filled concentration camps with "class enemies," depriving of their most fundamental rights all those who dared to differ from their brutal

orthodoxies even in thought. Decency, respect for human rights, and love of one's neighbor, be he ever so distant geographically, are as indivisible Humanity cannot afford to remain silent and by its silence condone

as peace.

these horrors.

The Baha'is of the United States feel genuine sympathy for the long suffering Iranian people. We pray for their peaceful and happy future. Yet we cannot remain indifferent to the sufferings of our Iranian brethren at the hands of bigots who have no compunctions about shedding innocent blood. We call upon our fellow citizens and our elected representatives to proclaim that America will not acquiesce in oppression and that its perpetrators will have to answer for their deeds in the court of world opinion.

Note: The following exhibits were displayed during the hearing: a map of Iran showing location of events cited; list of Baha'is executed in Iran; "The Baha'i Faith and Its World Community"; Resolutions: Alaska & Illinois; statements in the Congressional Record; resolutions by International bodies; records of Parlimentary debates and resolutions: Canada, Australia, West Germany, United Kingdom--House of Lords; Human Rights Commission of the Federation of Protestant Churches in Switzerland; report of Amnesty International; official documentation testifying to discrimination against the Baha'i community since the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Iranian Constitution; and photographs of executed Baha'is. This information can be obtained from the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is of the United States, 536 Sheridan Road, Wilmette, Illinois 60091.

Mr. BONKER. Thank you, Judge Nelson, for an excellent and moving statement.

I would now like to call upon Prof. Kazemzadeh.

Is that close?

Mr. KAZEMZADEH. Yes, sir.

Mr. BONKER. He is vice chairman of the National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha'is, and the chairman of the Middle-Eastern Studies at Yale University.

I have heard you speak before and have come to respect your knowledge and commitment to the Baha'is. I also have access to an article which you authored, which appeared in the New York Review of Books. It is an excellent piece and gives us a good historical perspective on the Baha'is. So, if you have no objection, I would like to have the article included in the official record.1 Mr. BONKER. You may begin.

STATEMENT OF FIRUZ KAZEMZADEH, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SPIRITUAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BAHA'IS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. KAZEMZADEH. I prepared a rather long statement, but I will summarize it, even though, for me, summarizing things is much more difficult than for my colleagues, because as a college professor, like Pavlov's dogs, I am conditioned to speak 50 minutes on my topic.

Mr. BONKER. We can sympathize, Professor. We have the same problems here in the House.

Mr. KAZEMZADEH. Judge Nelson has very eloquently presented the case of the Baha'is.

I would like to take this occasion to look back into history in order to explain the intensity of hatred that the Baha'is meet from the Shiite clergy. Perhaps it is not known to too many that the Shiite sect of Islam became the state of religion in Iran relatively late in history. It was only in the 16th century, under the aegis of a native Iranian dynasty, that Shiism was made a state religion, and the rival sect of Islam, the Sunni sect, was virtually deprived of its rights.

In the 18th century, Iran went through a period of anarchy, but both the rule of the Safavids and the 18th century anarchy worked to the benefit of the Islamic clergy, because it was the one institution to which the people could relate. In the 19th century, under the rule of a new dynasty, the Qajars, who came from Iranian tribesmen, and who had no legitimate right to the throne, the clergy once again became the first estate of the realm, the one institution that had the confidence and the respect of the Muslims. They became so powerful that they could raise crowds in the streets of the cities, and they provoked a war with Russia with disastrous results for Iran and loss of territory.

In 1828, they murdered the entire staff of the Russian Embassy in Tehran, something which reminds one of the case of the American hostages, only much worse, because in that case the Minister and the whole staff died.

1 See app. 5.

The reason for this power, the basic reason for the power, was that the clergy presented itself to be the vicars of the Hidden Imam. The Hidden Imam who was the 12th in the line of descent from the prophet Muhammad according to the Shiite belief, had the only legitimate right to authority over the faithful.

The Imam had disappeared sometime late in the ninth century, and his return was that great hope in which all the Shiite Muslims believed.

In the intermittent period between the disappearance of the Imam and his return, the Shiite clergy claimed to be his representative.

When the Baha'i religion began in 1844 with a young merchant from the city of Shiraz, Seyyed Ali Muhammad, the Bab, the title, itself, indicated his claim to the people. This was a direct challenge to the authority of the clergy. For 1,000 years, they were the intermediary. They conveyed the will of the Imam to the people; and now here was a young man who claimed that he exclusively, in fact, had that capacity.

Later on, as this new religion evolved, the Bab proclaimed himself to be a prophet of equal stature to Muhammad. This was a challenge to the belief that Muhammad was the seal of the prophets, and the Bab introduced such notions as the allegorical interpretations of such traditional beliefs as the time of the end and bodily resurrection. All such notions he interpreted in a poetic sense. He abrogated certain laws, certain matters relating to prayer, the laws of inheritance, to ritual purity, et cetera, and also laws and regulations relating to the status of women whom the Bab made equal to men in his community.

The Bab also denounced injustice wherever he found it, including the injustices perpetrated by the rulers and the clergy. Last but not least, he preached the coming of a yet greater prophet who would bring the reign of righteousness to Earth. These were the reasons why the clergy could not permit his community to exist. They counterattacked, enlisting Government support, and began largescale massacres in which most of the adherents of the Bab met their death. From about 1852 to this date, either large scale or small scale, either continuous or intermittent persecutions of the Baha'is have been the rule, rather than the exception.

I might say, parenthetically, that in my own family, there were several members who met death; and you have here a photograph of my own great grandfather, Haji Iman, chained around his neck to several other people, two of whom were killed. He and one more survived.

This gives you a notion of what was happening in the middle of the 19th century.

Once these massacres took place, the clergy felt that they had won; that there was no longer much of a threat.

Of course, they were mistaken, because, in 1863, one of the few surviving leaders of the Babi community, one who became known as Baha'u'llah, proclaimed himself to be the one predicted by the Bab, reorganized the Babi community, and, in fact, launched what is now known as the Baha'i faith.

It would be very difficult and perhaps out of place to try to summarize the various teachings of the Baha'i faith, but a few of them

ought to be mentioned, because they largely explain the particular quality of hatred that is directed against the Baha'is.

Contrary to the beliefs of the Shiite clergy, Baha'u'llah claimed that God is unknowable in his essence. Contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic clergy, Baha'u'llah preached that revelation is endless and progressive.

Baha'u'llah talked about the task of man. One part of the task is the cultivation of inner virtues, inner qualities, and the other, the advancement of civilization, a notion which was completely foreign to the Islamic clergy.

Baha'u'llah taught the unity of mankind, equality of races, world peace through collective security universal education, independent investigation of truth which, by the way, was also a scandalous notion, because in Shiite Islam, one reaches truth through imitation, through choosing an elder and being like him; so to investigate on your own, was a scandalous innovation.

So, the clergy transferred its hostility from the religion of the Bab now transformed into the Baha'i faith, to the followers of the new prophet and as the Baha'i community grew, the hostility grew within the clergy.

Allegations were made against the Baha'is. It was said that the Baha'is were renegades, and, therefore, deserved death; that the Baha'is led vile lives, committed all kinds of abominations, and, to all of this, the Baha'is were never given the right to reply, no more than today, when whatever is stated in the press or in any public forum in Tehran or in other cities of Iran goes unanswered because the Baha'is are not given an opportunity to do so.

Now in the last 50 years, certain very dramatic changes have occurred in the structure of the Iranian society. Modernization led to a relative decline in the power of the clergy. New emotions came to take the place of older ones. For instance, nationalism began to play a very important role. But the clergy simply shifted their terminology. Now instead of attacking the Baha'is on a theological ground, they began to attack them as unpatriotic, as tied to foreigners, and the foreigners were usually Russia and Britain, later the United States and Israel. I am surprised that Iraq has not been included.

Spurious documents have been produced. There is a document which is the Iranian equivalent of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The memoirs of Prince Dalqurki claim that it was he who founded the Baha'i religion in order to disrupt Iran by creating a schism within Islam. Unfortunately, the authors did not know Russian history, and therefore they have Czar Alexander II ascending the throne in 1844 when Nicholas I was czar.

Other examples of this sort are easy to find. However, these spurious documents have influenced very profoundly the thinking of modern Iranians, including that of the educated classes. And while the power of the clergy continued to decline, especially between 1925 and 1941, their essential anti-Baha'i attitudes continued to spread among nonclerical segments of the population.

In 1941, with the downfall of Shah Reza Pahlavi, the father of the last Shah, they acquired freedom to act. They began to form clerical societies. They began to participate in politics. In 1952 and 1953 they supported Mosaddeq, the Iranian nationalist leader, but

only as long as they thought that Mosaddeq was going to weaken the Shah's power. When they began to think that perhaps he would weaken the power of the monarchy to the extent it might fall and then they would be confronted with a nationalist nonmonarchie Iran, they switched sides and this was one of the internal causes of the downfall of Dr. Mosaddeq. The man who abandoned Dr. Mosaddeq was one of the patrons of the then young Ayatollah Khomeini. There are direct personal connections between all of these men.

Once the regime fell, the Shah had to pay the clergy, and the payoff was the permission given to the clergy to conduct antiBaha'i campaigns. The man in charge of these campaigns was given access to Government radio. He was permitted to go with others to form a number of anti-Baha'i societies such as the Society of Islamic Propaganda, which today is one of the most influential societies that occupies a quasi-governmental position, in fact, in Iran.

It was through the activities of these societies encouraged by the SAVAK, largely financed by the SAVAK, that the Iranian Government participated in the anti-Baha'i campaign of 1955. In this campaign, the army occupied the national Baha'i headquarters in Tehran, and the chief of the imperial staff himself dealt the first blow with the pickax to the dome of the large meeting hall over that national Baha'i center. It is a pity that we do not have here another photograph of the same event taken from a slightly different angle that shows a mullah in a white turban and black robes looking with a beatific smile as the dome is being demolished. I am sure we could provide the subcommittee with that photograph as well.

Mr. DYMALLY. What year was that?

Mr. KAZEMZADEH. 1955, under Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. Mr. DYMALLY. While you have taken a slight pause, what is the basis for the hate, the dislike of the Baha'is by the Muslems?

Mr. KAZEMZADEH. The basis is purely religious and theologic. It is the challenge to the authority of the clergy as intermediaries between God and man, to simplify.

Mr. DYMALLY. And the Government now?

Mr. KAZEMZADEH. And now they are also the Government, so you see the dilemma.

Mr. DYMALLY. Are there other minority religions in Iran, Christians?

Mr. KAZEMZADEH. There are, but it is easy to deal with the Christians. They were there before Islam. They have been legitimized by the Prophet Muhammad in the Koran. They are granted tolerance provided they do not convert Moslems. Under Islamic tradition, which does not go all the way back to Muhammad himself, which was created later, after the Prophet, anyone who changes his religion from Islam to anything else deserves death. So conversion to Christianity would be punished by death. However, there have been very few conversions to Christianity or Judaism in Iran in the last 150 years, but large-scale conversions to the Baha'i religion.

Mr. DYMALLY. What is the conception of those converting to Baha'i of other religions?