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for Compliance with the Continental Shelf Fisheries Resources section of the Bartlett Act, 78 Stat. 194 (16 U.S.C. 1081-1086). The Standards, which constitute 50 Code of Federal Regulations Part 295, include in the regulations a list of Continental Shelf Fisheries Resources of the United States and set forth prohibited acts and a procedure for enforcing those portions of the Bartlett Act which make it unlawful for any vessel except a vessel of the United States, or any person in charge of such vessel, to engage in the taking of any Continental Shelf fishery resource except as provided by the Act or an international agreement to which the United States is a party. The enforcement procedures subject any vessel engaging in fishing to boarding by an enforcement officer when that officer has reason to believe such vessel is engaged in the taking of any Continental Shelf fishery resource appertaining to the United States.

The species listed in the regulations have been found to constitute a Continental Shelf fishery resource by either (1) the Offshore Shrimp Fisheries Act of 1973 (87 Stat. 1061), or (2) the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State.

Fed. Reg., Vol. 41, No. 123, June 24, 1976, pp. 26019-26020.

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Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger presented, on April 8, 1976, a series of proposals regarding deep sea mining, aimed at contributing to a solution of the problem by the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. In a statement delivered in New York, he proposed, inter alia, a system of parallel access to seabed resources, under which, whenever a deep seabed mining site is set aside for state or private exploitation, a similar site would be set aside for the international community. He also suggested a temporary limit on production of seabed minerals, which would be tied to the projected growth in the world nickel market, currently estimated to be about 6 percent a year, that would in effect limit production of other minerals contained in deep seabed nodules, such as copper. Portions of his statement devoted to the deep seabeds follow:

First, to ensure an equitable decisionmaking system, the United States continues to believe that the Treaty should authorize the formation of an International Seabed Resource Authority to supervise exploration and development of the deep seabeds. The Authority would be comprised of four principal organs:

-An Assembly of all member states, to give general policy guidance;

-A Council, to serve as the executive, policy-level and main decisionmaking forum, setting operational and environmental rules for mining, and supervising the contracts for deep seabed mining;

-A Tribunal, to resolve disputes through legal processes; and --A Secretariat, to carry out the day-to-day administrative activities of the Authority.

The United States proposes

-that the power of the Authority be carefully detailed by the Treaty in order to preserve all those rights regarding the uses of the seas which fall outside the competence of the Authority, and to avoid any jurisdictional overlap with other international organizations;

-that the composition and structure of the Council reflect the producer and consumer interests of those states most concerned with seabed mining. All nations whose vital national concerns are affected by decisions of the Authority must have a voice and influence in the Council commensurate with their interests; -that the proposed permanent seabed Tribunal adjudicate questions of interpretation of the Treaty and of the powers of the International Authority raised by parties to the Treaty or by private companies engaged in seabed mining. Without a Tribunal, unresolved contention is a certainty. Such a body will be necessary if any seabed proposal is to win wide acceptance.

Second, to ensure that all nations, developed and developing, have adequate access to seabed mining sites:

-The United States proposes that the Treaty should guarantee nondiscriminatory access for states and their nationals to deep seabed resources under specified and reasonable conditions. The requirement of guaranteed access will not be met if the Treaty contains arbitrary or restrictive limitations on the number of mine sites which any nation might exploit. And such restrictions are unnecessary because deep seabed mining cannot be monopolized; there are many more productive seabed mining sites than conceivably can be mined for centuries to come.

-The United States accepts that an "Enterprise" should be established as part of the International Seabed Resource Authority and given the right to exploit the deep seabeds under the same conditions as apply to all mining.

-The United States could accept as part of an overall settlement, a system in which prime mining sites are reserved for exclusive exploitation by the Enterprise or by the developing countries directly-if this approach meets with broad support. Under this system, each individual contractor would propose two mine sites for exploitation. The Authority would then select one of these sites which would be mined by the Authority directly or made available to developing countries at its discretion. The other site would be mined by the contractor on his own.

-The United States proposes that the International Authority should supervise a system of revenue sharing from mining activities for the use of the international community, primarily for the needs of the poorest countries. These revenues will not only

advance the growth of developing countries; they will provide tangible evidence that a fair share in global economic activity can be achieved by a policy of cooperation. Revenue sharing could be based either on royalties or on a system of profit sharing from contract mining. Such a system would give reality to the designation of the deep seabeds as the common heritage of all mankind. -Finally, the United States is prepared to make a major effort to enhance the skills and access of developing countries to advanced deep seabed mining technology in order to assist their capabilities in this field. For example, incentives should be established for private companies to participate in agreements to share technology and train personnel from developing countries. Third, in response to the legitimate concerns of land-based producers of minerals found in the deep seabeds, we offer the following steps as an additional major contribution to the negotiations:

-The United States is prepared to accept a temporary limitation, for a period fixed in the Treaty on production of the seabed minerals tied to the projected growth in the world nickel market, currently estimated to be about 6 percent a year. This would in effect limit production of other minerals contained in deep seabed nodules, including copper. After this period, the seabed production should be governed by overall market conditions.

-The United States proposes that the International Seabed Authority have the right to participate in any international agreements on seabed-produced commodities in accordance with the amount of production for which it is directly responsible. The United States is prepared to examine with flexibility the details of arrangements concerning the relationships between the Authority and any eventual commodity agreements.

-The United States proposes that some of the revenues of the International Seabed Resource Authority be used for adjustment assistance and that the World Bank, regional development banks, and other international institutions assist countries to improve their competitiveness or diversify into other kinds of production if they are seriously injured by production from the deep seabeds. An urgent task of the International Authority, when it is established, will be to devise an adjustment assistance program in collaboration with other international institutions for countries which suffer economic dislocations as a result of deep seabed mining.

The United States believes that the world community has before it a grave responsibility. Our country cannot delay in its efforts to develop an assured supply of critical resources through our deep seabed mining projects. We strongly prefer an international agreement to provide a stable legal environment before such development begins, one that ensures that all resources are managed for the good of the global community and that all can participate. But if an agreement is not reached this year it will be increasingly difficult to resist pressure to proceed unilaterally


Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXIV, No. 1922, Apr. 26, 1976, pp. 533-542.

Permanent Regime

The United States put forward significant new proposals on the deep seabeds at the resumed session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, which met in New York August 26-September 17, 1976. It indicated its readiness to agree to a financing arrangement for the proposed Enterprise (the independent operating arm of the International Seabed Authority) designed to enable the Enterprise to begin mining operations within a reasonable time span. The United States further proposed that there could be a review, possibly in 25 years, to determine if the provisions of the treaty regarding the system of seabed exploitation were working adequately. Secretary of State Kissinger described the U.S. initiatives, in a statement to heads of delegations at the Conference, on September 1, 1976, as follows:

At the last session, the United States proposed the system of parallel access in which, concurrently with any state or private mining of the deep seabeds, a similar site would have to be set aside for the international community to be exploited or mined by the international community . . .

On reflection, many countries have expressed reservations about this concept on many grounds. . .one of the principal grounds was that it did no good to set aside a part of the mining sites for the international community if the international community did not possess the financial resources with which to mine or to put its Enterprise into business and if there were no provisions for the transfer of technology to the international community.

We have taken these views into serious consideration. And. therefore, on the occasion of my meeting with some of the members of Committee I, I proposed on behalf of the U.S. Government that the United States would be prepared to agree to a means of financing the Enterprise in such a manner that the Enterprise could begin its mining operation either concurrently with the mining of state or private enterprises or within an agreed timespan that was practically concurrent.

We proposed also that this would include agreed provisions for the transfer of technology so that the existing advantage of certain industrial states would be equalized over a period of time.

We have also taken into account the views that have been expressed by some delegates that it might be premature to establish a permanent regime for the deep seabeds, for the exploitation of the deep seabeds, at the beginning of a process of technology and to freeze it for an indefinite period.

For this reason we have proposed today that there could be periodic review conferences at intervals to be negotiated-for example, 25 years-in which the methods by which mining in the deep seabeds takes place and the apportionment between various sectors could be periodically reexamined.

The United States has made its proposals, which represent significant restrictions on our freedom of action, for the sake of international peace and international harmony and for the purpose of demonstrating that in this new area of mankind's activities we will make every effort to avoid the sort of rivalries that characterized colonial exploitations of the 19th century.

But there are limits beyond which no American leader can go. And if those limits are attempted to be exceeded, then we will find ourselves in the regrettable and tragic situation where at sea-just as previously on land-unilateralism will reign supreme.

We in the United States would not, in the short term, have any disadvantages from this-quite the contrary. But we are part of mankind, and we believe that an opportunity would be lost that may not come again.




Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV, No. 1944, Sept. 27, 1976, pp. 397-399.

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Regime of Transit Passage

The straits articles set forth in the revised single negotiating text (RSNT) submitted by the Chairman of the Second Committee at the fourth session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, March 15-May 7, 1976, provide for the regime of transit passage considered by the United States to be an essential element in the adoption of a 12-mile maximum breadth of the territorial seas. U.S. delegations to the 1976 sessions of the Conference reported general agreement among states on the subject, although noting that a small number of states sought changes, varying according to their geographical location and configuration.

Ch. 2 of the Second Committee's text, entitled "Straits used for international navigation," follows:

Article 33

Juridical status of waters forming straits used for
international navigation

1. The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation established in this chapter shall not in other respects affect the status of the waters forming such straits nor the exercise by the states bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil. 2. The sovereignty or jurisdiction of the states bordering the straits is exercised subject to this chapter and to other rules of international law.

Article 34
Scope of this Chapter

Nothing in this chapter shall affect:

(a) Any areas of internal waters within a strait, except where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with article 6 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which had not previously been considered as such;

(b) The status of the waters beyond the territorial seas of states bordering straits as exclusive economic zones or high seas, or

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