connection it implies, I think, a depth of conviction which would lead to active support of the principles in question, to doing one's share to maintain them. It is to persons holding such views, and to them only, that citizenship in this country is open." (See also to the same effect, In re D-, 290 Fed. 863.) Attachment to that principle of the Constitution which calls for defense of the Constitution and laws of the United States by military force where necessary does not require that an applicant shall believe in militarism. In the instructions given to the jury in the United States District Court for Oregon by Judge Wolverton, in the case of United States v. Ruttula (not reported), where the defendant was charged with perjury in a naturalization proceeding because he swore that he was attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, when in truth he was not so attached, particularly to that principle of the Constitution providing for the maintenance of armed forces for the suppression of domestic violence or insurrection within and the resistance to armed aggression of a foreign foe from without, the court said: "You are instructed that it is a fundamental principle of the Government of the United States that every person capable of bearing arms is under a legal duty to the Government of the United States to render military service for its protection and defense without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions; unless specifically excused or exempted from such duty by law, or unless he be an ambassador or other diplomatic representative of a foreign nation, or unless he be an alien enemy of the United States. "I instruct you that where a person says under oath "I am attached to the principles of the Const tution" it is equivalent to a declaration that he is in close and steady adherence to such principles, or has fidelity thereto, or has real or strong liking therefor, or is in sympathy with such principles or believes therein, or is well disposed to the good order and happiness of the United States. The word "principles " simply means fundamental or general truths, or maxims, or settled rules of action or procedure, or governing laws of conduct, or rules exercising a generally governing or guiding influence, or reasons or sources, or motives. "In your deliberations, it is of primary importance that you distinguish between a belief or disbelief in militarism, as the term is applied as respects Germany, for instance, for aggrandizement and the increase of power for aggression, and a belief or disbelief in the principle of maintaining armed forces for repelling invasion and repressing insurrection under a republican form of government. Militarism is not a principle of the Constitution, and does not inhere in the Government, while the other principle is in ful consonace with the maintenance of the free institutions of our Government. Generally speaking, we are all in favor of peace. We are a peace-loving, not a warlike nation. Mr. Carnegie is devoting much of his vast wealth to the promotion of a world's peace, and there is an organization in this country which has for its primary purpose the establishment of an international court for the enforcement of a world's peace. In this sense, we are in favor of peace and despise war. But this also is not to be confused with the principle of our Constitution promotive of the maintenance of organized armed forces for securing peace at home against the aggression of a foreign foe and insurrection from within which are subversive to the liberties and freedom which we so ardently espouse. Peace propaganda for lending aid and comfort to a foreign foe is inimical to this primordial principle, so that persons engaged therein can not be said to be attached to the principles of the Constitution." The naturalization laws do not provide that an applicant who is incapacitated from bearing arms by age, physical condition, or sex shall be relieved of taking the oath of allegiance to support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all its enemies or relieved from showing an attachment to the fundamental principles of the Constitution and of organized government, including the principle that the Constitution and Government shall be defended against invasion and insurrection and kept in existence by force of arms if necessary. The fact that the applicant for citizenship may or may not be able to bear arms is not the sole consideration. The mental attitude of the individual toward the Government and its defense, with its necessary influence on others, is a vital matter. The importance of that is illustrated by Schenck v. United States (249 U. S. 47). The applicant's intellectual attitude toward the institutions of the country are of importance. The applicant in this case says she has "no sense of na tionalism, only a cosmic consciousness of belonging to the human family" (R. 11); also that she is "an uncompromising pacifist for whom even Jane Addams is not enough of a pacifist." The tone of the respondent's statement shows that she is an extremist. Because of her sex and age there is, of course, no possibility that the respondent would ever be called upon personally to bear arms in defense of this country, but she does not believe in other people bearing arms in defense of the country, and she is a writer, author, and propagandist by profession. She does not believe in organized government as we understand it, because organized government can not exist without military defense. She is not attached to the principles of our Constitution and Government when she rejects the fundamental principle that they must be defended by military force if necessary. She would see the Constitution and the Government of the United States destroyed by an enemy rather than have one citizen lift a finger in their defense. If every citizen believed as she does, and acted as she will, we would have no Constitution and no Government. In United States v. Manzi, 276 U. S. 463, the court said (p. 467): "Citizenship is a high privilege, and when doubts exist concerning a grant of it, generally, at least, they should be resolved in favor of the United States and against the claimant." Refusal to perform military service on account of religious scruples is not involved in this case. The respondent has no religion. The fact that Congress in enacting the selective draft law provided that persons who were already citizens and who had conscientious religious scruples against military service should be given noncombatant duties does not indicate that aliens opposed to performance of military service should be admitted to citizenship. Those conscientious objectors whom we have among our citizens are dealt with in the best way possible, but the naturalization statutes afford no ground for inferring that Congress intended to show the slightest tolerance for the individual views of alien applicants which might interfere with full and complete performance of the duties of citizenship. Congress indicated its attitude as to admission to citizenship and military service when it provided in the act of July 9, 1918 (c. 143, 40 Stat. 845, 885): "That a citizen or subject of a country neutral in the present war who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States shall be relieved from liability to military service upon his making a declaration, in accordance with such regulations as the President may prescribe, withdrawing his intention to become a citizen of the United States, which shall operate and be held to cancel his declaration of intention to become an American citizen and he shall forever be debarred from becoming a citizen of the United States." Respondent cites a number of cases holding that the making of a claim of statutory immunity from military service by an alien during the late war did not permanently disqualify him for naturalization. There are a number of district court decisions the other way, but the question here presented is different. This is not a case of an alien who has availed himself of a statutory immunity from military service. The Naturalization act requires that "it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court admitting any alien to itizenship" that he has the necessary qualifications. The circuit court of appeals had no authority to substitute its judgment for that of the district court. It may not be said, as a matter of law, that respondent conclusively established her right to admission. If the circuit court of appeals had contended itself with granting a new trial so as to allow the past record and mental attitude of this respondent to be more thoroughly searched and disclosed in the record, it would have gone to the limit. CONCLUSION It is respectifully submitted that the judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals should be reserved. WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, Solicitor General. OSCAR R. LUHRING, Assistant Attorney General. HARRY S. RIDGELY, Attorney. MARCH, 1929. The CHAIRMAN. General Fries, do you want to make a statement at this time or would you rather wait? General FRIES. I am ready. The CHAIRMAN. Very well. STATEMENT OF AMOS A. FRIES, MAJOR GENERAL (RETIRED), UNITED STATES ARMY General FRIES. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am at this time speaking in behalf of the advisory board of the American Coalition, made up of a large number of organizations, most of whom, either in our membership or their ancestors, fought to make this Government what it is and to make its citizenship desirable. The thing that we ask is this: What is it that citizenship confers that the alien hasn't to-day? He has the right to come into this country and work and receive wages, get rich, do all things, except hold office and pass on laws. Now, that would seem apparently so desirable to certain others that they want the right to help make the laws to control those who have fought to make the country what it is. He demands its rights without assuming that responsibility. We feel that the final responsibility of citizenship is the duty of a citizen to defend this country in its time of utmost peril, and we feel that one who is not willing when the time of final peril comes to do anything in his power, man or woman, whether it is fighting with a rifle or otherwise to defend the life of the Nation should not be a citizen. I was interested a little bit ago in the remark that there were 99 things, perhaps, that could be asked of a man or woman in regard to upholding the Constitution besides whether they would be willing to bear arms in war and that that person should be given credit for 99. My reply would be that there are 999 laws you can obey in this country, but if you commit a murder you are still not a good citizen. I am going to read the names of these organizations, and I want to say that the advisory board of this American Coalition authorized its representatives on that advisory board to oppose this particular bill. At a meeting of the advisory board of the American Coalition held at Washington, D. C., April 24, 1930, the following was contained in a resolution unanimously adopted: 66* * Further resolved, That Mr. John B. Trevor, chairman of the advisory board of the American Coalition, is hereby authorized to represent the American Coalition, in taking such action as may be necessary or expedient in supporting or opposing bills or amendments in the present session of Congress along the lines of the foregoing resolutions and other resolutions heretofore passed by this board." At a meeting of the advisory board of the American Coalition held at Washington, D. C., March 12, 1930, the following resolution was unanimously adopted: 66 * * * Be it further resolved, That the advisory board of the American Coalition hereby records its opposition to the following bill: "House bill 3547, introduced by Representative Griffin, which would permit aliens, not willing to perform military service to the United States in time of war, to become naturalized." The organizations represented at the above meetings or that later signed the minutes of these meetings, approving the resolutions, follow: Allied Patriotic Societies of New York. American Defense Society (Inc.), The. American Legion Auxiliary. American Vigilant Intelligence Federation. American Women's Legion. Bergen County (N. J.) Women's Republican Club. Daughters of the American Revolution, National Society. Daughters of the Revolution, National Society. Daughters of the Revolution, New Jersey State Society. Daughters of Union Veterans of the Civil War, 1861-1865. Immigration Restriction Association (Chicago). Junior Order United American Mechanics, New Jersey. Key Men of America. Ladies Auxiliary, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States. Leonia (N. J.) Women's Republican Club. Military Order of the World War. National Immigration Legislative Committee. National Patriotic Association. National Society of New England Women. National Sojourners. National Woman's Relief Corps, The. Naval and Military Order of the Spanish American War. New York City Colony, Society of New England Women. Order of Independent Americans (Inc.), State Council of Pennsylvania. Sons and Daughters of Liberty, National Council. Sons and Daughters of the Pilgrims, National Society. United Daughters of the Confederacy, New York Chapter. United States Air Force Association (Inc.). United States Daughters of 1812, National Society. Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (Americanization committee). Westchester Security League. Women Descendants of the Ancient and Honorable Artillery Company, National Society. Mr. DICKSTEIN. Do these organizations you have enumerated, General, come before this committee and place their names in opposition to certain bills pending before this committee, as a rule, where it affects immigration, and so forth? General FRIES. I haven't taken an active part in that. I only have this particular bill and certain others. Mr. DICKSTEIN. Let us take bill H. R. 3547, the bill in question. Do you want to tell this committee that all these organizations have discussed the merits or demerits of this bill before they passed a resolution condemning it? General FRIES. I shouldn't say that. I said this is the action of the advisory council, the members appointed by those organizations on this American Coalition to represent them. Mr. DICKSTEIN. In other words, just a handful of men decide that everybody else in connection with the membership of all these patriotic societies, for whom I have the highest respect, would be in accord with their mind and their spirit in opposition to this. measure they have never seen or discussed among themselves? The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Dickstein, if it is necessary to go into details, I have letters and telegrams from 397 separate and distinct organizations for presentation to the committee. Too many to even present to the committee. Mr. DICKSTEIN. That is not exactly my point. The CHAIRMAN. Where there are so many societies, they can't all speak in detail. Mr. DICKSTEIN. When it comes down to letters and telegrams, I can almost double and triple that. That is not the point I make. If these organizations honestly discussed this legislation and by resolution of their respective organizations said this would be a menace to the American interests the statement would have great merit, in my mind. Mr. JENKINS. What would you say if these organizations should each select one representative man? Mr. DICKSTEIN. How is that? Mr. JENKINS. What would you think about it if each of these organizations the gentleman has enumerated, would select one representative man and instruct him to meet with one other representative man from the other councils; and if they would-stand on what they did. Wouldn't you think that would be a representation of all these organizations? Mr. DICKSTEIN. I don't want to argue the merits of this bill, nor am I attempting to express an opinion one way or another. If we are to take testimony here from all these organizations through an individual person who claims he represents them-and I don't doubt he represents all these patriotic societies—at least the committee ought to know and the Congress ought to know whether these organizations who went on record for or against this bill, or any bill pending before Congress, had full opportunity for consideration of it. That is the point I make. General FRIES. I think that point is directly in line with the work of the National Congress. The Members of the Congress come here and they have debated these questions from the point of view of what they think their citizens believe, and if these Congressmen aren't right they generally do not stay more than a couple of years. as representatives of these organizations, don't last very long unless we pretty well represent them. We, I am not trying to represent them in detail, as I said before. Some of them, for instance, the chapter of the Military Order of the World War, at a meeting to-day at noon particularly einpowered me to speak for them, all that were there, and I was informed later that their national committee had empowered their national adjutant to speak for them in full. Many of these organizations have discussed this bill. It was sent out to many of them immediately upon it becoming known it was coming up, and I am informed that the chairman has requests from a great number of their representatives who have been duly instructed to appear here. I think also that the same point applies to the organizations named on the other side, under the National Council for the Prevention of War. Mr. GRIFFIN. Will you put in the record the names of the committee empowered to appear here? General FRIES. We will get that and put it in; yes. |