I hope that the care with which the American negotiators seem to be hedging these treaties will not give the impression that we are opposed to an effort to complete them. I hope that the Covenants on Human Rights to be produced by the United Nations will be in such a form as to command overwhelming public support and the Senate will ratify them. I have faith that the American people and their Senate will weigh them when they are completed.

The American people need be concerned with only one coercionthe force of world public opinion. If we as a people violate our own Bill of Rights and we find that world public opinion criticizes us, then we must respect that world public opinion. I do not believe this country, any more than any other country, can be above public opinion.

As for the ILO conventions referred to in these hearings, the United States has only submitted five such conventions to the Senate for ratification. All ILO conventions are limited by the Federal-State clause which is incorporated in the constitution of the ILO.

As for the Genocide Convention, the fact that the United States has not ratified, although vigorous in its denunciation of genocide, is a mystery to the 41 nations that have ratified. It has been objected to on the ground that there will be an international court before which an American can be tried. However, the language of the convention indicates that the authority of the international court is not binding upon any signatories without a further treaty which will be in effect among only those who signed it. And no court is set up by the convention.

Many people believe that it would be well for the United States to call the attention of the United Nations to a pattern of genocide which is developing in the Soviet bloc. The refusal of the United States to ratify the treaty, however, weakens its moral position to the point. where it would scarcely undertake to initiate condemnation.

Many friends of the United Nations are profoundly disturbed over the implication of section 2 of Senate Joint Resolution 1. They are afraid that the language could be interpreted in such a way as, not only to prevent the development of the United Nations, but actually to retard it from progress already made.

The nations have embarked upon a great adventure in the United Nations. This adventure had to be undertaken if the nations were not to take the road to quick destruction. The United Nations is not a superstate. True, it contains some elements of executive authority. But these are the very elements we need for an enforceable system of collective security. Basically, the United Nations contains the means of voluntary cooperation and the means by which we can voluntarily pool such of our sovereignty as necessary for security in a civilized international society, without war. In the development of this system the implications of Senate Joint Resolution 1 are alarming. There is grave doubt if, with such an amendment in the Constitution, the United States could agree on many of the controls and regulations essential, particularly in the field of collective security.

Let us take the regulation and reduction of armaments as an illustration of what we mean.

Within the last few years the Government of the United States has presented to the members of the United Nations several proposals looking to agreements for the regulation and control of atomic energy

and conventional armaments. The plans proposed include provisions for United Nations inspection and control.

The world is groaning under a burden of arms so colossal that it threatens to bankrupt all of us, and overnight is consuming resources which men should be able to devote to the finer things of life for all people over a long period of time.

You, gentlemen, are making a sincere effort to reduce Government expenditure, and yet you know that the civilian economies that can be made are infinitesimal as compared with the amounts you must appropriate for war expenditures. I support these expenditures, as necessary to the security of this country in the climate in which we live; but I hope and pray, as we all do, for an international agreement which would make it possible for us to reduce armaments to a police level which would be strong enough to control aggression wherever it appears.

But if section 2 is adopted,we might as well tell the United Nations Disarmament Commission to adjourn, for we shall have served notice upon the rest of the world that we will not permit the reciprocal or international inspection regulation, and control necessary to make disarmament possible.

"It is

It is one thing for the United States to say, "I will accept or reject proposals for pooling sovereignty as they are presented to me. another thing for the United States to say, "I have so amended my Constitution that it is impossible for me to accept arrangements for the pooling of sovereignty for the common good and the security of the United States."

The President of the United States has pledged full cooperation with Congress in carrying out the American foreign policy. Would it not be better to give him a chance to develop this cooperation without your passing this resolution? Entirely aside from the effects of the specific provisions of such a resolution, it would seem to me that there will be two disastrous psychological effects. The Senate would be indicating lack of confidence in the President and in itself. And the nations of the free world, our friends in the United Nations, would believe that the United States had decided not to continue further on the adventure of international cooperation as contemplated in the United Nations Charter.

First, the few times that I have appeared before congressional committees, I get a great satisfaction out of the privilege of an American, or the right of an American to appear before his elected representative to express himself on some important issues concerning our country. It is a great privilege, and part of the greatness of this country.

Very eminent lawyers have appeared before you. I was very much impressed with Judge Parker this morning and Mr. Lashley the other day, and Dana Backus of the Bar of the City of New York. I am not a lawyer, Senator Kefauver, and I shall leave some of the technicalities and the Supreme Court citations to those that have appeared.

I notice that there are four points to the Bricker resolution. I would like to preface my remarks by saying that I think all of us are agreed that our fundamental objective is the peace and the security of the United States of America, and second, the development of a world system of law and order, because in the long run, in a world as complex as ours, we cannot have the security of the United States protected without the degree of security for the entire world.

So I approach the subject today on what is best for the security of my country and for the development of a world community. I believe that the Bricker resolution would be inimical to the security of the United States, and inimical to the development of a world organization. As far as the first point of the Bricker resolution is concerned, that which would prevent the Senate from ratifying a treaty that violates the Constitution, it seems to me that is quite unnecessary. I cannot conceive of the Secretary of State and the President negotiating a treaty or Congress ratifying a treaty or if it got that far, the Supreme Court upholding a treaty that abridged the fundamental rights of Americans as contained in our bill of rights. So I pass over article 1 as being quite unnecessary.

Then when one comes to the executive agreements and the treatymaking power of the Senate, it seems to me that the whole, I do not say the deliberate purpose of the Bricker resolution, far from that, but the result of it would be to hinder the President and the Senate from protecting the interests of this country.

For illustration, take executive agreements. I cannot conceive of any legislation or any constitutional amendment that would curb the authority of the President to negotiate executive agreements without seriously interfering with the protection of American interests.

Too, the President in making executive agreements has some checks, as the moral check of public opinion to whom he is responsible. Congress in many cases has to implement executive agreements with appropriations and legislation. But to say in advance Congress must lay down the terms by which executive agreements can be reached, of course, if Congress had to lay down the terms for the exchange of the destroyers for the strategic bases at the time that Britain so badly needed material to defend the free world and the time that the bases were so important to our security, that executive agreement never would have been negotiated.

Hawaii and other parts of the world were taken in by the executive agreement. I am thinking of the Atlantic Pact which the Senate ratified. Article 3 contains this provision:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Now, on the basis of article 3 of the Atlantic Pact, the President has proceeded to execute certain agreements to make it possible for then General Eisenhower to accomplish his mission. If each executive agreement, for the agreement on German forces or the American commander for the Atlantic Fleet of the Atlantic Pact, if all had to come before Congress before or afterward, I think we would be very far back in the development of the Atlantic community and the NATO forces. In other words, Senator, I am of the impression that there exists now all the checks and the curbs that can be placed upon the authority of the President to conduct the business of this country in a world as complex as this and that we have to trust the President, and I cannot conceive of the Senate either by such a constitutional amendment or any legislation curbing the authority of the President to negotiate executive agreements, and to do else but to seriously interfere with his conduct of the foreign affairs of this country.

Then, if I might come to the treatymaking power of the Senate, I have the greatest respect for the Senators that have signed the Bricker resolution. I know some of them signed because they wanted to see the matter discussed, and I hope what I am saying today will make a slight contribution to the general discussion, that not all of them meant by their signature that they were giving their final approval to the passage of the resolution. But I would say to them, as I would say to any Senators, I cannot understand why the Senate today, after 166 years of American constitutional history, wants to place a limit on the power of some future Senate. It seems to me a confession of fear or weakness that is beyond me. I cannot understand it. The treatymaking power of the Senate has been pretty conservatively used. So much so that I am sure that the time has gone by when some of us wished it could be used a little more liberally. Now it is proposed that treaties might override domestic laws as treaties sometimes do for the reciprocal advantages to be gained. Not only must these treaties have the approval of two-thirds of the Senators voting, and then be passed by the majority vote of both Houses of Congress besides. It seems to me that this long and interminable delay in the treatymaking process would make it very difficult to negotiate and ratify treaties that are important to this country.

The point has been made that there is a proliferation of tretaties as the result of the specialized agencies of the United States. The ILO has been a case in point. I will not dwell on it because I understand a distinguished representative of the machinists union will testify next week, who is quite familiar with ILO agreements.

I believe the acting chairman of the committee spoke this morning and said, I have forgotten, some 90 ILO agreements, but the point was not made that the very constitution of the ILO contains a Federal-State clause, so that a nation in accepting a convention of the ILO if it is a convention that affects State legislation, must automatically be submitted to the convention for appropriate legislation to the States.

Senator KEFAUVER. I think that is a good point to bring out, Mr. Eichelberger, but I think from just the hearings I have attended here, that a discussion about the merits and demerits of the various covenants and agreements and treaties that may have been arrived at by these various and sundry organizations, many of which are subsidiaries and outgrowths of the United Nations, has no place particularly in this consideration because they, of course, are proposals that address themselves to the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. While it is well for us to be familiar with what they all provide, we are not dealing here with the merits of these proposals, but rather with the machinery for either consideration or nonconsideration of them. Is that not correct?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That is quite true, sir. Senator, I am aware that much of the sentiment for the Bricker resolution among those that favor it has been based upon some rather extreme things that have been said about the Human Rights Covenants, and the ILO. So while I realize that their merits belong in the Foreign Relations Committee, I would like to make this point. There exists now, without any amendment to the Constitution, a way of placing plenty of safeguards in treaties. The Human Rights Covenant and the covenants have not been completed, and no one knows whether the Senate should

ratify them until they are completed-at least our Government has asked that there be included, and there is no doubt that it will be included-a Federal-State clause, a clause that the treaty is not selfexecuting. In addition there is a clause now as it now stands, that a nation signing the Human Rights Covenants does not delegate any of the liberties which it now enjoys under its own constitution. I agree those are matters for the Foreign Relations Committee.

My final point is that we are engaged in an experiment in building a world community. I am one of those who believes that this community has moved magnificently in the first 7 years of its existence, and that the very stresses and strains which it is now undergoing is a tribute to its vitality and its importance. We have had in the United Nations in the last week a tremendous debate between the Soviet bloc and most of the free world led by the United States where the vote was resolved in our favor of 41 to only 5 against. I realize my purpose here is not to make a case for the United Nations. That is not necessary to you, sir. I do want to say that we have embarged upon a great adventure of building a community of nations. The United Nations is not a superstate. It is not a world government. True, the United Nations does have some elements of executive authority, and those are elements in the field that is particularly necessay for the prevention of aggression and the preservation of peace.

The United Nations is fundamentally a means of cooperation and where the nations may jointly, voluntarily agree to pool some of their sovereignty at any particular time as is necessary for the making of

peace.

The greatest sacrifice of sovereignty that we have offered and challenged the rest of the nations to accept was the Baruch plan for the control of atomic energy which would have set up an authority for the inspection, management, and even the ownership of dangerous weapons. It went far in the sacrifice of sovereignty. But it was a voluntary pooling of sovereignty necessary for the preservation of peace. More recently we have proposed the United Nations Disarmament Commission, a system of progressive disarmament. Each successive stage is to be taken by a census of arms and inspection and control. Today the world is groaning under a burden of armament which threatens our liberites and our economies and our peace. I believe these appropriations and arms expenditures are absolutely necessary, I support them, until the world can have an arms limitation agreement. That agreement can only come about as we develop international police forces, as we develop progressive disarmament with adequate inspection and control. And as Bernard Baruch has said, to be firm in punishment for violation. There was even punishment for individuals of nations who violated the atomic-energy agreement. As I read article 2 of the Bricker resolution, where it is impossible to ratify a treaty that confers upon the international organization authority over Americans within the United States-rather difficult wording and hard to understand, and second, on the matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.

I frankly, Senator, do not believe that we could have a convention for the control of atomic energy or weapons and armaments if it provided for United Nations inspection, which means United Nations inspectors, visiting this country as well as the Soviet Union and else