Edit, 4. p. 82.

Pag. 48.

THE Dr. not only maintains, that "the Law of Na

ture is eternal, univerfal, and abfolutely unchangeable; " pag. 47. but has two Sections to prove," That the Will of God "always determines itself to act according to the eter "nal Reason of Things; and that all rational Creatures " are oblig'd to govern themselves in all their Actions by "the fame eternal Rule of Reafon ; which fuppofes, that all rational Creatures are not only capable of knowing this eternal Rule of Reason, but likewise of knowing there can be no other Rule, for the Actions both of God and Man. In his previous Discourse of the Being of a God, he affirms, 24g. 131. that “They, who are not govern'd by this Law, are for 66 fetting up their own unreasonable Self-will, in Opposi❝tion to the Nature, and Reafon of Things.

66

66

acting

contrary to their own Reason and Knowledge; attempt❝ing to destroy that Order, by which the Universe fub"fifts; and by Confequence, offering the highest Affront imaginable to the Creator of all Things, who himself 66 governs all his Actions by these Rules, and cannot but "require the fame of all his reasonable Creatures. pag. 49. in this Discourse he says, The All-powerful Creator, and

And

"Governour of the Universe, who has the absolute, and "uncontroulable Dominion of all Things in his own "Hands, and is accountable to none for what he does,

66

yet thinks it no Diminution of his Power, to make this "Reafon of Things the unalterable Rule, and Law of all "his own Actions in the Government of the World, and And: "does nothing by mere Will and Arbitrarinefs. ' indeed, if God does nothing by mere Will and Arbi-trarinefs, 'tis impoffible there can be any other Rule but: pag. 113. the Reason of Things. And accordingly he fays, "The eter"nal and unchangeable Nature, and Reason of the Things. ❝ them

"themselves are the Law of God; not only to his Crea"tures, but also to himself, as being the Rule of his own "Actions in the Government of the World. "And, as a pag. 87, 88. learned Prelate of our own has excellently fhewn, "not

66

66

barely his infinite Power, but the Rules of this eternal "Law, are the true Foundation, and the Measure of his "Dominion over his Creatures. Now, for the fame Rea"fon, that God, who hath no Superior to determine him, cr yet conftantly directs all his own Actions by the eternal "Rule of Justice and Goodness; 'tis evident all intelligent "Creatures in their several Spheres and Proportions, ought to obey the fame Rule according to the Law of their Na" ture. Which is fuppofing it wou'd be Tyranny in God to have any arbitrary Commands, or give Man any other Rules, but the Rules of this eternal Law, the true Foundation, and Measure of his Dominion over his Creatures. And again, God, who is infinitely felf-fufficient to his own pag. 121 "Happiness, cou'd have no Motive to create Things at "all, but only that he might communicate to them his "Goodness and Happiness. If fo, They, who do all the Good they can to themselves, and Fellow-Creatures, anfwer the End of their Creation. "And, be fays, that in pag. 86.87 "Matters of Natural Reafon and Morality, that which is "holy and good is not therefore holy and good, because it fis commanded to be done; but it is therefore com

manded by God, because it is holy and good:" Which supposes that all God's Commands, if they are all holy and good (between which, I think, the Distinction is only verbal;) are founded on the Nature, and Reason of Things. And accordingly he says, "that God has made (his intelli-pag. 4%, < gent Creatures) fo far like himself, as to endue them "them with those excellent Faculties of Reason and Will, "whereby

Z z 2

"whereby they are enabl'd to distinguish Good from Evil, " and to choose the one, and refufe the other." Which. supposes those are the only Things which God commands, or forbids; otherwise these excellent Faculties wou'd only enable them to know but Part of the Will of God; tho' God can will nothing but what is for their Good, that being the fole End of his creating them.

AND he fuppofes, That "this Law of Nature is not "founded in the pofitive Will of God, but arifes from the "different Relations and Refpects which Things have to

46

one another, which makes fome Things fit, and others un-"fit to be done. " And says, that "the Law of Nature has Pg. 89. its full obligatory Power, antecedent to all Confiderations "of any particular private, and perfonal Reward or Punishment, annex'd either by natural Confequence, or by "pofitive Appointment, to the Obfervance, or Neglect of "it. This alfo is very evident: Because if Good and Evil, "Right and Wrong, Fitness and Unfitness of being practifed, be (as has been shown) originally, eternally, and "neceffarily, in the Nature of the Things themselves; 'tis "plain, that the View of particular Rewards or Punish66 ments, which is only an After-Confideration, and does 66 not at all alter the Nature of Things, cannot be the ori"ginal Caufe of the Obligation of the Law, but is only an additional Weight to enforce the Practice of what Men were before oblig'd to by right Reason. " And to prove. pag. 53. this he fays, that "the Judgment and Conscience of a "Man's own Mind, concerning the Reasonableness, and "Fitness of the Thing, that his Actions should be con-" formed to fuch, or fuch a Rule, or Law; is the trueft, "or formallest Obligation, even more properly, and strictly. 66 "fo,, than any Opinion whatfoever of the Authority of the

"Giver of a Law, or any Regard he may have to its Sanc❝tions by Rewards and Punishments. For whoever acts con

trary to this Senfe, and Confcience of his own Mind, is "neceffarily felf-condemned; and the greateft, and ftrong"eft of all the Obligations is That, which a Man cannot "break through without condemning himself." And,

He likewife affirms, that "these eternal moral Obliga-pag. 1148 ❝tions, as they are really in perpetual Force, merely from "their own Nature, and the abftract Reason of Things; "fo alfo they are moreover the exprefs and unalterable "Will, and Command of God to his Creatures, which he

66

cannot but expect should, in Obedience to his fupreme "Authority, as well as in Compliance with the natural "Reason of Things, be regularly, and conftantly obferv'd "thro' the whole Creation." Which not only fuppofes, that the Reason of Things, and the divine Commands are infeparable; but that 'tis the Reason, or the Fitness of the Thing, that makes it a divine Law; and confequently, that they who never heard of any external Revelation; yet if they knew from the Nature of Things what's fit for them to do, they know all that God will, or can require of them; fince his Commands are to be meafur'd by the antecedent Fitness of Things; and Things can only be faid to be fit or unfit, but as they are for, or against the common Good. And if the Creator will do every Thing, the Relation he ftands in to his Creatures makes it fit for him to do; and expects nothing from them, but what the Relation they ftand in to him, and one another, makes likewife fit for them to do; how can they be ignorant of their Duty? Efpecially, if, as the Dr. demonftrates, "All the fame Reafons and Argu-pag. 118, which discover to Men the natural Fitneffes, or Un"fitneffes of Things, and the neceffary Perfections, or Attri

ments,

"butes

pig. 1191

pag. 121)

pag..34

'g. 8.

pag. 125.

pag. 154

"butes of God; prove equally at the fame Time, that That,
"which is truly the Law of Nature, or the Reason of
"Things, is in like Manner the Will of God. And,

He justly obferves, that tho' "This Method of deducing "the Will of God from his Attributes; is of all other the "beft and cleareft, the certaineft and mof univerfal, that "the Light of Nature affords; yet there are other collateral "Confiderations, which prove, and confirm the fame." And that

"THE fame may be prov'd from the Tendency, and "Practice of Morality, to the Good and Happiness of the "whole World:" Which, indeed, wou'd be no Proof, were any Thing commanded that had no fuch Tendency; for such Things, according to the Penalties they were to be enforc'd by, wou'd be more, or less to the Hurt of Mankind.

To fhew the natural Connexion there is between all the Parts of Religion, he says, "Who believes the Being, and "natural Attributes of God, muft of Neceflity confefs his

moral Attributes alfo. Next, he who owns, and has juft " Notions of the moral Attributes of God, cannot avoid " acknowledging the Obligations of Morality, and Natural "Religion. In like manner, he who owns the Obligations ❝of Morality and Natural Religion, muft needs to support "thofe Obligations, and make them effectual in Practice, "believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments. And he affirms, that "the Certainty of a future State of Re"wards and Punishments, is in general deducible, even "demonftrably, by a Chain of clear, and undeniable Rea"foning; "nay, he says, " 'tis a Propofition in a Manner "felf-evident." And fpeaking of fome Argument he had before mention'd, he fays, "These are very good, and

ftrong Arguments for the great Probabilty of a future

"State ;