The concept of belligerent occupation is exclusively one of the law of land warfare. While the notion of occupation of the territorial sea may be somewhat problematic, it is clear that high seas are not subject to belligerent occupation and that neither party to the Egyptian-Israeli dispute at present enjoys any right to belligerent activity on the high seas.

Second, assuming, arguendo, that Israel does have occupation rights in areas of the Gulf of Suez, it would have to respect the Amoco concessions as private property protected under the law of belligerent occupation.21 Thus, the permission granted to others to carry out activities regarding which Amoco (together with its partners) enjoys an exclusive concessionary right, must be judged illegal as a taking of private property not within the rights of an occupant under the private property provisions of the Hague Regulations.

It has been suggested that Israel's oil development plans in the Gulf of Suez might not conflict with any rights held by Amoco because the Amoco concession in the relevant area was only granted in 1974. This is not persuasive. Even were Israel considered to have belligerent occupant status in the relevant areas of the Gulf, this would not have the result of invalidating Egypt's grant of an oil concession in areas occupied at the time of the grant.22

Since the granting of an oil concession is a legislative act in Egypt (as the grant of a lighthouse concession was in Turkey at the time of the Balkan Wars when Turkey effectively made such a grant in territory occupied by Greece), the question may be analyzed in terms of the right of the ousted sovereign to legislate in general with respect to the occupied territories. Consistent with the ruling of courts of various countries, including the United States, it is now accepted that the absent sovereign can legislate with respect to property in occupied territory, at least where such action does not conflict with valid rights of the occupier.23

This rule would preclude the legislative grant by the absent Sovereign of a concession conflicting with the occupant's rights. However, it would not invalidate Egypt's oil concessions in this case, given the absence of any right in the belligerent occupant to open new mines or oil fields. There is no conflict with any valid ights of the occupier in the ousted sovereign's grant of a concession or such purposes, although the concessionaire might be unable to xploit the concession area during the occupation if the concession s in an area which is occupied, e.g., not on the high seas. Thus, the concessions granted by Egypt to Amoco appear equally alid, whether granted prior to or post June 1967.

Conclusion:

Israel's rights vis-a-vis the undeveloped oil fields in occupied Egyptian territory, those of a usufructuary, do not include the ight to develop a new oil field.

Any rights Israel might be able to assert with respect to the oil esources of occupied territory would, in any event, be limited by he purposes and underlying principles of the law of war which reclude their use for the general benefit of the Israeli economy, or heir sale for commercial or non-military use.

International law does not support the assertion of a right occupant to grant an oil development concession.

Amoco's concessions, whether pre or post 1967, are vali must be respected.

Thus, the oil development plans of Israel in Sinai and the Suez, even if the latter area were "occupied territory," are com to international law.

'See, E. H. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Occupation 817: "The textbooks are agreed that an occupant is not a sovereign.” Feil cites, C. C. Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applie United States, (1922) p. 362; Oppenheim, 5th Edition, p. 345; F. von Li Voelkerrecht systematisch dargestellt, (1898), p. 228; and P. Fauchille, Traite international public, (1921), Tome II, Guerre et Neutralite, p. 215. As Fauch it, [f]or as long as the war lasts, the invader is not juridically substituted for government. He is not the sovereign of the territory. His powers are limit necessities of the war" (Fauchille, p. 218, informally translated). S Oppenheim's International Law, Lauterpacht ed., 7th Edition, Vol. II, pp. hereafter cited as Oppenheim.

2 See e.g., Judgement of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, the Major War Criminals 253-54 (1947); U.S. v. Von Leeb, 11 Trials Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Cour No. 1, at 533; Oppenheim, (7th), Vol. II, pp. 234-35 and 397-415; Pro occupied territories must be disposed of "according to the strict rules laid the Hague Regulations" U.S. v. Krupp, 9 Trials of War Criminals B Nuremberg Tribunals 1341: The taking of property “must be judged by r exclusively to the Hague Regulations", E. Lauterpacht, The Hague Regulat the Seizure of Munitions de Guerre, 32 Brit. Y.B. Int'l. L. 218, 220 (1955). 3 C.P. Sherman, Roman Law in the Modern World, (1937) p. 142; E. R. Cu "Oil Resources in Occupied Arab Territories Under the Law of Be Occupation", 9 The Journal of Int'l Law and Econ. 533, 557-558.

4 S. Siksek, The Legal Framework for Oil Concessions in the Arab Wor (1960).

5 Oppenheim, p. 397; Department of the Army Field Manual, The Lau Warfare, FM 27-10, p. 151; Cummings, pp. 558-559.

6 Department of the Army, International Law, (1962) Vol. II, p. 183. 7 Some civil code jurisdictions have not adopted even this permissive a prohibit exploitation by a usufructuary of already operating mines, unless e authorized by the deed creating the usufruct. See, for example, Mexico, Arti Puerto Rico, Article 1516; and Spain, Article 476. Spain, however, provides exception, in Article 477, for operating existing mines on a profit-sharing bi the owner.

8 The French Civil Code, Article 598, for example, provides: "He also has th the same manner as the owner, of mines and quarries which are being exp the beginning of the usufruct; and, nevertheless, if the exploitation is on requires a concession, the usufructuary can only enjoy it after having obta permission of the King (President of the Republic).

"He has no right to unopened mines and quarries nor to peat-bogs which begun to be exploited nor to treasure which might be discovered during the the usufruct." (Informal translation.) A partial survey shows similar provisions are found in the civil codes of Argentina, Article 2900; Belgium 598; Italy, Article 987; Louisiana, Article 552; and the Netherlands, Article

also, G. Pugliese, “On Roman Usufruct", 40 Tulane L. Rev. 523, 546-47; Sherman, C.P., Roman Law in the Modern World, (1937) p. 165.

E. Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, p. 168 (1962). Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 2, Ch. 18.

10 See footnote 7 above.

11 Fauchille, pp. 253-54; Gerhard von Glahn, The Occupation of Enemy Territory, (1957), p. 177.

12 Stone, Julius, Legal Controls of International Conflict, (1959), p. 714.

13 Writing during World War II, Feilchenfeld stated: "[T]he Hague Regulations speak of 'seizure' [of public chattels] not of appropriation.' It would seem therefore, that no unlimited title is acquired . . . . It seems admitted that the occupant may sell, spend, otherwise dispose of seized public chattels during the occupation; but it is at least not beyond doubt that seized food stores, for instance, may be sold abroad in order to enrich the home treasury of the occupant. The French word saisie does not necessarily connote unlimited rights." Feilchenfeld, pp. 53-54; A later writer stated that "[s]ome jurists go so far as to justify the sale of [lawfully seized enemy movable public property], but the present writer believes that such a sale would violate the important restriction imposed by article 53 of the Hague Regulations, that is, that the property in question must be usable for military purposes. If seized enemy property is not to be utilized by an occupant at a given time, his authorities should appoint property custodians who should be placed in control of the property in question" von Glahn, p. 183; "The Occupant may take possession of [the property of the occupied State under article 53], provided that it may be used for operations of war. This is a power of requisition which the Occupant enjoys in relation to private property under article 52. It is wider principally because the Occupant is not limited by the restriction that property should be required only for the necessities of the army of occupation. It is narrower for the reason that the Occupant does not acquire title by his act of seizure, but only obtains a right to use the property (if necessary to the point of consumption or destruction)" E. Lauterpacht, p. 221.

14 A sweeping statement on this point was contained in a resolution adopted by the London_International Law Conference of 1943: "The rights of the occupant do not include any right to dispose of property, rights or interests for purposes other than the maintenance of public order and safety in the occupied territory. In particular, the occupant is not, in international law, vested with any power to transfer a title which will be valid outside that territory to any property, rights or interests which he purports to acquire or create or dispose of; this applies whether such property, rights or interests are those of the State or of private persons or bodies." (Entire resolution is set out in von Glahn, pp. 194-96).

The judgment in the trial of the major German war criminals included the following: “Article 49 of the Hague Convention provides that an occupying power may levy a contribution of money from the occupied territory to pay for the needs of the army of occupation, and for the administration of the territory in question. Article 52 of the Hague Convention provides that an occupying power may make requisitions in kind only for the needs of the army of occupation, and that these requisitions shall be in proportion to the resources of the country. These articles, ogether with articles 48 . . . 53, 55 and 56 ... make it clear that under the rules of war, the economy of an occupied country can only be required to bear the expenses of the occupation, and these should not be greater than the economy of the country an reasonably be expected to bear." Judgment, I Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 239 (1947). See also the decisions reached n the U.S. Nuernberg trials. In re Flick, In re Krupp and In re Krauch. This easoning was followed by Whyatt, C. J., in the Singapore Oil Stocks Case, who noted hat the Japanese exploitation of Sumatran oil fields was part of a Japanese plan to secure the oil resources of the Netherlands Indies, not merely for the purpose of

meeting the requirements of an army of occupation but for supplying the naval, military and civilian needs of Japan both at home and abroad, during the course of the war against the Allied Powers." Citing the decisions of the International and United States Military Tribunals, Whyatt concluded that "the seizure and the subsequent exploitation by the Japanese armed forces of the oil resources of the appellants in Sumatra was in violation of the laws and customs of war and consequently, did not operate to transfer the appellants' title to the belligeren: occupant." 51 Am. J. Int'l. L. at 808 (1957).

15 Stone, p. 697.

16 E. Lauterpacht, p. 222.

17 von Glahn, p. 209.

18 See, Stone, p. 698.

19 von Glahn, p.

19a It has been asserted that the oil activities and rights in the Gulf are those of GUPCO (the Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company) and not those of Amoco. However, GUPCO is a nonprofit Egyptian corporation which carries out operations under the concession agreement as the agent of Amoco and EGPC (Egyptian General Petroleum Company). The use of an agent does not affect the status of Amoco as a principal in the operations conducted and rights held under a concession.

20 This is the considered opinion of the State Department Geographer. Egypt has taken none of the actions which would have been necessary to extend the territorial sea through baselines, or to close the Gulf and make its waters internal. While Egypt claims a twelve mile territorial sea, the United States continues to refuse recognition to any claims beyond three.

21 Even in a case of state succession, acquired rights of a concessionaire must be respected by a successor state. D. P. O'Connell, “Economic Concessions in the Law of State Succession", 27 Brit. Y. B. Int'l L. 93, 116 (1951). A fortiori, they must be respected by a belligerent occupant whose rights fall far short of a successor sovereign's. The United States appears to have considered property rights based or concessions to be protected, and the occupant bound to respect those rights, ever prior to the Hague Regulations. See Cummings, n. 148, pp. 570-571, and the numerous authorities cited therein.

22 In the Lighthouse Case, the Permanent Court of International Justice considered as binding a concession contract for the usufruct of public immovable property granted in 1913 by the absent sovereign, Turkey, while the territory was under Greek belligerent occupation. The ad hoc judge appointed by the Greek Government argued that the occupant has the exclusive right to grant a concession to the usufruct of public immovable property. However, the majority did not acknowledge such a rule. The Court found it could decide without ruling on the point. The concession agreement, while concluded in 1913, covered the period 1924-1949, long before which the occupant, Greece, had become the sovereign. World Court Reports. Hudson, ed., Vol. III, pp. 368, 383, 388-89, 407–409.

23 Looking to pre-World War II authority, McNair stated: "It is at any rate arguable that, assuming the new law to fall within the category of that large portion. of national law which persists during the occupation and which the enemy occupant cannot lawfully change or annul, it ought to operate in occupied territory in spite of the absence of power to make it effective during the occupation." McNair, Legal Effects of War (1948) p. 383. The matter is somewhat differently stated in the leading American case: "In short, the legitimate sovereign should be entitled to legislate over occupied territory insofar as such enactments do not conflict with the legitimate rule of the occupying power." State of Netherlands v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York et al., 201 F.2d 455 at 462 (U.S.C.A. 2nd Circuit 1953). See this opinion for a thorough statement of the law and for citations to the relevant cases. "The currently accepted

principle appears to be that the legitimate sovereign may legislate for an occupied portion of his territory, provided that his laws do not conflict with the powers of the occupant as outlined in conventional international law." von Glahn, p. 35, Apparently, only the post-war decisions of Greek courts are contra.

Dept. of State File No. P77 0032-292.

Kempton B. Jenkins, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, replied by letter of October 19, 1976, to a question concerning the applicability to Israeli-occupied territory, formerly under Jordanian rule, of article 47 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (TIAS 3365; 6 UST 3516). The questioner had suggested that it might be an obstacle to peace "for parties other than the Israelis or Jordanians to attempt to introduce changes in situations or government forbidden by the Fourth Geneva Convention's article 47." Mr. Jenkins stated:

A full reading of article 47 and the official International Red Cross commentary on its provisions makes clear that article 47 does not bear directly upon the theoretical possibility [of] a transfer of West Bank territories to a political entity not in existence prior to June 1967. Article 47 provides that protected persons in an occupied territory shall not be deprived of the specific benefits set out in the Fourth Convention through changes introduced into the institutions or government of the occupied territory as a result of occupation, by agreements between the authorities of the occupied territories and the occupying power, or by annexation. This article is humanitarian in character. Its object is not to protect the preexisting political institutions or governmental machinery as such; rather it requires at minimum that if any modifications in the internal organization of an occupied territory take place, they must not deprive protected civilians of the benefits and safeguards spelled out in the Fourth Convention.

The protection of article 47, therefore, does not directly affect the possibility that an eventual political settlement regarding the West Bank may include participation by entities other than Israel and Jordan.

Dept. of State File No. P76 0162-1289. Art. 47 of the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War reads:

Protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power, nor by any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory.

The Security Council of the United Nations, on May 26, 1976, oncluded a series of meetings on the situation in Israeli-occupied rab territories with a statement by French Representative Louis de uiringaud, as President of the Council, expressing the view of the ajority of the members that certain measures taken by Israel in