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is prepared to recommend, in the draft report that it has been instructed to submit to us by December 20. Their inclusion in the draft report would be mandatory but not exclusive. Committee No. 2 would remain free to add additional findings and recommendations arising from their very valuable work. In other words, we are laying down certain principles to be included, by Committee No. 2, in the draft which we have directed them to submit to us. We do not attempt to exclude from that draft such other material as Committee No. 2
I doubt whether any public body ever devoted itself to its assignment with greater assiduity; with deeper understanding; and with finer devotion than has characterized this Commission since the beginning of its work. This is particularly true of the members of our Scientific and Technical Committee, who have contributed so greatly toward clarifying our understanding of this vast and complicated subject.
The further survey of the practical and operational elements of the problem by the informal group composed of our political and scientific advisers points towards a vital and, I hope, unanimous conclusion: For the protection of the world against the destructive uses of atomic energy there must be brought into existence an international control agency. Their discussions have been particularly valuable in giving an intimate and practical insight into the type and nature of controls appropriate to the various phases of atomic energy production. Thus, I need not argue these principles in detail. They are known to each and every one of us.
Upon rendering its report to the Security Council, the Commission will have completed the first stage of its assigned task. It will then, presumably, turn to the difficult questions of the organization, functions, powers, and the relations of the proposed international control agency to the United Nations and to the several states. However, before such discussions can be fruitfully undertaken, we must first establish a general framework within which the solutions will be sought. We need a determination of policy on the basis of which we can elaborate in detail the characteristics which an international con-. trol agency must have if it is effectively to fulfil our mandate. The resolutions proposed by the United States are offered to provide such a basis, in order that the work of this Commission may continue fruitfully and its past efforts not be lost. I am sure you will accept my proposals in this spirit.
I hope it is not amiss for me to point out, as a source of pride to all of us, that the comprehensive, many-sided debates in the General Assembly followed closely the proposals first outlined in this Commission. In fact, the lines of discussion paralleled the suggestions contained in the United States proposals at our first meeting. We were
all of us seeking the same goal, but it fell to the lot of my country, first, to put the ideas we all held into words we can all accept.
We have no pride of authorship, but we cannot, in justice to our trust, accept changes in purpose. We have debated long enough. Much of the discussion engendered by these suggestions already has taken place in the Assembly. The proof of their acceptance lies in the General Assembly Resolutions unanimously adopted Saturday, following strong supporting speeches by Messrs. Molotov and Bevin. The indication of our remaining duty was contained in the speech made by Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State of the United States, on Friday night. He, it was, who brought the United Nations and the public, which is so deeply interested in this Commission, to a refreshed understanding of the fact that abstractions have been debated, and it is now up to us—the Atomic Energy Commission—to present an immediate, a practical, and a realistic program.
The mandate, creating us, puts within our terrain, not merely the elimination of the atomic weapon from future wars, not merely the disposal of existing stocks and the beneficial development of the energybut, of equal importance, it asks the development of measures to prevent the use of other instruments of mass destruction.
It is my thought that these Resolutions are to be acted upon at this time. We have aocepted the duty, and we must proceed promptly to its fulfilment. We believe, and our work follows this belief, that the best way of gaining our objective is to do first things first. In the very forefront of that effort lies the control of atomic energy. If we are able, satisfactorily, to solve that vast problem, the others will come easier. As I have said, the man who says “A” can be taught to say the rest of the alphabet.
This is to be a treaty that is meant to be kept. This is to be a program for which the world has striven through all recorded history, and even before for man, in his soul, is peaceful and life-loving. Deep inside of him, he knows that he can live in security only by the force of law and never by the law of force.
Before formally moving the adoption of the Resolutions, with which you are familiar, I would very much appreciate it, Mr. Chairman, if you and the Commission would extend me a personal courtesy. There are three short changes in the language of these Resolutions as distributed on December 5 which, in the interest of clarity, I would like to incorporate into the Resolutions before I move their adoption. None of these changes alters their purpose.
The first change involves adding to the second paragraph of 3 (a) of the recommendations, the following sentence: "Atomic research for
1 See supplement.
peaceful purposes by national agencies shall be subject to appropriate safeguards established by the international authority."
The second change involves substituting in place of the last sentence of the second paragraph of 3 (e) the following sentence: "In dealing with such violations, a violator of the terms of the treaty should not be protected from the consequences of his wrong-doing by the exercise of any power of veto.”
The third change involves deleting the words “the control of” which occurred twice in the third paragraph of section 3 (a).
Copies including these changes have been placed before all Members of the Commission by the Secretariat.
10. Summary of Findings of the Committee on Controls of the Atomic Energy Commis
sion, December 26, 19461
These findings have led to the important conclusion that an international control agency must be responsible for the system of safeguards and control. They also indicate some of the essential functions of the agency. The specific control measures mentioned in the findings are not meant to be definitive but rather to be indicative of the various types of safeguards applicable at each stage. In devising a definite system of control, provision must be made for flexibility in adapting safeguards to a rapidly developing technology. Moreover, the findings are interrelated and, although the coordination of safeguards is discussed to some extent, further measures of coordination must be considered before formulating a comprehensive system of control. The findings, therefore, do not represent a plan for atomic energy control but only some of the elements which should be incorporated in any complete and effective plan.
Summary of Findings on Safeguards Necessary To Detect and Prevent Diversion From Declared
DIVERSION OF URANIUM FROM DECLARED MINES AND MILLS
Adequate safeguards against diversion from declared mines and mills are possible by a system of inspection, including guards, similar to normal managerial operating controls, provided that the inspectorate has unrestricted access to all equipment and operations and has facilities for independent weighing, assay, and analysis.
DIVERSION OF THORIUM FROM DECLARED MINES AND MILLS
Effective control of the raw material and concentrates of thorium is possible through a system of inspection similar to that found adequate for uranium.
"The First Report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council", in srocess of publication by the United Nations, Part II, B.
DIVERSION OF URANIUM AND THORIUM FROM DECLARED
REFINERIES AND CHEMICAL AND METALLURGICAL PLANTS
Adequate safeguards against diversion from declared refineries and chemical and metallurgical plants are possible by a system of inspection, including guards, similar to normal managerial operating controls, provided that the inspectorate has unrestricted access to all equipment and operations and has facilities for independent weighing, assay, and analysis and provided that it has the right to require the plant to be shut down for purposes of clean-up and accounting at appropriate times and to require efficiert operating procedure.
At these stages, there is no fundamental difference between the processes for thorium and for uranium.
DIVERSION OF URANIUM FROM DECLARED ISOTOPE SEPARA
TION PLANTS At present, it is not possible to place reliance on the method of obtaining a material balance of uranium isotopes in the case of isotope separation plants. This is one of the important reasons why there must be internal control of such plants by a director or manager and why the management must be established by and be responsible to the international control agency. Even if the material balance could be greatly improved, the inherent danger of the operation would still require management by the international control agency.
DIVERSION OF URANIUM, THORIUM, AND PLUTONIUM FROM
DECLARED NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED CHEMICAL EXTRACTION PLANTS
A. At present, it is not possible to place reliance on the method of obtaining a material balance of plutonium in the case of reactors and associated chemical extraction plants. This is one of the important reasons why the chemical extraction plants and, in some cases, the reactors should be subject to internal control by a director or manager and why the management must be established by and be responsible to the international control agency. Even if the material balance could be greatly improved, the inherent danger of the operations would still require management by the international control agency.
B. The safeguards required for the control of reactors will depend on their size and design and especially on their content and possible rate of production of nuclear fuel. The safeguards available to the international control agency should include licensing and inspection, supervision, and management of the operation of reactors. In addition, close supervision of the design and construction of reactors is essential in all cases.