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permanent member because that member can prevent enforcement action against itself. Of course this formula does no such thing. The permanent members are bound legally and morally in the same degree as all other Members of the United Nations "to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice are not endangered". In the same degree as all the other Members they are bound to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations". These sweeping and binding commitments are not limited by the power of veto in the Security Council. The veto does not legalize any violations of these commitments. They are the law.

No Member of the United Nations can be permitted to ignore the fact that, as Secretary Byrnes said on February 28, 1946, "the mere legal veto by one of the permanent members of the Council does not in fact relieve any state, large or small, of its moral obligations to act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter”. Nor does the failure of any organ of the United Nations to take a decision relieve any Member of that obligation.

Besides being bound by the law of the United Nations Charter, 23 nations, including the United States, Soviet Russia, the United Kingdom, and France, are also bound by the law of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. It makes planning or waging a war of aggression a crime against humanity for which individuals as well as nations can be brought before the bar of international justice, tried, and punished.

It is true that if one of the Great Powers violates the law of the Charter and the law of Nuremberg against aggression there is, ultimately, only one way to enforce the law-and that is by a major war. That, however, would be just as true if the Charter did not require unanimity in the Security Council. A decision involving military measures against one or more of the permanent members by other permanent members would not be a decision for police action as the Charter contemplates it, but for war.

I believe I have made clear the reasons why the United States considers that unanimity of the permanent members of the Security Council in action by the Council concerned with the enforcement of peace is wise and necessary at this stage in the development of the international community.

Criticism of article 27 is directed particularly at the fact that the requirement of unanimity of the permanent members extends to decisions concerning peaceful settlement as well as to enforcement action. It is true that the requirement of unanimity tends to reduce the

speed of action of the Security Council and increases the difficulties in the way of adopting a clear-cut decision. It may even prevent action which might peacefully settle a dispute.

On the other hand, the unanimity requirement tends to discourage the taking of intransigent positions and to encourage the achievement of agreement through compromise. Certainty is better than speed. In the long run important decisions unanimously accepted by the permanent members are likely to produce better results than decisions which find the permanent members divided. The unanimity requirement-properly applied-prevents the Security Council from being progressively committed to a course of action inconsistent with the vital interests of any permanent member.

It was these latter considerations-among others-that prevailed at San Francisco. In the Four-Power statement of June 7, 1945, to which France later agreed, the permanent members took the position that substantive decisions on peaceful settlement require the concurrence of the permanent members of the Council because of the possible consequences of those decisions. It was believed they might have major political repercussions and might initiate a chain of events which in the end would require the Security Council to invoke measures of enforcement under chapter VII.

It was held that since the Council cannot take enforcement action without the concurrence of all the permanent members, it might endanger the effectiveness of the Council's work, if decisions under chapter VI that might lead to the necessity for enforcement action under chapter VII were taken by a vote which found the permanent members divided.

Despite the attitude of the five powers and the decisions made at San Francisco, which I have described, the United States hopes that the five permanent members may find it desirable at some time in the future, in full agreement among themselves and with other members, to support modification of the unanimity requirement in its application to matters arising under chapter VI.

However, a case for amendment of the Charter ought not be made on the basis of so brief an experience. The United States is opposed to amendment of article 27 of the Charter at this time.

We must recognize that during its first nine months the Security Council has labored under unusually difficult circumstances. In its infancy, before it had established its rules and its precedents, the Council was forced to consider substantial differences among the permanent members about problems arising directly from the war.

We must remember that the Security Council-and the United Nations as a whole-was not intended to deal with the peace settlements that must be made as a result of the war. These settlements, both with

the ex-enemy states and among the major allies themselves, were left to separate negotiation. Until they have been made, differences among the major allies about the terms of settlement inevitably will handicap the work of the Security Council. As these settlements are made, we can expect that the areas of present disagreement among the permanent members will be greatly reduced.

The United States does recognize that there is room for improvement in the operations of the Security Council. There is room for improvement in the application of article 27 and of the Four-Power statement in the Security Council. There can be little doubt that a number of the difficulties which have arisen could have been avoided if the voting formula adopted at San Francisco had been more fully and clearly defined.

There has been confusion and misunderstanding both within and without the Security Council.

Necessary action by the Council for the peaceful settlement of a dispute should never be prevented by the votes of any one or any number of its members, permanent or non-permanent. In this connection, we should not forget that the non-permanent members possess six votes in the Council and that at least two of these votes are always necessary to action by the Council.

Restraint and self-discipline to avoid doing anything contrary to the letter or spirit of the Charter are essential in the application of the voting formula. This is one of the greatest challenges to conduct if we are to give strength to the United Nations for peace.

A program of interpretation and application of the voting principles which will facilitate and not hinder peaceful settlements should be pursued. Here is where clarification through discussions, definition, and regulation and practice are necessary to carry out the spirit as well as the letter of the Charter. This is a United States policy. We would not have today the laws and the institutions of the United Nations without the unanimous agreement of the Great Powers and the general agreement of all nations. We must continue that unity.

As they stand these laws and institutions offer in their entirety far greater possibilities for the establishment of a just and lasting peace than humanity has ever known before.

We have hardly begun to explore and to exploit these possibilities. That they are virtually limitless can be perceived the moment we stand back far enough to get perspective.

The Charter and the institutions of the United Nations reflect the greatest common denominator of agreement now realizable in a world of sovereign states, with differences in ideology, political and economic systems, and cultural and social traditions.

Science and technology are uniting the world as it has never been united before. Fears and suspicions must not continue to divide the peoples of the world. We must use the institutions and laws of the United Nations to banish these fears and suspicions. So far as we succeed in doing this we shall succeed in creating a world society and a world rule of law in which the veto will wither away.

This may take a long time. But there is no short-cut, no magic formula, by which we can escape the price of peace.

Only by a frequent recurrence to fundamental principles will we give to the Charter a living spirit in the moral sense of nations and of the human race.

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4. Address by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes to the General Assembly, December 13, 1946

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The United States supports wholeheartedly the proposed resolutions. I first wish to congratulate the members of the Committee by reconciling their differences and reporting the resolutions. They have made a splendid contribution to the cause of peace. I have learned too of the splendid assistance rendered the Committee by the accomplished President of the Assembly, and I know you will all join me in expressing appreciation of the efforts of the distinguished representative of Belgium, Mr. Spaak.

Ever since the close of hostilities, it has been the policy of the United States to hasten the return of conditions of peace. We want to enable the fighting men of the United Nations to return to their homes and their families. We want to give the people of all lands the chance to rebuild what the war has destroyed. There need be no concern about the willingness of the American people to do everything within their power to rid themselves and the world of the burden of excessive armaments.

In the recent past, the concern of peace-loving nations has not been that America maintained excessive armaments. The concern has been that America failed to maintain adequate armaments to guard the peace. When Hitler started the world war in September 1939, Germany had been preparing for war for more than five years. But at that time, there were in active service of the United States in the Army, Navy and the Air Force, only 330,000 men. It was our military weakness, not our military strength, that encouraged Axis aggression.

After the first World War, Japan was given a mandate over strategically important islands in the Southwest Pacific which bound her to keep those islands demilitarized. Although the evidence showed that Japan was violating the terms of the mandate, the United States delayed in building bases on islands under her sovereignty in the Pacific. The result was that when the United States was treacherously attacked at Pearl Harbor, she had no adequately fortified base in the Pacific between Pearl Harbor and the Philippines. Japan's covenant not to use the mandated territories as military bases contained no safeguards to insure compliance. Japan's covenant misled the United States, but it did not restrain Japan. That was our mistake, and we do not intend again to make that mistake.

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