4. Arms Control Provisions in Department of Defense
Authorization Acts 1

a. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and

1989

Partial text of Public Law 100-180 [H.R.1748], 100 Stat. 1019, approved December 4, 1987

AN ACT To authorize appropriations for fiscal years 1988 and 1989 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe personnel strengths for such fiscal years for the Armed Forces, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

TITLE IX-MATTERS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL

SEC. 901. MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that

(1) the proliferation of nuclear weapons and of missiles capable of the delivery of nuclear weapons is a threat to international peace and security;

(2) in the early 1980's, the danger of the proliferation of such weapons and missiles was formally recognized in discussions among the governments of the United States, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom; and

(3) these seven governments, after four years of negotiations, on April 7, 1987, concluded an agreement known as the Missile Technology Control Regime, for the purpose of limiting the proliferation of missiles capable of the delivery of nuclear weapons (and hardware and technology related to such missiles) throughout the world.

(b) EXPRESSIONS OF CONGRESS.-The Congress

(1) expresses its firm support for the Missile Technology Control Regime as a means of enhancing international peace and security;

(2) expresses its strong hope that all nations of the world will adhere to the Guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime; and

(3) expresses its expectation that all relevant agencies of the United States Government will ensure the fully effective implementation of this regime.

1 Other miscellaneous provisions contained in Department of Defense authorization acts that relate to arms control issues, including the Strategic Defense Initiative, may be found at Volume I. Section A-5.

(c) REPORT ON MANPOWER REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.-(1) Not later than February 1, 1988, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report

(A) identifying the functional responsibilities of the Department of Defense for implementing the Missile Technology Control Regime;

(B) describing the number and skills of personnel currently available in the Department of Defense to perform these functions; and

(C) assessing the adequacy of these resources for the effective performance of these responsibilities.

(2) The report required by paragraph (1) shall identify the total number of current Department of Defense full-time employees or military personnel and the grades of such personnel and the special knowledge, experience, and expertise of such personnel, required to carry out each of the following responsibilities of the Department under the regime:

(A) Review of private-sector export license applications and government-to- government cooperative activities.

(B) Intelligence analysis and activities.

(C) Policy coordination.

(D) International liaison activity.

(E) Enforcement and technology security operations.
(F) Technical review.

(3) The report shall include the Secretary's assessment of the adequacy of staffing in each of the categories specified in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (2) and shall make recommendations concerning measures, including legislation if necessary, to eliminate any identified staffing deficiencies and to improve interagency coordination with respect to the regime. SEC. 902. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds the following:

(1) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party to the Treaty from deploying ballistic missile early warning radars except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

(2) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty prohibits each party to the Treaty from deploying an anti-ballistic missile system to defend its national territory and from providing a base for any such nationwide defense.

(3) Large phased-array radars were recognized during negotiation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as the critical long lead-time element of a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles.

(4) In 1983 the United States discovered the construction, in the interior of the Soviet Union near the town of Krasnoyarsk, of a large phased-array radar that has subsequently been judged to be for ballistic missile early warning and tracking.

(5) The Krasnoyarsk radar is more than 700 kilometers from the Soviet-Mongolian border and is not directed outward but

instead, faces the northeast Soviet border more than 4,500 kilometers away.

(6) The Krasnoyarsk radar is identical to other Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars and is ideally situated to fill the gap that would otherwise exist in a nationwide Soviet ballistic missile early warning radar network.

(7) The President has certified that the Krasnoyarsk radar is an unequivocal violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of the Congress that the Soviet Union is in violation of its legal obligation under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

SEC. 903. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE BY THE SOVIET UNION WITH THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

(a) IN GENERAL.-The President shall submit to Congress, not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, a report discussing the use of the current official United States method of estimating the yield of Soviet underground nuclear tests to determine the extent to which the Soviet Union is complying with the 150 kiloton limit on underground nuclear tests contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

(b) FORM AND CONTENT OF REPORT.-The report shall be submitted in both classified form and (if possible) unclassified form and shall include the following matters:

(1) A discussion of whether past assessments made by the United States of the extent of Soviet compliance with the 150 kiloton limit contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty would have been different if the United States, in making those assessments, had used the current official United States method of estimating the yield of underground nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union.

(2) The number of nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union after March 31, 1976, that have a central value exceeding 150 kilotons yield (estimated on the basis of the current official method used by the United States in estimating underground nuclear test yields), the central value of those tests (estimated on such basis), and the dates on which those tests were conducted.

(3) The number, dates, and estimated central values of tests, if any, conducted by the United States after March 31, 1976, which, if measured on the basis of the current official method used by the United States in estimating Soviet underground nuclear test yields (taking into account the differences between the United States and Soviet test sites), would have an indicated central value exceeding 150 kilotons yield.

(4) The number of tests conducted by the United States after March 31, 1976, if any, which actually had yields exceeding 150 kilotons, the estimated central value of each such test, and the date on which each such test was conducted.

(5) A description of all nuclear testing activities of the Soviet Union which the President has found to be likely violations of the legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the dates on which those activities took place, and the specific

legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty likely to have been violated by the Soviet Union in conducting such activities.

(6) A discussion of whether and, if so, the extent to which, the President, in arriving at his finding that several nuclear tests conducted by the Soviet Union constituted a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, considered the mutual agreement contained in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty which permits one or two minor, unintended breaches of the 150 kiloton limit per year to be considered nonviolations of the Treaty.

(7) A detailed comparison of the current official method used by the United States Government in estimating Soviet underground nuclear test yields with the method replaced by the current method, and the date on which the current official method was adopted by the United States.

SEC. 904. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS AND DECLARATIONS CONCERNING ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

(a) CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The United States and the Soviet Union are currently engaged in negotiations to conclude a treaty on intermediaterange nuclear forces (INF) and are continuing serious negotiations on other issues of vital importance to the national security of the United States.

(2) The current negotiations, which reflect delicate compromises on both sides, are a culmination of years of detailed and complex negotiations in which the negotiators for the United States have been pursuing a policy consistently advocated by the past two Presidents regarding nuclear arms control in the European theater.

(3) While recognizing fully that the President, under clause 2, section 2, article II of the Constitution, has the power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, the Congress also recognizes the special responsibility conferred by the Founding Fathers on the Senate in requiring that it give its advice and consent before a treaty may be ratified by the United States and that in carrying out this responsibility the Senate is accountable to the people of the United States and has a duty to ensure that no treaty is ratified which would be detrimental to the welfare and security of the United States.

(4) In recognition of this responsibility, the Senate has established a special continuing oversight body, the Arms Control Observer Group, which over the last two and one-half years has functioned to provide advice and counsel to the President and his negotiators, when appropriate, on a continuing basis during the course of the negotiations to achieve an INF treaty.

(5) The Senate and the President both have a role under the Constitution in the making of treaties and Congress as a whole has a role under the Constitution in the regulating of expenditures, including expenditures for weapons systems that may be the subject of treaty negotiations.

(b) CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATIONS.-In light of the findings in subsection (a), Congress

(1) fully supports the efforts of the President to negotiate stabilizing, equitable, and verifiable arms reduction treaties with the Soviet Union;

(2) endorses the principle of mutuality and reciprocity in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and cautions that neither the Congress nor the President should take actions which are unilateral concessions to the Soviet Union; and

(3) urges the President to take care that no provision is agreed to in those negotiations that would be harmful to the security of the United States or its allies and friends.

(c) DECLARATION OF THE SENATE.-The Senate declares that it will reserve judgment regarding the approval of any arms control treaty until it has conducted a thorough examination of the provisions of the treaty and has assured itself that those provisions(1) are effectively verifiable; and

(2) serve to enhance the strength and security of the United States and its allies and friends.

SEC. 905. REPORT ON MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF THE ELIMINATION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES

(a) REPORT REQUIREMENT.-Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report examining the military consequences of any arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that would provide for the elimination of all strategic ballistic missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union.

(b) MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED.-Such report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form and shall include a discussion of the strategic, budgetary, and force structure implications of an agreement described in subsection (a) for

(1) conventional defenses of the United States and its allies in Europe, the Far East, and other regions vital to the national security of the United States;

(2) tactical nuclear deterrence by the United States in those regions;

(3) strategic offensive retaliatory systems of the United States that would not be affected by such an agreement, including bomber forces and cruise missiles;

(4) air defenses of the United States needed to counter bomber forces and cruise missiles of the Soviet Union;

(5) Strategic Defense Initiative programs designed to provide possible defenses against strategic ballistic missiles; and

(6) any new programs which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may consider necessary in order for the United States to protect its national security interests in light of the relative advantage conferred by such an agreement on other nations possessing nuclear weapons whose strategic ballistic missile forces would not be affected by the agreement.