II. SUPPORTING ILLUSTRATIONS A. Supervision by international body of plants and production of atom bombs, submarine, or bacteriological weapons, in consideration of reciprocal concessions by Russia; B. Permission for large Allied military installations on our soil, and furnishing of bases and related authority to foreign powers or to NATO, and permitting administration; C. Acceptance of rights to supervise and control bases, areas maintained on foreign soil, and other privileges and exemptions, such as are enjoyed in Newfoundland, Bahamas, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Iceland, and Greenland; D. Trial of our own soldiers for criminal offenses, as in England, China, India, and France; E. Permission to foreign power to supervise and control military cemeteries, within the United States, free from local burial regulations; F. Would impair power to make agreements to deal with aggres sors; G. Adherence to existing agreements for enforcement measures, against acts of aggression such as economic sanctions; H. Participation in the International Monetary Fund Agreement; J. Allocation of radio frequencies through the International Telecommunications Union; K. Quarantine against spread of disease pursuant to World Health Organization regulations. If serious expectations are still entertained concerning the first of these illustrations, they are attributable to incurable optimism. The protection of salmon may fall within the field of constitutional principle applicable to migratory birds; but, with that possible exception, the burden rests upon those who allege that the preventive and remedial measures they contemplate cannot be encompassed within the legislative area. And that is where we find the International Monetary Fund Agreement. Concern expressed for the effects upon this agreement reflects the authors' further misapprehensions. They say: Under section 2, the United States could not take part in the International Monetary Fund Agreement. Provisions such as the article barring a change in the par values of the respective currencies of fund members except under specified circumstances, submit domestic matters to international control. The President was explicitly authorized by the Congress to accept these articles of agreement on behalf of the United States. By joining the fund, the United States thus agreed not to exercise one of its powers without the concurrence, under certain circumstances, of an international organization. While the Congress retains its constitutional power "to coin money [and to] regulate the value thereof," the good faith of the United States is pledged internationally to a measure of forbearance in the exercise of this power. The language descriptive of the power of the Congress in respect of the monetary system is taken from article I, section 8, clause 5 of the Constitution; and it is believed that this power is nondelegable. The enabling act does not seem to fortify the authors' position. Article IV, section 1, of the agreement sets gold and the United States dollar as the standard by which other currencies shall be measured. •Bretton Woods Agreement Act (Statutes at Large, ch. 339, Public Law 171). Article IV, section 5, contains various provisions for proposals of currency changes in cases of "fundamental disequilibrium," as does section 7 of the same article. The Congress took cognizance of all these provisions, and its own responsibilities, and expressed it in section 5 of the enabling act (supra). This reads, in part: SEC. 5. Unless Congress by law authorized such action, neither the President nor any person or agency shall on behalf of the United States **** (b) propose or agree to any change in the par value of the United States dollar under article IV, section 5 or article XX, section 4, of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund, or approve any general change in par values under article IV, section 7. The writers of that objection do not seem to have studied the statute very carefully and the point that I would here make is that what they are objecting to or declaring impossible was accomplished through the orderly process of legislation. Sections 3 and 4 of the resolution represent imperative constitutional needs. They are too multifarious for enumeration, and so broad and complex in their implications as to defy appraisal. It is perhaps little wonder that, in their defensive efforts, the authors of the statement have been misled into grievous error. Concerning an historic agreement through which the transfer of 50 destroyers and other war materiel to a nation at war was effected, they assert that: Wendell Willkie, Republican candidate for President at the time, supported the agreement when announced. This hardly comports with the record. Immediately following the announcement, Mr. Willkie said: The country will undoubtedly approve of the program to add to our naval and air bases and assistance given to Great Britain. It is regrettable, however, that the President did not deem it necessary in connection with this proposal to secure the approval of Congress or permit public discussion prior to adoption. The people have a right to know of such important commitments prior to and not after being made. We must be extremely careful in these times when the struggle in the world is between democracy and totalitarianism not to eliminate or destroy the democratic processes while seeking to preserve democracy. It is the contention of the totalitarian rulers that democracy is not effective. We must prove that it is effective by making full use of its processes. Congress has constitutional functions as important. and sacred as those of the Chief Executive." Two days later, he said: In discussing President Roosevelt's transaction with the British Government, Mr. Willkie said it was an arbitrary use of power, contrary to the spirit of American laws and institutions, adding that he favored all possible aid to the British short of war. "The trouble is that it establishes a dangerous precedent," he said. "We don't know what the President may trade away next without the consent of Congress. If he is reelected he may trade away the Philippines without consulting Congress. It is a hazardous proceeding." 8 And on the following day: "Within the last few days the United States has transferred 50 destroyers to Great Britain in return for air and naval bases," said the Presidential nominee. 7 New York Times, Sept. 4, 1940, p. 1, col. 3. Op. cit., Sept. 6, 1940, p. 16, col. 3. "Now leaving out of account the advantages or disadvantages of the trade, the method by which that trade was effected was the most arbitrary and dictatorial action ever taken by any President in this history of the United States. It has been compared to the Louisiana Purchase. In the Louisiana Purchase, Thomas Jefferson considered the matter of a constitutional amendment. He finally decided it was not necessary and secured the approval of Congress. "This trade is the most dictatorial action ever taken by any President. It does us no good to solve the problems of democracy if we solve them with the methods of dictators or wave aside the processes of democracy. "If I am elected President of the United States I will lean over backward to bring about restoration of democratic processes.' I have quoted Mr. Willkie at length, not alone to disabuse the minds of the authors of the statement, but rather to set forth a declaration of principles, that cannot be improved, that should guide our national and international relations, if liberty is to be maintained. A lifetime of study and observation has ever deepened the conviction that men have devised no political system, that, in its assurance of natural rights, transcends, or equals the representative. Its erosion must. be resisted. No one can be more conscious of the magnitude of the problems here under discussion, and the inadequacy of his own effort, than this writer. That treaties and other international engagements can be more safely and effectively consummated and administered through the cooperation of the executive and legislative branches of the Government, I have sought to make its underlying theme. We then have the balance of efficiency with deliberation; neither must be sacrificed to the other. Executive usurpation of these prerogatives will spell eventual disaster. All of which is respectfully submitted. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed. Are there any other witnesses to testify? Mr. SMITHEY. Mr. Gunther who asked to be heard today has submitted a telegram requesting permission to file a written statement. The CHAIRMAN. We will notify him to get his brief filed not later than March 4. Mr. SMITHEY. This is a telegram from former Dean Manion of Notre Dame. The CHAIRMAN. Send him a warm telegram thanking him and have this filed with the proper heading. (The telegram referred to is as follows:) Senator WILLIAM LANGER, Chairman Judiciary Committee, LOS ANGELES, CALIF., February 24, 1953. United States Senate, Washington, D. C.: Regret that speaking engagements here will prevent my presence in Washington to testify before your distinguished committee in its hearings on Senate Joint Resolution No. 1. In lieu of my oral testimony will you please include in the official record the following statement from me: "I am convinced that a constitutional amendment is necessary to protect personal rights, States rights, and the independence of the United States from the threatened supremacy of treaty law. "In my judgment the most concise and appropriate language for such an amendment is that proposed to the Senate Judiciary Committee by the Peace and Law Committee of the American Bar Association. To meet its objective the amendment should provide that any provision of any treaty or executive agreement which conflicts with the Constitution of the United States shall ⚫Op. cit., Sept. 7, 1940, p. 8, col. 1. be void and of no effect. It should further provide that no treaty or executive agreement shall become effective as internal law of the United States until implemented by legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty or treaties. "Such language would protect the constitutionally established jurisdiction of both the States and the Federal Government without impairing the foreign relations of the United States. "In the last 2 years I have spoken on this subject in practically every State in the Union. I know first hand that the rank and file of our citizens are seriously shocked to learn that a treaty may change or supersede the Constitution of the United States. Their reaction is invariably to demand that this dangerous siuation be corrected by appropriate constitutional amendment. I am deeply obliged to your honorable committee for its permission to include this statement in its record." CLARENCE MANION. The CHAIRMAN. I want the record to show that there is going to be no delay in this matter, Mr. Smithey. You notify everybody who wants to testify that we are going to finish taking testimony on March 4. If Secretary Dulles, Attorney General Brownell, and Secretary of Defense Wilson cannot testify before that time, they will have to file their statements because that is the day we stop. Will you see that every member of this committee gets a copy of all this testimony. We will set March 11 at 10 o'clock in the morning, which will give them nearly a week to read the record, as the time for the calling of a meeting of the subcommittee for what I hope to be final action on this matter. Members of the Bar Association Committee will take notice. In other words, we are not going to fool around with this thing at all. We are going to get rid of it. You will find down here that one of the worst things that can happen in the Congress is this matter of delay and dilatoriness. We want to get this thing cleaned up because we have other amendments of the Constitution to take up. What about this lady who was to testify tomorrow morning? The CHAIRMAN. Did she previously announce she wanted to testify? Mr. SMITHEY. All right, Senator. The CHAIRMAN. That will be the last day she will have. If she is not here then she will be barred, and that is true of anybody else. The meeting is adjourned. (Thereupon, at 2: 15 p. m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., Wednesday, March 4, 1953). TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 1953 UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, D. C. The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a. m., in room 424, Senate Office Building, Hon. William Langer, chairman of the committee, presiding. Present: Senators Langer, Dirksen, Butler, and Kefauver. Present also: Senators Watkins and McCarran; Wayne H. Smithey, subcommittee counsel. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Mr. SMITHEY. Senator, before we proceed with the list of witnesses this morning, we have received a statement of the national board of the Young Women's Christian Association for inclusion in the record. May that be received, sir? The CHAIRMAN. Yes, file it. (The material referred to follows:) STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF THE YOUNG WOMEN'S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION ON SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 The national board of the Young Women's Christian Association is opposed to adoption of Senate Joint Resolution 1 for the following reasons: We believe that the constitutional amendment proposed by this resolution is not necessary to safeguard the constitution of the United States and the conduct of foreign relations. We believe that existing safeguards such as the following are adequate: (a) the Senate may accept or reject any treaty, it may remove unwise articles in a treaty, it may attach reservations or understandings to a treaty; (b) the Supreme Court may declare a treaty unconstitutional; (c) any treaty may require legislation to make it effective as internal law in the United States or the Senate may add such a requirement when it give its approval; (d) legislation by the Congress is often necessary to make executive agreements effective (for example, appropriation of funds) and in any event a subsequent act of Congress may override such agreements. We believe that the proposed constitutional amendment is unwise, even dangerous, in that it would tie the hands of our Government in carrying out its foreign policy and in promoting international cooperation. This is an unthinkable risk in such crucial times as these. We believe that this amendment in undesirable in that it would place limits on the power of the United States to accept certain commitments which are to our own advantage-for example, use of international courts for peaceful settlement of disputes, protection of American citizens in cases before the International Court of Justice, regulation of international air traffic, negotiation of reciprocaltrade agreements. It is the earnest hope of the national board of the Young Women's Christian Association that this resolution will be rejected by your committee. The CHAIRMAN. I call attention to the representatives of the American Bar Association and to anyone else that is here in this room and |