administration and regulation of both transactions in foreign exchange of gold and silver and property transfers in which any foreign country or national thereof has an interest. See testimony by Mark B. Feldman, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, the 1975 Digest, p. 642.

See also H. Rept. 94-238; S. Rept. 94-1168.

Upon signing the National Emergencies Act, President Ford issued the following statement:

I support the purposes of the enrolled bill [H.R. 3884]. One of its provisions, however, would purport to permit the Congress to terminate a national emergency by a concurrent resolution. This feature of the bill is unconstitutional.

... [P]rovisions for disapproval of regulations and other action by concurrent resolution, or by resolutions of one House, are clearly unconstitutional. Such provisions are contrary to the general constitutional principle of separation of powers whereby Congress enacts laws but the President and the agencies of government execute them. In addition, they violate article I, section 7 of the United States Constitution which requires that resolutions having the force of law be sent to the President for his signature or veto.

In recent years, the Congress has increasingly given consideration to these kinds of legislative encroachment measures. Accordingly, the Attorney General, at my direction, has become a party plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a comparable provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act. In the event that the court strikes down all legislative encroachmenttype provisions now in law, I consider section 202(a)(1) of H.R. 3884 as separable from the rest of the bill, and would therefore expect the other provisions relating to emergency powers to remain in force.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 12, No. 38, Sept. 20, 1976, p. 1340. The Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations published in Nov. 1976 a Committee print entitled "Trading with the Enemy-Legislative and Executive Documents Concerning Regulation of International Transactions in Time of Declared Emergency." It contains the legislative history of sec. 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act in part I, its executive history in part II, and regulations governing financial transactions issued under the authority of sec. 5(b) (31 CFR) in part III.

Title IV of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1976 (P.L. 94-212), approved February 9, 1976, prohibited the use of any

funds appropriated therein "for any activities involving Angola other than intelligence gathering." On signing the bill into law, President Ford said that the provision "would severely limit our effectiveness in international affairs." He added: "I am deeply disappointed that the Congress has acted in this bill to deprive the people of Angola of the assistance needed to resist Soviet and Cuban military intervention in their country. I believe this provision is an extremely undesirable precedent that could limit severely our ability to play a positive and effective role in international affairs.

See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 12, No. 7, Feb. 16, 1976. p. 172.

The Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1976 (P.L. 94-330; 90 Stat. 771), approved June 30, 1976. provides in section 109 that none of the funds appropriated or made available pursuant to the Act "shall be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly any type of military assistance to Angola."

Section 404 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329; 90 Stat. 757; 22 U.S.C. 2293 note), approved June 30, 1976, sets forth limitations on assistance to and activities in Angola. The relevant provision follows:

SEC. 404. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no assistance of any kind may be provided for the purpose, or which would have the effect, of promoting or augmenting, directly or indirectly, the capacity of any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual to conduct military or paramilitary operations in Angola unless and until the Congress expressly authorizes such assistance by law enacted after the date of enactment of this section.

(b) If the President determines that assistance prohibited by subsection (a) should be furnished in the national security interests of the United States, he shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report containing

(1) a description of the amounts and categories of assistance which he recommends to be authorized and the identity of the proposed recipients of such assistance; and (2) a certification that he has determined that the furnishing of such assistance is important to the national security interests of the United States and a detailed statement, in unclassified form, of the reasons supporting such determination. (c) The prohibition contained in subsection (a) does not apply with respect to assistance which is furnished solely for humanitarian purposes.

(d) The provisions of this section may not be waived under any other provision of law.

Canada

In connection with the purchase by Canada on July 21, 1976, of 18 Long-Range Patrol Aircraft (LRPA) from the Lockheed Corporation, the United States Government furnished an aide-memoire of April 29, 1976, stating its judgment on the continuing viability of the

Lockheed Corporation and containing certain assurances as to U.S. facilitation of the purchase. Included also were assurances regarding U.S. efforts to see that, in the event of Lockheed insolvency, Canada would receive advantages and considerations no less favorable than those which might be obtained by the United States. The aidememoire provides as well the U.S. view regarding the mutual security interests involved in Canadian acquisition of a modern longrange patrol aircraft capability. An exchange of letters on July 6 and 7, 1976, confirmed that the aide-memoire continued to apply (TIAS 8388; 27 UST).

The text of the U.S. aide-memoire reads, in part, as follows:

With respect to Lockheed's overall financial viability, its ability to continue as a corporation and to fulfill the terms of its proposed contract with the Canadian Government, the United States Emergency Loan Guarantee Board (ELGB) and the United States Department of Defense have recently reviewed Lockheed's financial position and have expressed confidence in Lockheed's prospects. The following factors are relevant:

1. Lockheed's financial projections appear to be realistic;

2. It appears that Lockheed will be able to pay back its $195,000,000 guaranteed loan before the ELGB's statutory authority expires at the end of 1978;

3. Lockheed appears to be financially healthier than six months or one year ago;

4. While recent publicity regarding payments to foreign officials may have delayed the signing of new contracts by certain foreign governments, the United States Government is unaware of any contracts having been cancelled as a result of such publicity.

5. Approximately 60 percent of Lockheed's sales are to the United States Department of Defense. No significant reduction is anticipated in the volume of this procurement or the cash flow resulting from it.

6. L-1011 airline customers are beginning to report improved traffic and operating results after having experienced a very severe industry-wide recession.

All things considered, it is the present judgment of the United States Government that the prospects are favorable for Lockheed to continue as a viable corporation.

The United States Government shares with the Canadian Government a strong interest in the successful completion of the proposed Canadian procurement of eighteen Lockheed LRPA aircraft. In the view of the United States Government, the acquisition of these aircraft will substantially enhance Canada's ASW patrol capability, improve North American defense arrangements, contribute to NATO's overall security and thus is in the best interest of the United States. The proposed Canadian purchase will complement the purchase of a large number of Lockheed maritime patrol aircraft planned by the United States

Government and should work to the mutual advantage of the two Governments.

In recognition of this mutuality of interest, the United States Government will facilitate the carrying out of the LRPA contract between the Lockheed Corporation and the Canadian Government. Towards this end the United States Government will facilitate, to the maximum extent permissible under United States law, the achievement of the Canadian industrial involvement provided for in the contract by:

1. permitting the rent-free use of United States Government production and research property subject to the normal terms and conditions governing such use,

2. permitting a shift in the manufacture of mutually-agreed selected components from the United States to Canada, and 3. agreeing to duty-free entry into the United States of Canadamanufactured components incorporated in P-3 type of aircraft sold by Lockheed to Canada or other countries.

If a situation were to occur under U.S. bankruptcy laws involving voluntary or involuntary reorganization or bankruptcy of Lockheed which might affect Lockheed's contract performance. the United States Government, recognizing that it is in its best interest to do so, will act with Canada in all matters relating to the Canadian LRPA contract to obtain for Canada advantages and considerations no less favorable than those that might be obtained by the United States with respect to performance of its own defense procurement contracts, in the following respects:

With Respect to Delivery:

In its determination to see that its aircraft and those of Canada are delivered expeditiously, the United States authorities will make every effort to ensure that all measures taken to obtain the production of P-3 and S-3 aircraft for the United States Navy will also be applied to maintain for Canada production of LRPA in accordance with its proposed contract with Lockheed, including an equitable dovetailing of the production of its P-3 aircraft and the Canadian LRPA to achieve delivery on a schedule as close as possible to that provided for in their respective contracts with Lockheed.

With Respect to Price:

In the event of a requirement to renegotiate the price of the Canadian LRPA the United States authorities will seek for Canada treatment no less favorable than that which the United States Department of Defense obtains with respect to its own defense procurement contracts. In this regard the United States authorities will endeavor to ensure that any renegotiation of the LRPA price will be based on direct costs and reasonable indirect costs and profits associated with subsequent production of the Canadian LRPA.

With Respect to Canadian Industrial Involvement:

The undertakings of the United States Government with regard to facilitating Canadian industrial involvement set out in the three numbered subparagraphs above, will continue to apply.

Chile

Under section 406(a) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-329; 90 Stat. 758; 22 U.S.C. 2370 note), approved June 30, 1976, no military or security supporting assistance and no military education and training are to be furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for Chile; and no credits are to be extended and no loan guaranteed under the Arms Export Control Act with respect to Chile. Also, no deliveries of any such assistance, credits, or guaranties were to be made to Chile on or after the date of enactment. Further the section provides that no sales may be made and no export licenses issued under the Arms Export Control Act with respect to Chile on or after the enactment date.

For limitations on economic assistance to Chile, see ante, Ch. 3, § 6, p. 172. Egypt

On March 25, 1976, President Ford determined that the sale to Egypt of C-130 aircraft and the training of Egyptian personnel in their operation and maintenance would "strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace." The determination was made pursuant to section 3(a) (1) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2753; now the Arms Export Control Act) and was necessary to make Egypt eligible to purchase the aircraft and training from the U.S. Government. The Department of Defense, on March 25, informed the Congress of the proposed sale, as required by section 36(b) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)). (Cong. Rec., Vol. 122, No. 45, Mar. 29, 1976, p. S4470).

On April 13, the House of Representatives International Relations Committee voted to table five draft resolutions of disapproval under section 36(b). In the Senate no resolutions opposing the proposed action were submitted. Failure to adopt a concurrent resolution of disapproval by midnight April 14, the end of the 20-day review period provided under section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act (22 U.S.C. 2776(b)), permitted the sale of the aircraft and training to go forward.

Sec. 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act was amended by P.L. 94-329 (90 Stat. 729), approved June 30, 1976, which, inter alia, extends the congressional review period to 30 days and restyles the Act as the Arms Export Control Act.

Secretary of State Kissinger, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Apr. 2, 1976, supported the proposed sale to Egypt in the context of U.S. policy followed, with congressional support, in the Middle East since 1973, "to help bring about a settlement of the... Arab-Israeli dispute, to support and insure the survival and security of Israel, and improve our relations with the Arab States of the region." For the text of Secretary Kissinger's statement, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1921, Apr. 19. 1976, pp. 505-507; Hearings on Proposed Sale of C-130's to Egypt,