DIVERSION OF URANIUM AND THORIUM FROM DECLARED Refineries AND CHEMICAL AND METALLURGICAL PLANTS

Adequate safeguards against diversion from declared refineries and chemical and metallurgical plants are possible by a system of inspection, including guards, similar to normal managerial operating controls, provided that the inspectorate has unrestricted access to all equipment and operations and has facilities for independent weighing, assay, and analysis and provided that it has the right to require the plant to be shut down for purposes of clean-up and accounting at appropriate times and to require efficient operating procedure.

At these stages, there is no fundamental difference between the processes for thorium and for uranium.

DIVERSION OF URANIUM FROM DECLARED ISOTOPE SEPARATION PLANTS

At present, it is not possible to place reliance on the method of obtaining a material balance of uranium isotopes in the case of isotope separation plants. This is one of the important reasons why there must be internal control of such plants by a director or manager and why the management must be established by and be responsible to the international control agency. Even if the material balance could be greatly improved, the inherent danger of the operation would still require management by the international control agency.

DIVERSION OF URANIUM, THORIUM, AND PLUTONIUM FROM DECLARED NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED CHEMICAL EXTRACTION PLANTS

A. At present, it is not possible to place reliance on the method of obtaining a material balance of plutonium in the case of reactors and associated chemical extraction plants. This is one of the important reasons why the chemical extraction plants and, in some cases, the reactors should be subject to internal control by a director or manager and why the management must be established by and be responsible to the international control agency. Even if the material balance could be greatly improved, the inherent danger of the operations would still require management by the international control agency. B. The safeguards required for the control of reactors will depend on their size and design and especially on their content and possible rate of production of nuclear fuel. The safeguards available to the international control agency should include licensing and inspection, supervision, and management of the operation of reactors. In addition, close supervision of the design and construction of reactors is essential in all cases.

C. Periodic inspection, together with licensing, is an adequate safeguard in the case of small research reactors and their associated chemical plants, unless their total content of nuclear fuel or potential rate of output in any area is of military significance.

D. Adequate safeguards for chemical extraction plants associated with all except small research reactors are only possible through management by the international control agency.

E. Adequate safeguards during the preparation of high-grade or pure nuclear fuels in a suitable form for insertion in secondary reactors, and, during the storage and shipment of such fuels, are only possible through management by the international control agency.

Summary of Findings on Safeguards Necessary To Insure the Detection of Clandestine Activities

A. The international control agency will require broad privileges of movement and inspection, including rights to conduct surveys by ground and air. These privileges should, however, be very carefully defined to insure against misuse.

B. Reports and returns on relevant matters will be required from national governments.

C. The international control agency should coordinate all relevant information to determine what areas may be suspected of containing clandestine activities.

D. Isotope separation plants, reactors, and chemical extraction plants as well as mines, have distinguishing features which would facilitate the detection of clandestine activities at these stages.

E. Detection of clandestine refineries and chemical and metallurgical plants is more difficult than detection of clandestine operations at other stages in the processing of nuclear fuel.

F. The detection of clandestine bomb manufacture as such is almost impossible; it is, therefore, vital that any unauthorized accumulation of essential nuclear fuels be prevented.

Summary of Findings on Seizure

Problems relating to seizure have been considered thus far only in preliminary terms. The major questions of seizure are political rather than technical. It appears, however, that technical measures could reduce the military advantages and, therefore, the dangers of seizure.

Summary of Findings on Coordination of Safeguards

A. In addition to material accounting at each individual step in atomic energy processes, the international control agency should pro

vide for material accounting checks between points of shipment and receipt of material as a means of detecting possible diversion in transit.

B. The international control agency should control the storage and shipment of uranium and thorium materials to the degree necessary for security purposes.

C. The international control agency should itself store and itself handle all enriched or pure nuclear fuel in transit. This does not necessarily imply ownership either of the materials or of the transit or storage facilities, questions which have not yet been discussed.

D. Since stocks of concentrated or pure nuclear fuel are acutely dangerous, operations at successive stages in the production of atomic energy should be so scheduled that stocks of materials in transit and in storage are minimized, but without interfering unduly with the development and effectiveness of peaceful activities.

11. General Findings and Recommendations Approved by the Atomic Energy Commission on December 30, 1946 and Incorporated in its First Report to the Security Council

[While containing certain language modifications, these General Findings and Recommendations are, in all essentials, the same as those put forward for the approval of the Commission by the United States Representative on December 5, 1946, and on December 17, 1946. In the First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council, in process of publication by the United Nations, the General Findings appear in Part II, section C and the Recommendations, in Part III.]

Based upon the proposals and information presented to the Commission, upon the hearings, proceedings, and deliberations of the Commission to date, and upon the proceedings, discussions, and reports of its several committees and subcommittees, all as set forth in this report, the Commission has made the following additional findings of a general nature:

1. That scientifically, technologically, and practically, it is feasible (a) to extend among "all nations the exchange of basic scientific information" on atomic energy "for peaceful ends",1

(b) to control "atomic energy to the extent necessary to insure its use only for peaceful purposes","

(c) to accomplish "the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons",1 and

(d) to provide "effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying states against the hazards of violations and evasions".1

2. That effective control of atomic energy depends upon effective control of the production and use of uranium, thorium, and their nuclear fuel derivatives. Appropriate mechanisms of control to prevent their unauthorized diversion or clandestine production and use and to reduce the dangers of seizure-including one or more of the following types of safeguards: accounting, inspection, supervision, management, and licensing-must be applied through the various

1

Commission's Term of Reference, art. V, Resolution of the General Assembly, Jan. 24, 1946.

stages of the processes from the time the uranium and thorium ores are severed from the ground to the time they become nuclear fuels and are used. . . . Ownership by the international control agency of mines and of ores still in the ground is not to be regarded as mandatory.

3. That, whether the ultimate nuclear fuels be destined for peaceful or destructive uses, the productive processes are identical and inseparable up to a very advanced state of manufacture. Thus, the control of atomic energy to insure its use for peaceful purposes, the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments, and the provision of effective safeguards to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions must be accomplished through a single unified international system of control and inspection designed to carry out all of these related purposes.

4. That the development and use of atomic energy are not essentially matters of domestic concern of the individual nations, but rather have predominantly international implications and repercussions.

5. That an effective system for the control of atomic energy must be international, and must be established by an enforceable multilateral treaty or convention which in turn must be administered and operated by an international organ or agency within the United Nations, possessing adequate power and properly organized, staffed, and equipped for the purpose.

Only by such an international system of control and inspection can the development and use of atomic energy be freed from nationalistic rivalries with consequent risks to the safety of all peoples. Only by such a system can the benefits of widespre..d exchange of scientific knowledge and of the peaceful uses of atomic energy be assured. Only such a system of control and inspection would merit and enjoy the confidence of the people of all nations.

6. That international agreement to outlaw the national production, possession, and use of atomic weapons is an essential part of any such international system of control and inspection. An international treaty or convention to this effect, if standing alone, would fail (a) "to ensure" the use of atomic energy "only for peaceful purposes" 1 and (b) to provide "for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions," and thus would fail to meet the requirements of the terms of reference of the Commission. To be effective, such agreement must be embodied in a treaty or convention • providing for a comprehensive international system of control and inspection and including guarantees and safeguards adequate to insure

'Commission's Terms of Reference, article V, Resolution of the General Assembly, Jan. 24, 1946.