarmament be established by simple decision of the Security Council but did not insist on this point. The Canadian Delegation proposed that all Members of the United Nations should consider the plans prepared by the Security Council at a special session of the General Assembly. The resolution as adopted calls for such a session to consider the plans of the Council for the regulation and reduction of armaments and for submission of the treaties approved by the Assembly to the signatory states for ratification in accordance with article 26 of the Charter.

(4) Armed Forces. In the resolution the General Assembly also recognized the close connection between international security and disarmament. With the full support of the United States and other nations, the General Assembly recommended in the resolution that

the Security Council should accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces to be provided for security purposes under article 43 of the Charter.

In the course of the Assembly's debates the Soviet, Egyptian, and other Delegations drew the Assembly's attention to the fact that the armed forces of some Members of the United Nations were stationed outside their own territories and emphasized the desirability of their withdrawal. The resolution on armaments includes a recommendation that Member states undertake a progressive and balanced withdrawal of troops stationed in ex-enemy areas. It also suggests the withdrawal without delay of armed forces stationed in the territories of Members of the United Nations without their consent, expressed freely and publicly in treaties or agreements consistent with the Charter and not contradicting international agreements.

The resolution, moreover, recommends that the Members should reduce their national armed forces to an extent corresponding to such withdrawals and, in addition, that they should carry out a general progressive and balanced reduction of national armed forces. In fact, during consideration of the resolution, its general provisions on the regulation and reduction of armaments were extended to include armed forces as well.

This Assembly resolution will not of itself secure disarmament or even the general regulation and reduction of armaments. Significant progress in this direction involves not only formidable technical difficulties but-and this is of much more consequence-the resolution of problems of the greatest political import. In the last analysis, control and reduction of armaments can be effective only so far as genuine collective security and a peaceful political atmosphere are firmly established.

Yet the action of the General Assembly is of memorable importance, because it pledges all the Members of the United Nations to support basic principles of international control and inspection in the elimination of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and in the regulation and reduction of all other armaments.

The United States supports wholeheartedly the resolution adopted by the General Assembly. Its approach to the implementation of this resolution and its understanding of the priorities established by it were outlined by the Secretary of State in an address before the Assembly on December 13, 1946, in which he stated:

"We must see to it that disarmament starts with the major weapons of mass destruction. that [it] is general and not unilateral.

1See the next section, p. 7.