(4) The opinion of the advisory panel and the reasons therefor shall be submitted to the Council which, after considering all the relevant information, shall decide the dispute.

(5) The Council shall rule on any dispute brought before it within six months of submission of such dispute for its consideration.

(6) Any complaint that any Member has failed to fulfil its obligations under this Agreement shall, at the request of the Member making the complaint, be referred to the Council which shall make a decision on the matter.

(7) No Member shall be found to have been in breach of its obligations under this Agreement except by a distributed simple majority vote. Any finding that a Member is in breach of its obligations under this Agreement shall specify the nature of the breach.

(8) If the Council finds that a Member is in breach of its obligations under this Agreement, it may, without prejudice to other enforcement measures provided for in other Articles of this Agreement, by a distributed two-thirds majority vote, suspend such Member's voting rights in the Council and its right to have its votes cast in the Board until it fulfils its obligations, or the Council may decide to exclude such Member from the Organization under the provisions of Article 66.

(9) A Member may seek the prior opinion of the Executive Board in a matter of dispute or complaint before the matter is discussed by the Council.

S. Ex. H., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. See ante, Ch. 10, § 2, pp. 484-486, for further discussion of the Coffee Agreement, 1976.

U.S.- Brazil Consultations

Secretary of State Kissinger, on the occasion of a visit to Brazil, signed on February 21, 1976, with Brazilian Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, a memorandum of understanding concerning consultations on matters of mutual interest. It calls for semi-annual consultations at the cabinet level on the full range of foreign policy matters, plus any specific issue raised by either side.

The text of the memorandum of understanding is set out below:

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: Inspired by the long tradition of friendship and cooperation between their two peoples:

Reaffirming the need to give wider expression to the solidarity of the Western World and the benefits to be derived from a constructive interpretation of the concept of interdependence among all nations;

Recognizing the responsibility of their two countries to pursue their shared goal of a just and enduring solution to international problems;

Convinced of the importance to the sound development of their respective policies of close and frequent consultations on matters of common interest;

And believing that these considerations call for the establishment of a flexible mechanism permitting open and active communication at the cabinet level, have arrived at the following understanding:

1. The two Governments will normally hold consultations semi-annually, on the full range of foreign policy matters including any specific issue that may be raised by either side. Economic, political, security, cultural, legal, educational and technological subjects, whether bilateral or multilateral, may be discussed within the political framework afforded by the consultations.

2. These consultations will normally be held alternately in Brazil and in the United States on dates to be mutually determined. Special meetings may be called by mutual agreement.

3. The consultations will be conducted by the Minister of Foreign Relations on the part of the Federative Republic of Brazil and by the Secretary of State on the part of the United States of America. The Chairman of the meeting will be the chief of the delegation of the host country.

4. Each delegation will be composed of such other high-ranking officials, including cabinet members, as may be appropriate to the agenda to be discussed. 5. After review of matters of common interest by the delegations, the chiefs of the delegations may propose to their respective governments measures deemed pertinent and appropriate.

6. By joint decision, study groups or working groups may be established to examine particular questions of current interest or to help carry forward special projects.

7. Each party will establish such internal arrangements as it deems appropriate to follow through on the agreed conclusions and recommendations that may arise from the consultations.

8. In addition to these consultations at the cabinet level, consultations will be carried forward on an on-going basis through normal diplomatic channels. These channels will be used for the preparation of a mutually acceptable agenda for the consultations.

9. The foregoing arrangements will complement and in no way replace or detract from the existing channels for transacting business.

10. This memorandum will come into operation upon signature by the Foreign Minister of the Federative Republic of Brazil and of the Secretary of State of the United States of America.

SIGNED in duplicate at Brasilia this twenty-first day of February, 1976, in the Portuguese and English languages.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1916, Mar. 15, 1976, pp. 337-338.

Cyprus

Negotiation

Secretary of State Kissinger, in addressing the U.N. General Assembly on September 30, 1976, stated the willingness of the United States to assist in restoring momentum to the negotiating process on the Cyprus problem but said that a settlement must come from the Cypriot communities themselves. Suggesting that a set of principles might help the parties to resume negotiations, he proposed agreement on the following concepts:

-A settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

-The present dividing lines on Cyprus must be adjusted to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side;

-The territorial arrangement should take into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees;

-A constitutional arrangement should provide conditions under which the two Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs; and

-Security arrangements should be agreed that permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement.

Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1948, Oct. 25, 1976, p. 503. The U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 12, 1976, adopted by a vote of 94 to 1(Turkey), with 27(U.S.)) abstentions, Res. 21/12, concerning the question of Cyprus. It calls for implementation of earlier GA and Security Council resolutions, requests the Secretary-General to provide his good offices for the negotiations between the two communities, and decides to include the Cyprus item in the provisional agenda of the 32d sess. Senator George McGovern, U.S. Representative to the Assembly, made a statement in plenary on Nov. 11, expressing the hope that the two parties would come together under the Secretary-General's auspices to consider the set of ideas put forward by Secretary Kissinger, supra. Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1955. Dec. 13, 1976. p. 721.

Middle East

In the U.N. Security Council on January 26, 1976, the United States vetoed a six-power draft resolution (S/11940) which would have affirmed, inter alia:

(a) the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination; (b) the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes or to receive compensation for their property;

(c) that Israel should withdraw from ail Arab territories occupied since June 1967; and

(d) that appropriate arrangements should be established to guarantee the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, within secure and recognized boundaries, of all states in the area.

The resolution would also have decided that the foregoing should be taken fully into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the framework of the United Nations for the establishment of peace in the Middle East.

The United States opposed the draft resolution on the grounds that it attempted to revise the negotiating framework established in Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973) and accepted by the principal parties to the Middle East problem. The United States argued further that altering the framework without agreement of all parties would have been seriously harmful to the future of the peacemaking process. In addition, the United States abstained on a proposed United Kingdom amendment that would have added a new operative paragraph reaffirming the provisions of Resolutions 242 and 338 and declaring that nothing in the draft resolution superseded them. The United States stated its position to be that it would be inappropriate for a document to alter the rights, entitlements, and expectations of those resolutions and at the same time reaffirm them.

In explanation of the U.S. veto, the Department of State issued a statement on January 26, 1976, which reiterated the view that a solution to the Middle East problem lay in preserving the framework for negotiations established in Resolutions 242 and 338, and concluded:

We believe that we have an obligation to keep open and intact the negotiating framework and to assist in developing a common understanding of the problems that remain before us. We are confident that progress leading to an eventual solution of all the issues is possible, utilizing—and, in fact, only by utilizing-the present framework; and we are committed to assist in every way we can to facilitate such progress . . . .

For the text of the draft resolution, and statements made by Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan in opposition to it on Jan. 19 and Jan. 26, 1976, as well as the Dept. of State statement of Jan. 26, 1976, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1912, Feb. 16, 1976, pp. 191-197. See also U.N. Doc. S/PV.1876, Jan. 19, 1976, pp. 6-12, and S/PV.1879, Jan. 26, 1976, pp. 41-46.

On December 9, 1976, the U.N. General Assembly adopted, by a vote of 122-2-8 (the United States and Israel alone opposing), Resolution 31/62 calling for a reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East not later than the end of March 1977. The resolution, sponsored by Egypt, directed the Secretary-General to resume his contacts with the parties to the dispute and to report to the Security Council by March 1, 1977, following which the Council is requested to meet. At the same plenary meeting the Assembly adopted a Syrian resolution (31-61) by a vote of 91-11 (U.S.)-29, calling for early resumption of the Middle East Peace Conference with participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and condemning Israel.

In explaining the U.S. votes to the General Assembly, Ambassador William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative at the United Nations, emphasized that the United States did not disagree with the underlying purpose of the Egyptian resolution, which was to emphasize the urgency of resuming the negotiating process. However, he said, the United States disagreed with specific elements of the resolution, most importantly its arbitrary deadline for reconvening the Geneva Conference. This, he stated, was not a matter for the General Assembly, but rather it was a matter for the parties to that Conference themselves to decide in consultation with the United States and the Soviet Union as cochairmen.

Ambassador Scranton also objected to the artificial time frame set for a meeting of the Security Council and questioned the utility of any such effort by the General Assembly to determine the pace and form of Middle East negotiations.

For the statement by Ambassador Scranton in the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 9. 1976, and the texts of the two resolutions, see Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXVI, No. 1960, Jan. 17, 1977, pp. 37-40.

Israeli-occupied Territories

A veto by the United States on March 25, 1976, blocked a draft Security Council resolution on the situation in the territories occupied by Israel, which, inter alia, would have had the Security Council "deplore Israel's failure to put a halt to actions tending to change the status of the city of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken to that effect." It would also have called on Israel to refrain from all measures against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories. The Council meeting had been requested by Libya and Pakistan after an Israeli lower court ruled that Jews had the right to pray on the Temple Mount, or Haram al-Sharif, a site sacred to both Jews and Moslems. The Government of Israel, which since 1967 had prevented this because of the danger of disrupting public order, appealed the decision to the Israeli Supreme Court which, in a similar case, had sustained the Government ban. Riots and demonstrations were also occurring throughout the West Bank and Jerusalem, fanned by Palestinian fears of increasing Israeli settlements in the territories and Palestinian criticism of Israeli handling of demonstrators.

On March 23, 1976, Ambassador William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, stated the longstanding U.S. policy that Israeli occupation should be dealt with in the context of a peace settlement negotiated on the basis of Security Council Resolution 242(1967). He stated that Israel's "punctilious administration" of the holy places in Jerusalem had greatly minimized the tensions inherent in the situation. He reaffirmed that the part of Jerusalem captured by Israel was "occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power" and that unilateral attempts to predetermine its future have no standing.

Ambassador Scranton declared that substantial resettlement of Israeli civilian population into the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, was illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949 Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; TIAS 3365; 6 UST 3516). He said, in part:

[M]y Government believes that international law sets the appropriate standards. An occupier must maintain the occupied areas as intact and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation and be