immaterialist in one, of two situations-either to renounce his doctrine, or to submit, unconditionally, to the hypothesis of the Review before quoted, and of the Cambridge Advocate -that life cannot, even in the instances above given, result from organization; and that, consequently, the minutest atom of animal life is inhabited by an immaterial soul. To us the attenuated form of evil spirits-which are said to be so minute that 20,000 of them can dance a sarrabrand on the point of a needle, without jostling each other—is rationality compared with such monstrous doctrines. But to have, in plain language, from such parties, such a concession, we hold to be most important to the argument. We are willing to allow that it is the system, and not the advocates, which has yielded us this essential service; for although some of the ancient defenders of the soul confined its possession to man, because of his mental powers, yet, this position having been overthrown by reference to the sagacity of the brute tribes, the parties whose arguments have had any claim to consistency, feel themselves, compelled either to acknowledge the materiality and mortality of man; or, the immateriality and immortality of the whole animal creation!

But it is said, by a" Medical Student of Oxford University," and also by other similarly inconsistent immaterialists, that the Cambridge Advocate, and his supporters, have admitted, as well as contended for, too much; and that mere "life" may be conceded to matter that it may be organized; but that mental manifestations-that reasoning powers-bespeak the want and necessity of spiritual agency, and that such agency is confined to human beings; that being the cause of their passions, as well as the foundation of their immortality. We meet this position precisely upon the same principles of argument as we have done the foregoing; and are prepared to shew that if mind be the criterion by which the argument for an immaterial immortal soul is to be tried, a reference to the brute creation must destroy this branch of the system; for it will be found that the exercise of mental powers, of memory, of deliberation, and of extraordinary sagacity is not confined to man: in proof of this we might instance the oft-repeated cases of the sagacity of the elephant, the talent displayed by the ourang outang, the art and calculation of the fox, the ingenuity and ability of the beaver; which latter animals, in addition to the skill displayed in the erection of their huts, and laying out of their villages, are said to exist under a well regulated, democratical form of government!

Instances too occur in animals of inferior estimation. Of the carrier pigeons many singular circumstances are related. Pliny states that Brutus employed pigeons during the siege of Modena, to keep up a correspondence with the besieged; and in the east they are now used in conveying information to and from the several seats of government. The Ettrick Shepherd, Mr. Hogg, relates of one of his dogs, that when he was "scarcely a year "old, and knew so little of herding, that he had never "turned sheep in his life; but as soon as he discovered that "it was his duty to do so, and that it obliged me, I can "never forget with what anxiety and eagerness he learned "his different evolutions; he would try every way, delibe"rately, till he found out what I wanted him to do; and "when once I made him understand a direction, he never "mistook or forgot it. Well as I knew him he often astonished "me, for when hard pressed, in accomplishing the task "which was set him, he had expedients of the moment, "that bespoke a great share of the reasoning faculty." The ass, in descending the Alps-the mule, in traversing the Andes, exhibit extraordinary powers of memory and of deliberation; and, in their swiftest motion, when they might seem to have lost all government of themselves, they follow the windings of the road, having previously settled in their minds the rout they are to follow, and take every precaution for their safety; hence, according to Humbolt, the mountaineers judge, not of the animal whose step is the surest, but him" who reasons best.”

We now ask, in what situation do these instances put the supporter of the qualified doctrine of an immaterial and immortal soul in man, as they clearly demonstrate that memory, deliberation and judgment are possessed by the brute creation; the position which confers spiritual agency on man, because of these powers, being, consequently, untenable? And (except by abandoning their whole system) its supporters cannot avoid being driven to the same concession which they have condemned in Mr. Rennell and his followers: in other words, that the ape, equally with the philosopher, has an immaterial soul. And this concession, by the way, does not appear to have been one either hastily or willingly made; its consequences would seem to have been rightly appretiated, as we discover from its supporters that they are anxiously alive to the effect which it must have upon their argument. One of these parties, indeed, (the Review before referred to) as a guide to our paths, tells us that although brutes are animated

by spiritual beings, yet that "an immaterial spirit is not, as "such, necessarily immortal." We seize upon this new concession, and contend, that if it be not in its own nature immortal, then the very principle of their argument, in support of future existence, is shaken to its very foundation. The old lawgivers, indeed, in the immaterial school, always contended that" immaterial spirits were necessarily immortal; and that "they were immortal because they were immaterial.' If we are to have a classification of immaterial souls, some mortal and some immortal, who shall assure us that the soul of man, if he possess one, is not as mortal as his body? And who shall extricate us from the endless labrinth of doubt and uncertainty into which, by such an hypothesis, we should be plunged? Another writer, as a lamp to our feet, apprises us that while all living beings are inhabited by immaterial souls, yet that it is probable man alone has succeeded in gaining those which will not die. The means, by which to apply the test of immortality to these spirits, we are not supplied with-at least, not from the scriptures; but our Christian guide and "Advocate" knowing how essential such information must be to his argument, has consistently and rationally taken us back-not to Jesus, but to Plato!!

"The very desire of immortality, which distinguishes the "human soul, is, of itself, a POWERFUL argument for the "attainment of its object; for there is no desire of the "human mind which man has not some general means of fulfilment; as, therefore, in man, the existence of this “rational desire is a strong presumption in favour of its "gratification; so absence of the desire in the animal is "ALMOST a proof, that, from its very nature, it is incapable " of immortality." (Rennell 115.)

This argument, while it is not a novel one, is yet so admirably suited to our purpose, that we cannot let it pass; it, in fact, amounts, on the part of the Advocate, to throwing up his brief. We are, therefore, perfectly content to take this writer upon his own shewing; contending, as we do, that the mere existence of a desire," in the mind of man, is not a "presumption" at all, much less a strong one, "in "favour of its gratification." We might instance the "desire" for riches and for power-desires these which, doubtless, "distinguish" man from" the animal;" which but, "strongly," and "universally," as they unquestionably exist, are yet found to furnish, in their results, any thing rather than a rational and confident assurance of their gratification: but we pass by these and a numerous catalogue of desires,

which belong "peculiarly" to the human race, and which are but very partially gratified, for the purpose of instancing one desire in particular-that which, cherished equally by the peasant and by the philosopher, by the king and by the beggar, yet never has been gratified-we mean the desire for a longer continuance of life than that naturally allotted to man. Now, as this desire truly is "universal," is "rational," and does "distinguish man from "the animal," what reason can the "Advocate," upon his own shewing, give, not merely for its non-accomplishment, but that the desire" itself, deeply as it is rooted in the human heart, does not add one moment to our present existence? yet, if his position were a just one, this "desire" having all the requisite qualifications, man would not require futurity, for he would be immortal in the present state of things.

Thus have we stated the three several points, in which are comprehended the creeds of all classes of immaterialists; they appear to be, First, That matter cannot of itself possess life; and, consequently, in its very lowest possible state of animation, there must reside within it an immaterial soul.

Secondly, That matter may be so organized as to have mere life, but not mental qualities.

Thirdly, That immaterial souls are not, as such, necessarily immortal.

This task we have performed gratuitously, and not because it is really called for by our argument; for, in truth, it is imperative upon these parties to demonstrate-First, why, and on what principle, the organization of matter is incapable of performing the functions of animal life. Secondly, if an immaterial and immortal principle be necessary to account for the manifestation of a mind in a child, or in an idiot, (Lord Portsmouth for instance) why is it not equally necessary to the dog or the horse. Thirdly, if they concede it to these animals, why they deny it to the mouse and to the maggot. And, finally, if mortal souls be allotted to brutes, and immortal to man, then they ought to furnish us with some certain criterion in soulology, (if we may coin a word) by which we shall be justified in depriving so many millions of immaterial souls of their pre-supposed natural immortality.

In our next number we design submitting some of the facts connected with the brain, the circulation of the blood, and the medical treatment of insanity, and other diseases, all tending to the same point; and from the whole of which we feel persuaded that we shall succeed in establishing our

first position, "THAT LIFE AND MIND ARE THE RESULT 66 OF ORGANIZATION." Having thus cleared the way, by proving that man is by nature a material and a mortal being, we then propose turning our attention to revelation, and shewing that his hopes of futurity rest solely upon the scriptural doctrine of A RESURRECTION FROM THE

DEAD.

PRIESTS.

"THUS we have heard, readers, how many shifts and evils the PRELATES invented to save their ill-got booty; and if it be true, as in scripture it is foretold, that pride and covetousness are the sure marks of those false prophets which are to come, then boldly conclude these to be as great seducers as any of the latter times. For between this and the judgment day do not look for any arch-deceivers, who, in spite of reformation, will use more craft and less shame, to defend their love of the world and their ambition, than these prelates have done.”—Milton's Apology.

"UPON this open, avowed attempt, in almost the whole bench of bishops, to destroy the church, I resolved to have no more commerce with persons of such prodigious grandeur; who, I feared, in a little time, would expect me to kiss their slipper. It is happy for me that I know the persons of very few bishops; and it is my constant rule never to look into a coach—by which I avoid the terror that such a sight might strike me with. I call God

to witness that I did then, and do now, and shall for ever, firmly believe that every bishop who gave his vote for either of these bills, did it with no other view, bating further promotion, than a premeditated design, from the spirit of ambition and love of arbitrary power, to make the whole body of the clergy their slaves and vassals, until the day of judgment, under the load of poverty and contempt. I have no room for more charitable thoughts, except for those who will answer now, as they must at that dreadful day, that what they did was out of perfect ignorance, want of consideration, hope of future promotion, an argument not to be conquered, or the persuasion of cunninger brethren than themselves.”—Swift.

"THE PRIEST is not a negative character, he is something positive, and disagreeable. He is not, like the quaker, distinguished from others merely by singularity of dress and manner; but he is distinguished from others by pretension to superiority over them. His faults arise from his boasted exemption from the opposite vices, and he has one vice running through all his others-HYPOCRISY. He is proud with an affectation of humility; bigoted from a pretended zeal for truth; greedy with an ostentation of active contempt for the things of this world; professing self-denial, and always thinking of self-gratification. As he cannot be armed at all points against the flesh and the devil, he takes refuge in self-delusion and mental imposture-learns to play at fast and loose with his own conscience, and to baffle the vigilance of the public by dexterous equivocations; sails as near the wind as he can-shuffles with principle-is punctilious in matters of form, and tries to reconcile the greatest strictness of decorum and regularity of demeanour with the least possible sacrifice of his own interest or appetites. They (the priests) indulge in all the sensuality that is not prohibited in the