nations and waiver are reported to the Congress. Any such report shall include

(A) a detailed justification for each of the determinations;

(B) an assessment of the impact on national security of the removal of the Soviet Embassy from Mt. Alto; and

(C) specify the steps that have been or will be taken to achieve the requirements of paragraphs (1) (B) and (C). (4) NONDELEGATABILITY.-The President may not delegate the responsibility for making the determination and waiver permitted by paragraph (1).

(d) NOTIFICATION OF UNAVAILABILITY OF MOUNT ALTO.-If the President does not waive subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall notify the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the Mount Alto site will cease to be available to that Government for any purpose as of the date which is 1 year and 10 days after the earliest date on which the President could make the waiver under subsection (c).

(e) PROHIBITION ON FUTURE USE OF MOUNT ALTO SITE BY FOREIGN MISSIONS.-If subsection (b) takes effect, the Mount Alto site may not be made available for use thereafter by a foreign mission for any purpose.

SEC. 152. RECOVERY OF DAMAGES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT THE NEW UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

It is the sense of the Congress that the arbitration process between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is currently under way with respect to damages arising from delays in the construction of the new United States Embassy in Moscow, should include Soviet reimbursement of the full costs incurred by the United States as a result of the intelligence activities of the Soviet Union directed at the new United States Embassy in Moscow.

SEC. 153. UNITED STATES-SOVIET RECIPROCITY IN MATTERS RELATING TO EMBASSIES.

(a) REQUIREMENT FOR RECIPROCITY IN CERTAIN MATTERS.—The Secretary of State shall exercise the authority granted in title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (relating to foreign missions) to obtain the full cooperation of the Soviet Government in achieving the following objectives by October 1, 1989:

(1) FINANCE.-United States diplomatic and consular posts in the Soviet Union not pay more than fair value for goods or services as a result of the Soviet Government's control over Soviet currency valuation and over the pricing of goods and services.

(2) ACCESS TO GOODS AND SERVICES.-United States diplomatic and consular posts in the Soviet Union have full access to goods and services, including utilities.

(3) REAL PROPERTY.-The real property used for office purposes, the real property used for residential purposes, and the real property used for all other purposes by United States diplomatic and consular posts in the Soviet Union is comparable in terms of quantity and quality to the real property used for

each of those purposes by diplomatic and consular posts of the Soviet mission to the United States.

(b) SOVIET CONSULATES IN THE UNITED STATES.-The Secretary of State shall not allow the Soviet mission to the United States to occupy any new consulate in the United States until the United States mission in Kiev is able to occupy secure permanent facilities.

(c) SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.-The Secretary of the Treasury shall provide to the Secretary of State such assistance with respect to the implementation of paragraph (1) of subsection (a) as the Secretary of State may request.

(d) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.-Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Congress a report setting forth the actions taken and planned to be taken in carrying out subsection (a).

SEC. 154. REPORT ON PERSONNEL OF SOVIET STATE TRADING ENTERPRISES.

Not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the Congress a report discussing whether the number of personnel of Soviet state trading enterprises in the United States should be reduced.

SEC. 155. PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM FOR EMBASSIES IN HIGH INTELLIGENCE THREAT COUNTRIES.

(a) SPECIAL SECURITY PROGRAM.-The Secretary of State shall develop and implement, within three months after the date of enactment of this Act, a special personnel security program for personnel of the Department of State assigned to United States diplomatic and consular posts in high intelligence threat countries who are responsible for security at those posts and for any individuals performing guard functions at those posts. Such program shall include

(1) selection criteria and screening to ensure suitability for assignment to high intelligence threat countries;

(2) counterintelligence awareness and related training;

(3) security reporting and command arrangements designed to counter intelligence threats; and

(4) length of duty criteria and policies regarding rest and recuperative absences.

(b) REPORT TO CONGRESS.-Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary of State shall report to the Congress on the special personnel security program required by subsection (a).

(c) DEFINITION.-As used in subsection (a), the term "high intelligence threat country" means

(1) a country listed as a Communist country in section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961; and

(2) any other country designated as a high intelligence threat country for purposes of this section by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, or the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

SEC. 157. PROHIBITION ON CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT AT UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR MISSIONS IN COMMUNIST

COUNTRIES.

(a) PROHIBITION.-After September 30, 1990, no national of a Communist country may be employed as a foreign national employee in any area of a United States diplomatic or consular facility in any Communist country where classified materials are maintained.

(b) DEFINITION.-As used in this section, the term "Communist country" means a country listed in section 620(f) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(c) ADDITIONAL FUNDS FOR HIRING UNITED STATES CITIZENS.-The Congress expresses its willingness to provide additional funds to the Department of State for the expenses of employing United States nationals to replace the individuals dismissed by reason of subsection (a).

(d) REPORT AND REQUEST FOR FUNDS.-As a part of the Department of State's authorization request for fiscal years 1990 and 1991, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the heads of all relevant agencies, shall submit—

(1) a report, which shall include

(A) a feasibility study of the implementation of this section; and

(B) an analysis of the impact of the implementation of this section on the budget of the Department of State; and (2) a request for funds necessary for the implementation of this section pursuant to the findings and conclusions specified in the report under paragraph (1).

(e) WAIVER.-The President may waive this section

(1) if funds are not specifically authorized and appropriated to carry out this section; or

(2) the President determines that it is in the national security interest of the United States to continue to employ foreign service nationals.

The President shall notify the appropriate committees of Congress each time he makes the waiver conferred on him by this section.

SEC. 158. TERMINATION OF RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FOREIGN NATIONAL EMPLOYEES ENGAGING IN HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

(a) TERMINATION.-The Secretary of State shall exercise the authorities available to him to ensure that the United States does not provide, directly or indirectly, any retirement benefits of any kind to any present or former foreign national employee of a United States diplomatic or consular post against whom the Secretary has convincing evidence that such employee has engaged in intelligence activities directed against the United States. To the extent practicable, the Secretary shall provide due process in implementing this section.

(b) WAIVER.-The Secretary of State may waive the applicability of subsection (a) on a case-by-case basis with respect to an employee if he determines that it is vital to the national security of the United States to do so and he reports such waiver to the appropriate committees of the Congress.

SEC. 159. REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT OF FOREIGN NATIONALS AT FOREIGN SERVICE +POSTS ABROAD.

Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the United States Information Agency, and the Director of the Peace Corps, shall submit to the Congress a report discussing the advisability of employing foreign nationals at foreign service posts abroad (including their access to automatic data processing systems and networks).

SEC. 160. CONSTRUCTION SECURITY CERTIFICATION.

(a) CERTIFICATION.-Before undertaking any new construction or major renovation project in any foreign facility intended for the storage of classified materials or the conduct of classified activities, the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence, shall certify to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that

(1) appropriate and adequate steps have been taken to ensure the security of the construction project (including an evaluation of how all security-related factors with respect to such project are being addressed); and

(2) the facility resulting from such project incorporates

(A) adequate measures for protecting classified information and national security-related activities; and

(B) adequate protection for the personnel working in the diplomatic facility.

(b) AVAILABILITY OF DOCUMENTATION.-All documentation with respect to a certification referred to in subsection (a) and any dissenting views thereto shall be available, in an appropriately classified form, to the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

(c) DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.-The Director of Central Intelligence shall provide to the Secretary of State such assistance with respect to the implementation of this section as the Secretary of State may request.

(d) DISSENTING VIEWS.-If the Director of Central Intelligence disagrees with the Secretary of State with respect to any project certification made pursuant to subsection (a), the Director shall submit in writing disagreeing views to the Secretary of State. SEC. 161. 27

SEC. 162. APPLICATION OF TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS TO PERSONNEL OF CERTAIN COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS. (a) 28 **

27 Sec. 161 adds a new subsec. (d) at sec. 205 of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (Public Law 84-885; 70 Stat. 890). It prohibits the acquisition of real property in the United States by certain foreign countries if it is determined that such acquisition would improve capabilities for hostile intelligence activities against the United States. For text, see page 235.

28 Subsec. (a) adds a new sec. 216 to the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (Public Law 84-885; 70 Stat. 890.). It applies to individuals of certain countries and organizations the same generally applicable restrictions to travel while in the United States that apply to members of the missions of the Soviet Union in the United States.

(b) EFFECTIVE DATE.-Subsection (a) of the section enacted by this section shall take effect 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

SEC. 163. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE POLYGRAPH SCREENING OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY SERVICE PERSONNEL.

(a) IMPLEMENTATION OF PROGRAM.-Under the regulations issued pursuant to subsection (b), the Secretary of State shall implement a program of counterintelligence polygraph examinations for members of the Diplomatic Security Service (established pursuant to title II of the Diplomatic Security Act) during fiscal years 1988 and 1989.

(b) REGULATIONS.-The Secretary of State shall issue regulations to govern the program required by subsection (a). Such regulations shall provide that the scope of the examinations under such program, the conduct of such examinations, and the rights of individuals subject to such examinations shall be the same as those under the counterintelligence polygraph program conducted pursuant to section 1221 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145).

SEC. 164. UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN HUNGARY.

(a) FINDINGS.-The Congress finds that

(1) the full implementation of the security program of a United States diplomatic mission to a Communist country cannot be accomplished if employees of that mission who are citizens of the host country are present in the same facilities where diplomatic and consular activities of a sensitive nature are performed;

(2) the facilities currently housing the offices of the United States diplomatic mission to Hungary are totally inadequate for the proper conduct of United States diplomatic activities, and unnecessarily expose United States personnel and their activities to the scrutiny of the intelligence services of the Government of Hungary;

(3) the presence of local citizens in a facility where sensitive activities are performed, as well as their access to certain unclassified administrative information, greatly enhances the ability of the host government's intelligence services to restrict our diplomatic activities in that country;

(4) since the United States Government owns a substantial amount of property in Budapest, it is in a unique position to build new facilities which will substantially enhance the security of the United States diplomatic mission to Hungary; and (5) units such as the Navy Construction Battalion are uniquely qualified to construct such facilities in an eastern bloc country.

(b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.-It is the sense of the Congress that(1) the Department of State should proceed in a timely fashion to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Hungary to allow for the construction of new chancery facilities in Budapest which would totally segregate sensitive activities from those of an unclassified and public-oriented character; and