the United States, in the same manner as the articled seamen of the vessel.1 The certificate of the consul is prima facie evidence of the refusal of any master to take a seaman on board, and of all the facts stated in the enacting clause, which are necessary to bring the case within the penalty. If a seaman be entitled to the privileges of an American seaman, and be destitute, the consul is the proper judge as to the ship on board of which he should be placed for his return to the United States; and the fact that the seaman has deserted from his ship, and that she is lying in port at the time when he becomes destitute, does not supersede the authority of the consul to require another American ship to bring him home.3 Congress have legislated further upon the unlawful discharge of mariners abroad. The Act of 1825, chapter 276, section 10, provides, " that if any master or commander of any ship or vessel, belonging, in whole, or in part, to any citizen or citizens of the United States, shall, during his being abroad, maliciously and without justifiable cause, force any officer, or mariner, of such ship or vessel, on shore, or leave him behind, in any foreign port or place, or refuse to bring home again all such of the officers and mariners, of such ship or vessel, whom he carried out with him, as are in a condition to return, and 1 United States v. Sharp, 1 Peters's Circ. C. R. 118. 2 Mathews v. Offley, 3 Sumner's R. 115. 3 * Ibid. Foreigners, while employed as seamen in the merchant ships of the United States, are deemed to be "mariners and seamen of the United States," within the language and policy of this Act. The fact that such a foreigner became destitute by desertion from the ship, does not deprive him of the protection of the Act, unless followed up by engaging in some foreign service. Ibid. willing to return, when he shall be ready to proceed on his homeward voyage, every master or commander, so offending, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine, not exceeding five hundred dollars, or by imprisonment, not exceeding six months, according to the aggravation of the offence." 66 To constitute the offence here described, the forcing on shore must be done both "maliciously" and without "justifiable cause." Maliciously," in the sense of the statute, means not merely a wicked, malignant and revengeful act, such as in cases of murder constitutes malice; but if the act be wantonly done, that is, with a wilful disregard of right or duty, it is, in the sense of the statute, malicious. It must be a wilful act, done contrary to a man's own convictions of duty.' What would be a 'justifiable cause," under the Act, is not, it seems, every cause which would justify a discharge by the general principles of the maritime law. The right to discharge a seaman, under this Act, has been considered by Story J. to result only from what may be deemed a moral necessity, analogous to the cases put in the statute. The right arises only under extraordinary emergencies and in extreme cases, where otherwise the safety of the officers or crew, or the due performance of the voyage, or the regular enforcement of the ship's discipline, would be put in jeopardy.2 The measure of damages recoverable by a seaman, in case of a wrongful discharge, will be considered in a future chapter. 1 United States v. Ruggles, 5 Mason's R. 192. 1 Sumner's R. 394. 2 United States v. Coffin, ut supra. United States v. Coffin, CHAPTER I. OF THE MASTER'S RELATION TO THE VESSEL AND ITS OWNERS. THE Master of a merchant vessel is that officer, to whom is entrusted the entire command of the ship, and between whom and the owner or owners, by the fact of his appointment and by operation of law there arise certain peculiar relations, imposing upon each mutual obligations towards the other, and towards third persons. The master's appointment may take place in several ways. If there be but one owner of the vessel, he alone of course appoints the master. If there are several owners, the control of such a vessel is vested by law in the majority in interest, and such majority have the right to appoint the master. The master himself, too, has power to appoint a substitute in a foreign port, if dangerously ill, or if he is obliged from other controlling reasons to leave the vessel; for although it is a general rule that agencies of this kind cannot be delegated, yet the maritime law has established an exception in favor of commerce, in this particular case. So, too, the consignees of vessel 1 1 Bell's Comm. p. 413. Pothier, Louages Mar. n. 49. The Alexander, 1 Dods. Adm. R. 278. |