Mr. SMITHEY. That is one reason why I prefaced my remarks some time ago with the question as to whether you were or were not a lawyer. I did not mean to put you on the spot or in any wise embarrass you.

Now, Mrs. Berg, just how effective do you think this power of the Congress to provide appropriations, insofar as executive agreements are concerned, is? When the Congress is presented with a fait accompli, and the President might have already put certain funds into a project, is it correct to say that the Congress has a real power there to change that executive agreement by refusing to appropriate money? Mrs. BERG. I say clearly that they have a right to refuse to appropriate funds. I certainly would say clearly they do. I do not think there is any question about it. They have only to say they will not do it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it would be justified today in refusing to appropriate money for the boys in Korea?

Mrs. BERG. No, of course not. I don't believe that was the result of an executive agreement. I do not believe it was. I mean, that the action in Korea is not the result of an executive agreement.

Mr. SMITHEY. Did the Senate make any agreement?

Mrs. BERG. To what?

Mr. SMITHEY. To send the troops to Korea.

Mrs. BERG. They did not make any agreement, but we entered into a United Nations treaty, and the Security Council voted on that action. Inasmuch as we were committed to that we therefore became involved in the action. That is as I understand it.

Now, I would like, if I may, to get a point of clarification here. I have been unable to determine from reading this proposed amendment how this would affect a future Korea action. What part of the United Nations Charter would be invalidated by this proposed amendment? I haven't the answer to that.

It seems to me that we have only two choices on the effect of this on the United Nations Charter: one, that we should never engage in collective security-I do not know whether you believe we should or should not-or, two, that the United States representative on the Security Council should consult with the House and Senate as well as with the Executive. I think it must be one of the two things. So, I do not know, and I think it would be very helpful to our association and possibly to the people here to know what effect Senate Joint Resolution 1 would have on the United Nations.

Mr. SMITHEY. Switching to another point on the subject of treaties, you several times, at least twice that I recall during the course of your testimony, made reference to the fact that we would subject ourselves to a charge of hypocrisy if the Bricker amendment were to be adopted as a part of the Constitution.

Mrs. BERG. That is right.

Mr. SMITHEY. Now, let me ask you if you know that the Netherlands has just recently adopted a constitutional amendment which would permit its participation in the European defense community? Are you aware of that?

Mrs. BERG. No, I wasn't, of that particular point.

Mr. SMITHEY. Would you advocate that the United States participate in such an organization by treaty rather than by constitutional amendment?

Mrs. BERG. I would not at this point advocate and I speak for myself now because this is a question that was not discussed by the committees that we participate in any one of these plans that I mentioned. I would say, however, that the United States Constitution is designed to be a permanent document. We do not know when if ever, in the future it might be necessary to have collective security when, for instance, Canada and the United States and Mexico might need to. I do not say that they do now, but why positively prohibit it? If this is enacted and becomes an amendment to the Constitution then it would be necessary, before we could take this action, to amend the Constitution. We have no way of anticipating whether it would or would not happen. If it did, then we would be faced with one of two things, either ignoring the Constitution, which we could not do, or we would have to amend the Constitution to take this out:

Mr. SMITHEY. Which is what Holland did.

Mrs. BERG. I think that is very cumbersome and very dangerous. Mr. SMITHY. Apparently the Dutch did not think so because they did it. But aside from that

Mrs. BERG. Why add something to the Constitution?

Mr. SMITHEY. The point I am getting at is you are eventually advocating, are you not, that if we get into some kind of a scrape here, now unforeseen and undescribed, eventually we accomplish these things, joining in a European defense community or pooling our sovereignty of becoming a part of a collective armed effort, that we do so by treaty. Is that not what you are advocating?

Mrs. BERG. Well, I do not know how else it could be accomplished. Mr. SMITHEY. By constitutional amendment, the same way Holland

did it.

Mrs. BERG. Mr. Smithey, if I may, excuse me. This is a point about which I feel rather strongly.

Certainly, I do not think that we should be meddling around with the Constitution, that is, passing an amendment to the Constitution, with full knowledge that at some future date we would want to amend it. Otherwise, we would have a document that would be pages and pages and pages longer than it is. Under that argument you could say, use a constitutional amendment every time you wanted

of a law passed.

any kind

Mr. SMITHEY. Let me ask you this, then: Do you think that we could under the present Constitution, go into a defense community such as the European defense community without the enactment of a constitutional amendment?

Mrs. BERG. I think we could by treaty, could we not?

Mr. SMITHEY. That is what I am asking you. Do you think we could?

Mrs. BERG. Yes, I think we could.

Would you like to enlighten me further?

Mr. SMITHEY. I do not propose the questions for the purpose of enlightening you. I just want to get your ideas on the record.

Mrs. BERG. I would, for the record, like to make it clear that any matters of policy, in support or opposition to any ideas set forth here, are not the ideas of the two committees concerned. I delivered a statement for them. It is my purpose, as the result of my work in this and with this, to attempt to answer or to clarify, however I might do it. Mr. SMITHEY. In other words, you do not pledge the organization

which you here represent that it is their idea that this could be and should be at some future time the subject of a treaty, that is, the joining of a European defense community or some similar organization? Mrs. BERG. That is perfectly correct, thank you.

Mr. SMITHEY. Mrs. Berg, I want to revert for just a moment for a couple of questions to the subject of executive agreements to see what you think. What power do you think the Congress had after the Yalta and Potsdam agreements had been made to change the provisions of those executive agreements so far as they affected the Curzon Line in Poland or the cession of part of Sakhalin Island off Japan? Mrs. BERG. It is my understanding that the decisions as to boundaries were to await final peace treaties.

Mr. SMITHEY. Do you think that now, short of war, we could oust Russia from those territories?

Mrs. BERG. As I stated in my prepared statement-and here I speak for the association-the criticism of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements is in the failure to live up to the agreements, not in the agreements themselves. And this would not be changed even if it had been passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Mr. SMITHEY. The point at which we differ, I think, is that I doubt if the Senate of the United States would have approved the drawing of the boundary at the point at which it was drawn, or the cession of Sakhalin Island. I think Senator Dirksen has so indicated in previous questioning before the committee.

Mrs. BERG. I see nothing in this that would affect purely external treaties. Is that correct?

Mr. SMITHEY. We are speaking now of executive agreements. I think section 4 very definitely affects the external aspects of executive agreements.

Mrs. BERG. It says "shall be subject to the limitations imposed on treaties." The limitation imposed on treaties by this article is on the internal aspect, not on the external.

Mr. SMITHEY. I think you have ignored the first sentence, which is the sentence I have reference to.

Mrs. BERG. Well, we do not know in what manner and to what extent they might be prescribed by law. I think that is pure speculation. It is not spelled out here.

Mr. SMITHEY. It certainly confers the full power on the Congress to determine in what manner they shall be made.

Mrs. BERG. That is right, but your statement is not necessarily

correct.

Mr. SMITHEY. So that it is perfectly possible for the Congress, then, to prescribe the lengths to which the President may go in executive agreements, so far as external affairs are concerned.

Mrs. BERG. Then we get back to our basic disagreement, I would say, that is, that under your interpretation of this resolution, or under your interpretation here, the executive power to make executive agreements would be virtually tied or could be completely nullified. You would be putting an extra burden on Congress by that very act. But I repeat, we cannot tell from section 4 what kind of restrictions would be put on it. It is a blanket authority to put any kind of restriction on, but we do not know what kind of restrictions those would be.

Mr. SMITHEY. I do not think that I have ever indicated that we knew what kind of restrictions there would be. My question went to the point which you apparently did not see originally, that the Congress could, under this first sentence of section 4, limit the power of the President to make executive agreements with respect to external affairs.

Mrs. BERG. Then I misunderstood you because it was my opinion that you were stating that the Congress would not have approved these boundaries. Then it was a misunderstanding.

I am going to feel like an international lawyer before I get out of here.

Mr. SMITHEY. I do not mean to embarrass you at all. I do want to get your ideas, and the ideas of your organization on the record, if I

may.

With respect to treaties, section 3, I think you will find, provides that the treaty shall become internal law in the United States only through the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress. Now, is your organization against that section of the amendment?

Mrs. BERG. At this point, I would be forced to speculate on what the association policy decision would be on this. My thought would be that in view of extradition, for instance, where it might be necessary for the United States, in order to gain protection for its citizens abroad, to give protection to their citizens within the United States.

Mr. SMITHEY. That would not really prohibit that sort of a treaty, would it? Would you read it again?

Mr. BERG. I guess I was referring to section 2. I had a note on this. Mr. SMITHEY. So far as you are aware, your organization has taken no position with respect to section 3, then, has it?

Mrs. BERG. I would be forced to check that, but I would be happy to let you know. May I do that?

Mr. SMITHEY. Certainly, we would be glad to have you do so.

Mrs. BERG. I will make a note of it. Perhaps if it were not in this entire context they might take a different view. I am not sure about that.

(The material referred to appears at the end of Mrs. Berg's testimony.)

Mr. SMITHEY. The point that I was leading up to ultimately was, Mrs. Berg, do you think that we ought to be in any respect different from other federal states such as Canada, whose laws provide that a treaty shall not become effective as domestic law or internal law until such time as the legislature of Canada sees fit to enact law in furtherance of those treaties?

Mrs. BERG. I believe that this is a point that was brought out in the hearings on Senate Joint Resolution 130, and if I recall correctly, a distinction was made between the forms of government; that is, whereas we have a separation of power, it is not proper to compare it to Great Britain and France, where the executive and legislature are, for all intents and purposes, one and the same, that is, they do not have the same separation of power that we have.

Mr. SMITHEY. Do you think it is wrong to compare it with Canada, which is a federal state relationship as we are here?

Mrs. BERG. Would the committee indulge me just one moment?
The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mrs. BERG. I have just consulted with our international associate. She is not a member of the International Relations Committee of the AAUW, but inasmuch as we have two purposes here, to be helpful as well as to oppose, I think that it would be not a service to this committee for me to speculate on what our answers might be.

It is the opinion of our international associate that it is not relevant to compare our Government with our governments, that it has nothing to do with this particular provision which is our point at this moment. Mr. SMITHEY. All right, Mrs. Berg.

It

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions to ask Mrs. Berg. The CHAIRMAN. Could you not get more on this last answer? does not make sense to me. I would like to have her answer it more completely.

Mrs. BERG. Would the committee permit me to ask Miss Bornholdt to speak to this particular point, just to this one point? She is our international associate.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not that important. That will be all right. Mrs. BER. Thank you very much, senator.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Berg. We appreciate your appearing here today.

(The matter referred to is as follows:)

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT BY THE LEGISLITIVE PROGRAM COMMITTEE AND THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN, MARCH 12, 1953

Section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 1 reads as follows:

"SECTION 3. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through the enactment of appropriate legislation by the Congress." We are opposed to this section as a Constitutional Amendment whether or not included as a portion of Senate Joint Resolution 1 on the ground that it is unnecessary. Under existing law, a treaty may be either self-executing or non-selfexecuting. If it seems desirable to make a treaty non-self-executing, a provision to that effect can be incorporated into any treaty. In 165 years of experience there has been no evidence of abuse of this discretionary power. We believe it is important to retain this freedom of choice in the treaty-making process. Mr. SMITHEY. Is the representative of the Students for Democratic Action here?

(There was no response.)

Mr. SMITHEY. Mr. Fred Nielsen?

(There was no response.)

Mr. SMITHEY. Is a representative of the Queens County Bar Association present?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who else is going to testify, and when?

Mr. SMITHEY. Senator, we have scheduled tentatively a hearing for Friday with certain governmental witnesses. Their appearance has not been confirmed, so I suggest we not announce them at this time. There is a hearing scheduled for Monday, the 16th, at 2:00 p. m. The organization which is to appear on the 16th indicated that that would probably be the best date for the appearance, and the hearing was so scheduled.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have it on the 16th. Now, my understanding is there will be no more witnesses allowed to testify after the 16th!