We shall be better understood, and less open to misapprehension, if we give one or two examples, instead of further argument at the present moment.

By the law of England, every free man, in every shire and borough, has a vote for the representatives of the shire or borough in Parliament. At one time and another statutes have been introduced which have curtailed this common_right. In a codified system, which of these set of statutes shall be introduced? We rather think it is important to the interests of the people that no man, and no Ministry, (certainly not that which we now have,) shall be able to set his fiat upon one of these sets of statutes and declare the others repealed for ever.

By the Law of England, every sheriff of every shire is bound to hold, once every month, a court of the free men of the shire, at which every free man has the right to attend and take part, and at which the county business ought to be transacted. We all know that this good law is now neglected, and that Crown-appointed justices usurp the powers and functions that belong to the whole body of the freemen. And we further know that bills have been introduced, proposing, in ignorance of the actual law, what are called county boards. As it needs but a little knowledge and a little earnestness to restore the true law to its full activity, we confess ourselves anxious to see that law remain on the Statute-book unmeddled with. We have no doubt whatever how it would be dealt with by any codifier under the sanction of the present Government.

The law of England disfavours a standing army: it recognizes the right, and enjoins the practice, of every freeman being familiar with the use of arms. Governments, on the other hand, ever strive after the establishment of standing armies, and do not like the idea of freemen being their own national defence. They go so far as sometimes to try to put down rifle clubs, (though they have no warrant whatever for this,) and would have us all be mere passive creatures dependant on mercenary defence. The Peace Society, again, looks with horror at arms in the hands of any man, and would have us all alike submit to the Christian humility of any attacker. It strikes us that the codification of our statute law would fare very differently, on this matter, according to what the special opinions of the codifier might chance to be in either of these three directions.

We have probably said enough, for the present, to show that, while the codification of the statute law, is a phrase that slips glibly off the tongue, and sounds "comprehensive"-to use one of the most cant words of the day-it is a matter which involves very grave considerations, and is not merely to be treated as a work of index-making. The importance of the subject, and the many aspects that it has, will probably induce us to return to it again ere long.

J.T.S.

IN a late number we made some remarks on the proposition for a codification of the Statute Law. The subject is no less wide than important. We then intimated that we should return to it; and we propose now to redeem that promise.

The considerations which we have already advanced, were directed principally to points of obvious inconvenience and practical impolicy. But there are considerations of even a higher nature than these, because of wider bearing and touching wider questions, to which we would now invite the attention of our readers. We will, with all brevity, show what deep and important Constitutional Principles are involved in this matter.

Is Parliamentary government a reality, or is it a mere name? Is the deliberation on, and discussion in Parliament of, public measures, a matter which helps to sustain free institutions, or is it a mere sham, a "mockery, a delusion, and a snare?" Is it of importance that the people of England should have, through their representatives, a voice in the making and sustaining of the laws they live under; or is this to be treated as an exploded notion, which the present enlightened age contemns ? Six hundred years ago it was considered, by one of the greatest of English lawyers, [Bracton,] that "the laws of England, having been approved by the consent of those who use them, cannot be changed nor set aside without the common consent and counsel of all those by whose counsel and consent they were first put forth." And a later writer, Fortescue, alluding to the statutes passed by Parliament, dwells, writing four centuries ago, on the security to liberty thus given, "seeing that they are ordained, not by the device of one man alone, nor of a hundred wise councillors only, but of more than three hundred chosen men."

The advocates for codification must be prepared to maintain that the principles which such writers as these have recognized are unsound. They must be prepared to maintain that, in our days, men are unfit to exercise any voice in the making or administering of the laws they shall be governed by, or in the choice of those who form the Legislative Body. That this is necessarily implied in the very proposition for a codification, is capable of demonstration. few considerations must now suffice to illustrate the point.

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Unless the digested code be plainly admitted as about to be enforced by mere arbitrary authority, it is clear that every clause and article which it contains must be separately and carefully considered and discussed in Parliament; and only sanctioned after, and as the result of, that consideration and discussion.

This is, practically and morally, an impossibility. It is a practical impossibility, because, setting aside now the variety of topics, the mere time necessary for going through the articles, and giving to each its proper discussion, would be what no arrangements of Parliament could enable it to bestow.

It is a moral impossibility for much higher and more insurmountable reasons.

In the course of every man's life, events occur in reference to which he is obliged to shape his course upon the best consideration of the circumstances then present to him. Such events may occur again ; though only rarely perhaps; certainly not very

often. But, if he is a wise man, he treasures up every experience gained: he keeps all records of that experience; so that, when the event arises, he may be able, at the moment, to avail himself of it.

It is the same with the life of nations as with the life of individuals. There are events occurring from time to time which require adaptations and arrangements to meet them. In other words, legislation The immediate occasion may

grows out of them.

pass. The grounds and reasons, by the actual presence of which alone that legislation can be fully interpreted, and its importance felt, will be forgotten. It is then ignorantly denounced, by those who would appear superlatively enlightened, as but the obsolete remnant of another age. But, in the course of human events, the same or nearly parallel occasions and events arise again. Too late, if the doctrinaire has been listened to, will it be found how fatally the spoiler has done his work. Some of the illustrations we gave before, apply here. Instead of giving others, we will quote the very striking words of Coke, when pointing out the qualifications of mind and knowledge necessary to those who would dabble in legislation. They are words forgotten now in practice, but which cannot too often be repeated.

Every member of Parliament, he says, should set himself, to "know the several kinds of the municipal laws of his own proper nation; for the innovation or change of some laws is most dangerous, and there is less peril in the alteration of others to understand what the true sense and sentence of the laws now standing is, and how far forth former laws have made provision in the case that falleth into question : -by careful search to apprehend what have been the causes of the danger or hindrance that hath fallen out in that particular to the commonwealth, either in respect of time, place, person, or otherwise-to foresee that a proportionable remedy be applied, so as that, for curing of some defects past, there be not a stirring of more dangerous effects in the future."

All this may sound very strange now-a-days, and may be easily sneered at as very obsolete doctrine. But we venture to think that it contains the only true principles of sound legislation; and it is absolutely inconsistent with any such notion as a codification of Statute Law.

It will necessarily be the case, that a codification, completed at any one time, will differ from one completed at any other time. Every particular year, indeed, will, according to the particular direction that men's thoughts and attention then have, cause one set of laws to be treated as obsolete, and another as of prominent importance, the relative value of each of which would, in another year, be reversed. The events of the last six years afford many striking illustrations of this. The only sound course is, for all such special legislation to remain of record, and of equal authority, ready to be put in use again, or to be reconsidered again, when the particular circumstances shall again arise which require its action and enable all the conditions to be judged of. We do but a wrong to our fathers, and to our children, if, self-complacently looking only to our own conditions and circumstances, we pronounce a judgment on the acts of the former, by declaring obsolete what they did when all the means of judgment, and the special needs calling for action, were before them. We thus deliberately rob our children of that inheritance which is the result of former experience in events, which, in the course of national

existence, may, in all probability, arise again. We are not fit judges without all the facts before us. If a special enactment does not seem to concern us, let us at any rate leave it ready to be put in use or reconsidered by those whom it may hereafter concern, and who may have better means of considering it before them.

There is another consideration of very great importance, connected with this view of the subject. A codification, to be of the utility pretended, must be complete. Now, apart from what was said in our former article as to the present annual literary productions of the Parliamentary press, it is clear that the negative objection to and defects of a scheme of codification must be even greater than the positive. What we have said above comes to this :-that all sound legislation is the result of experience, and the adaptation of means, as learned by experience, to conditions and circumstances that arise in the course of human events. While the observations we have made are grounded upon the principle that human wisdom is the accumulations of the lessons learned by experience, we as strongly, and in full consistency, maintain that that wisdom is progressive ; and we cannot any more consent to tie up future consideration and adaptation of events, and the appliances necessary to them, than we can consent to wipe out the recorded fruits of former experience. We deny the right of our day to say to posterity:— "This is the Code of English Law: by it ye shall be for ever bound." We reverence rather the sentiment which is found at the beginning of the laws published by King Alfred :-"I dare not be so bold as set down for law aught much of my own; for that it is unknown to me what of it would be liked by those who shall live after us." We cannot foresee what posterity may need. No code that human wisdom can devise can meet all future contingencies. It is mere pedantry to attempt it ;-but the attempt must be productive of very great and inevitable mischief. Yet, as we have already shown, codification means nothing if it is merely temporary. It can be but a mischievous delusion, instead of a practical advantage.

The points thus noticed have drawn us in immediate approach to a consideration which, in itself, We should be sufficient to settle this question. mean that of the Delegation of the powers of Parliament. This is, however, a topic of so much interest and importance in itself, that we forbear entering upon it now. We shall probably direct some attention to it in our next.

Lord

SINCE we last called attention to the project of the codification of the statutes, that matter has received considerable illustration in Parliament, in more ways than one; and the arguments we ventured to advance have received the strongest confirmation. Cranworth has told the world that he has put the matter in the hands of one or two learned gentlemen, quite unknown to fame,-and, as he professes with wonderful simplicity, even to himself,-with carte blanche to expurgate, re-arrange, and doctor up, as they think fit! Even learned lords who hardly dare offer to put common sense in opposition to any cant of the day, are rather startled. They suggest that titles may be endangered. We have already shown that far more important matters and questions than mere titles (though the unsettling of them is no trifle) will be affected. We think that every one who has carefully read what we have already said, will be satisfied that constitutional principles, the very action of Parliament itself, will be unsettled and shaken. The distinct avowal that the work of expurgation will be a principal one, confirms precisely the greatest of the dangers that we have dwelt upon. And the avowal that the work is to be put into one or two hands to accom plish, further proves the correctness of our argument that Parliament is to be ousted of its functions; that the whims and crotchets of one or two irresponsible individuals, not even members of Parliament, are to be let over-ride all the authority of Parliament and all those safeguards for well-considered legislation that we alluded to, and some of which we quoted authoritative opinions on, in a former article.

For ourselves, the more we hear and read on this matter, the more ground do we see for dissatisfaction at this attempt to set up individual dogmatism as superior to Parliamentary authority. We think

that Fortescue, whom we have already quoted, was right when he said that "if it fortune these statutes, being devised with such great solemnity and wit, do not fall out so effectually as the intent of the makers did wish, they may be quickly reformed, but not without the assent of the commons and states of the realm, by whose authority they were first devised." And that assent must be the result of real and thorough discussion and consideration; not that mockery of assent which is contained in laying a big blue-book on the table of the House, as the modern doctrinaire school is so fond of.

A remarkable illustration of the actual results of this sort of system has been afforded within the last few days, which shows what the real end will be of all such theoretical follies under pretence of reforms. By the promoters of the Public Health Act it was pretended, with much parade and self-laudation, that a scheme was thereby devised for doing away with the heavy expense and length of local acts of Parliament. Brevity, that soul of wit, was to be attained. Parliament was to be saved all trouble. A snug little Crown-appointed irresponsible board (just like our now paraded codifiers) was to do the thing comfortably in a private room. The farce was to be gone through by Parliament of confirming these snug pieces of legislation; but that was intended to be, and has always been, a mere form, a mere act of blind indorsement. The thing has gone on for four years. Our irresponsible board have had their salaries regularly paid, and have done no little in this new trade of secret and undiscussed law-making. But complaints loud and deep have arisen ;-too

loud and deep for any government to shut its ears to. The most monstrous pranks have been played, and members of Parliament have learned that it is impossible for this to be let go on. So, instead of the mere nice short confirmatory act that has heretofore been passed, Mr. Wilson Patten himself, the chairman of committees, moved, the other day, and carried it, that all the "Provisional Orders" (as the Board of Health call their precious productions in this line) should be inserted at full length in the confirmatory bill. The adoption of the unconstitutional and mischievous system so ignorantly but pretentiously enacted by the Public Health Act, has thus led to a more cumbrous, incomplete, and preposterous thing than ever, and to the encumbering of the Statutebook with unwieldy acts of no sort of interest to the public.

And thus it always is with these speculative and theoretical doctrinaire schemes. They are, all of them, attempts, under cover of the pretence of simplicity, to supersede Parliamentary authority and action by the arbitrary discretion of one or two men. It is the delegation of legislative power from those who are responsible, to those who are irresponsible; from the many, who discuss and consider, to the few, who only concoct; from the representatives of the people, to those who represent nothing but the principle of all despotism and the individual crotchets that they happen themselves to have.

The laws thus promulgated as the "Code" will be, not the laws made by Parliament, but the laws made by one or two individuals. The former are to be abrogated in order to set up the latter in their place. The only next step remaining will be to Louis-Napoleonize Parliament altogether. By assenting to such a scheme Parliament distinctly acknowledges its own incompetency to fulfil the very duties it was appointed to discharge. cannot too soon be dismissed altogether.

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For ourselves, whatever complaints we admit in the present system, we are not prepared to acknowledge that Parliamentary government is a thing to be thus treated as obsolete. We wish to see real Law Reform, earnestly carried out, and not made but a mask and excuse under which to rear up a more widely-extending functionarism in everything. We desire to see practical mischiefs practically grappled with, and not sentimentalism and theoretical perfectability attempted to be imposed on the public as Law Reform. We desire to see the monstrous and growing evils of over-legislation put a stop to; and the course and mode of legislation itself rendered more simple, logical, and constitutional, and less rash, reckless, and random. achieve these reforms is a thing real, practicable, and attainable: but it must not be attempted to attain the appearance of it by the delegation of the powers of Parliament to one or two under the i name of doing a work of codification. We hold that the words of Lord Coke are as true now, and must always remain so, as they ever were, and that they always ought to be remembered by all who would maintain our free institutions :-"For the high power of Parliament to be committed to a few, is holden to be against the dignity of a Parliament ; and no such commission ought to be granted."

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A SHORT debate took place in Parliament a few days ago, which, apart from its mere applicability to certain distinguished individuals, has attracted little attention, but the subject of which involves principles and considerations of the very first importance to the liberties of this country. The report of that debate was headed by the significant words, "National Police." A little mystification and attempt at disguise were thrown over the affair; but the real end and object of this ingeniously-planned move are very plain. The Home-office has long been hankering to have all the police and constabulary of England under its own immediate control, and the present astute and vigourous chief of that department is quite willing to realize that desire if the public will only permit him. The existing independence of local management and action does not suit the "convenience" of modern Liberal Governments. So it was arranged that Mr. Rich should propose a committee, and that Lord Palmerston should seem simply to support the motion; though innocently declaring, at the same time, lest any should blame him for his remissness, that he would by no means "shrink from the responsibility of the office he had the honour to fill." Of course not. If Parliament will (after a few such well got-up scenes) put all the police of England under a Home Secretary's management, he will accept the duties thrust upon him. Has not Lord Palmerston been busy all his life in the disputes of Europe? Has he not been reputed to delight to have a finger in the pie at every squabble? Nay, some are ill-natured enough to insinuate that he has not been averse to set different Cabinets by the ears and to keep Europe in hot water. Human nature is human nature. He must feel the change from the Foreign-office to the Homeoffice. For a man who loves squabbles and hot water, the latter is but flat, stale, and tame. It is worth while to try if he cannot make the Homeoffice a Foreign-office in little; if he cannot have a finger in every county and in every borough, and have a standing army of his own dependents in each. Such is the foregone conclusion of the labours of the committee which was appointed on Tuesday week last.

The constabulary arrangements which have existed in England for fourteen hundred years are based on a very simple principle. That principle is, that those most immediately concerned in taking care of their own safety and the protection of their ! own property, are those most likely to take vigorous and efficient means to secure these. The constantly maintained policy of the English system,-until the days of modern enlightenment have taught us to dismiss with contempt the teachings of fourteen centuries has been to fix all men with the closest sense of the personal responsibilities attaching to them as citizens: to have it continually imprinted, practically, upon them, that those who would be well governed must take a real and active part in governing themselves and managing their own affairs. To do their own governing for themselves has been, in former times, the guiding spirit of our fathers. To give up all this to somebody else to do for them is the spirit and tendency of our day. The tendency daily increases. Every fresh step made in the way undermining the sense of responsibility, and substituting that of dependence and commutation, lessens the spirit and earnestness with which the duties and responsibilities that remain are set about to be discharged, and thus craftily and step by step the course is cleared for fresh inroads, and fresh oppor

tunities are given to the enlightened philanthropists of the day to fill columns in The Times with pictures of mischief for which they have a cut and dried remedy ready to hand. It is only to be lamented that our fathers were not more blessed. If England, under all the disadvantages of a locally managed constabulary for fourteen hundred years, has managed to struggle on to her present position, what would not have been her halcyon state had there only been a Rich or a Palmerston any time this fourteen hundred years back, the one to initiate, the other "not to shrink from the responsibility" of carrying out a system of centralized police, all worked from the Home-office, with electric telegraph and railway train to help it?

We cannot go at any length here into the real machinery of the constitutional system of constabulary. We are content with asking attention to two points at present. First: there must be something good and sound in what has lasted so long. Second: we have the express testimony of many of the most distinguished and experienced constitutional authorities, among the rest of Lord Coke himself, to the actual efficiency of the system. That efficiency has become lessened solely through the operation of the causes already noticed-the carefully-designed weakening, in so many ways, of late years, of the sense of practical responsibility of men as regards their attention to and fulfilment of their local duties, and the encouragement given to that pure spirit of selfishness which is content to let the fulfilment of all such duties be commuted for, and handed over to functionaries. But, in the committee appointed on Tuesday week, we may be very sure that none of the causes that have led to the less efficiency of the constitutional system will be inquired into and traced. What will be done will be, to cull as many instances as possible of incidental mischiefs, and then to announce the Home-office remedy. In fact, the same course will be taken which is now invariable with nostrum-mongers who "don't shrink from the responsibility, &c. ;"-the topical ailment will be dealt with only, and any search into the source of the disease treated with sublime contempt; just the same as if the surgeon should think his end to be, to plaster the forehead in case of head-ache, instead of treating the digestive and nervous sys

tems.

The real point that the people of England ought to consider, and to express a very decided opinion upon, is, whether the police is an institution which exists, or ought to be let exist, for the benefit of the people, and for their protection and security, or for the benefit of the "Government," and for helping it to carry out its own ends? No doubt it will be mighty convenient for Government to be able to control all popular demonstrations; to interfere at public meetings; to hinder, for example, next year, when the mountain is to be in labour with a new Reform Bill, any expressions of popular disgust at the shortcomings of such bill. It will be mighty convenient to Government to be able to dispense with the machinery of Olivers and Castles, and all the trouble attending them, by having, spread over the whole land, an organized network of men interested in discovering and trumpeting all manner of mare's nests of conspiracies and treasons. Every one will remember the strong remark which was so justly made, during the late election, upon the frequent and wholly unjustifiable presence of policemen at the hustings,

and in the body of the election meetings in the metropolis; displays which led to disturbances, instead of hindering them. It is all very well to talk of the "civil force," and pretend the wish not to use the military. If this were sincere, the causes of any decline in efficiency would be traced; and the remedy applied there. What is really felt is, that the military is under the control of the Horseguards, and not of the Home-office; and the Home-office wants to get the command of an army of its own. In short, Lord Palmerston is like the ancient Roman. He will neither "shrink from responsibilities," nor is he too proud to learn from one whose enemy he has long been esteemed, by itself at least, to be. The system of police in Austria is well known. Its admirable working is notorious. The peace, security, and happy undisturbed repose of that land have long been the admiration and envy of our own wretched, because hitherto un-police-ridden, land. Every "treason and stratagem" is there nipped in the bud. Neither Governments nor individuals dread disturbance or revolution. The argus-eye of an infallible police is ever open, watching like a faithful house-dog, and being a terror only to evildoers. To that happy state, which we have all so long sighed after as unattainable here, it is now proposed to bring England. To help in so desirable a consummation, man in England raise voice and hand in support of Mr. Rich's already started scheme of a National Police!

every

WE called attention, in a recent number, to the proposition for a national police. We warned our readers that this proposition is now in the fair way to actual accomplishment, unless the people of England arouse themselves to a speedy and decided expression of opinion on the subject. That expression must be the result of a clear comprehension of the question and consequences involved; and no duty has ever devolved on public journalists, since the first broadsheet was issued in this country, more imperative than is that which calls, in reference to this matter, for their awakening public attention to it, and for their helping to afford the means for a Bound judgment upon it.

The considerations which we have already presented were general. It is necessary that consideration should be more nearly called to the special considerations connected with the subject.

The real point at the bottom of the whole question is this:-What is the object of the existence of a legitimate constabulary; and who are they that are concerned in it? It must be very clear to every one who is not entirely lost to the spirit of selfrespect and independence, that the only legitimate object of the existence of any constabulary is the maintenance to individuals of that protection which it is the end of civil society to secure to all. It is essentially an arrangement for the purpose of securing the individuals of society against aggression, either upon their persons or property. Such arrangements must exist in every state which pretends to offer the advantages of civilization and progress; inasmuch as progress depends, more than anything else, upon the assuredness that the result of every effort put forth will be safely enjoyed by him who puts it forth.

But the idea of a police force under the control of a central government is precisely the reverse, in its essential characteristics, from what any true system of constabulary must be. As a matter of fact, it is notorious that in no countries are person and property less secure than in those where the police is under a centralized control. And in no countries is the personal independence of every citizen more held in check. In none is the safe future enjoyment of the results of effort less consciously felt. The police is made dependant, not on those for whose benefit alone it ought to exist, but upon a certain small section called "the Government," which arrogates to itself the right and power to govern and provide for all, and which, in doing this, virtually treats all men besides its own small number in the light of men suspect, men to be watched. Such a police is an organized spy system. It renders all society afraid of its own shadow, instead of filling it with confidence. Made dependant on others than those whom it ought to be their sole business to secure against incidental danger, the members of the police have, as their chief motive, the ingratiation of themselves with the functionaries and authorities, by their zeal and activity in presenting (and therefore trumping up) cases of pretended ill-allegiance to the "State." It is clear that their whole function is thus perverted; that which alone a sound system of constabulary should exist for is not accomplished; while an endless complication of mischiefs, and an all-pervading sense of insecurity, are created by the existence and action of that very body which ought to act only for the prevention of these. And it must be evident to every one that such are the necessary consequences of the establishment of any system of National Police. This has proved so in every continental state where it exists. It is absolutely impossible, from the laws of human nature, but that it should be so wherever such a system is introduced. It is the unquestionable and humiliating fact that, even in England, every step taken, or attempted to be taken, in the same direction, notwitstanding all the jealousy that free expression and a free press can exercise, has exhibited the same results. We only forbear dwelling on instances in order that the thread of our argument may not be broken.

How, then, apart from any arguments drawn from abstract considerations of political right or ancient usage, must it be evident that a system of constabulary can alone work soundly and efficiently? This is a most important question to the peace and good order of society, and no less so to the maintenance of our civil and political liberties. It is a question which every friend of order, every holder of property, ought thoroughly to look into, no less than he who would jealously maintain, for its own sake, the noble fabric of liberties which our fathers so manfully and successfully upheld through many centuries of what we too often self-complacently call unenlightened times;-but which were times, most assuredly, when the spirit of manhood was more profoundly felt, more widely diffused, and more nobly vindicated, than it is in our own vain-glorious age.

A sound system of constabulary must have it as its essential and fundamental principles, that the entire thought and motive of those engaged in the working of the system shall be the fulfilment of their duties to the individuals; and, in order to