499. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted because one of the questions presented involved a conflict between the decision below and United States v. Sall, 116 F. 2d 745, decided by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

A single conspiracy was charged and proved. Some of the overt acts charged in the conspiracy count were the same acts charged in the substantive counts. Each of the substantive offenses found was committed pursuant to the conspiracy. Petitioners therefore contend that the substantive counts became merged in the conspiracy count, and that only a single sentence not exceeding the maximum two year penalty provided by the conspiracy statute (Criminal Code § 37, 18 U. S. C. § 88) could be imposed. Or to state the matter differently, they contend that each of the substantive counts became a separate conspiracy count but, since only a single conspiracy was charged and proved, only a single sentence for conspiracy could be imposed. They rely on Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49.

In the Braverman case the indictment charged no substantive offense. Each of the several counts charged a conspiracy to violate a different statute. But only one demurrer should have been sustained. But each of the remaining substantive counts on which the jury had returned a verdict of guilty carried a maximum penalty of three years' imprisonment and a fine of $5,000. Int. Rev. Code, § 3321, 26 U. S. C. § 3321. Hence the general sentence of fine and imprisonment imposed on each under the substantive counts was valid. It is settled law, as stated in Claassen v. United States, 142 U. S. 140, 146-147, "that in any criminal case a general verdict and judgment on an indictment or information containing several counts cannot be reversed on error, if any one of the counts is good and warrants the judgment, because, in the absence of anything in the record to show the contrary, the presumption of law is that the court awarded sentence on the good count only."

The same rule obtains in the case of concurrent sentences. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 85 and cases cited.

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conspiracy was proved. We held that a single conspiracy, charged under the general conspiracy statute, however diverse its objects may be, violates but a single statute and no penalty greater than the maximum provided for one conspiracy may be imposed. That case is not apposite here. For the offenses charged and proved were not only a conspiracy but substantive offenses as well.

Nor can we accept the proposition that the substantive offenses were merged in the conspiracy. There are, of course, instances where a conspiracy charge may not be added to the substantive charge. One is where the agreement of two persons is necessary for the completion of the substantive crime and there is no ingredient in the conspiracy which is not present in the completed crime. See United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 355–356; Gebardi v. United States, 287 U. S. 112, 121-122. Another is where the definition of the substantive offense excludes from punishment for conspiracy one who voluntarily participates in another's crime. Gebardi v. United States, supra. But those exceptions are of a limited character. The common law rule that the substantive offense, if a felony, was merged in the conspiracy,' has little vitality in this country. It has been long and consistently recognized by the Court that the commission of the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses. The power of Congress to separate the two and to affix to each a different penalty is well established. Clune v. United States, 159 U. S. 590, 594-595. A conviction for the conspiracy may be had though the substantive offense was completed. See Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131, 144. And the plea of double jeopardy is no defense to a conviction for both offenses. Carter v.

3

2 See May's Law of Crimes (4th ed. 1938), § 126; 17 Corn. L. Q. (1931) 136; People v. Tavormina, 257 N. Y. 84, 89-90, 177 N. E. 317. 3 The cases are collected in 37 A. L. R. 778, 75 A. L. R. 1411.

McClaughry, 183 U. S. 365, 395. It is only an identity of offenses which is fatal. See Gavieres v. United States, 220 U. S. 338, 342. Cf. Freeman v. United States, 146 F. 2d 978. A conspiracy is a partnership in crime. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 253. It has ingredients, as well as implications, distinct from the completion of the unlawful project. As stated in United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 88:

"For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized by secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its discovery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when discovered."

And see Sneed v. United States, 298 F. 911, 912–913; Banghart v. United States, 148 F.2d 521.

Moreover, it is not material that overt acts charged in the conspiracy counts were also charged and proved as substantive offenses. As stated in Sneed v. United States, supra, p. 913, "If the overt act be the offense which was the object of the conspiracy, and is also punished, there is not a double punishment of it." The agreement to do an unlawful act is even then distinct from the doing of the act.*

4 The addition of a conspiracy count may at times be abusive and unjust. The Conference of Senior Circuit Judges reported in 1925:

"We note the prevalent use of conspiracy indictments for converting a joint misdemeanor into a felony; and we express our conviction that both for this purpose and for the purpose or at least with the effect of bringing in much improper evidence, the conspiracy statute is being much abused.

"Although in a particular case there may be no preconcert of plan, excepting that necessarily inherent in mere joint action,

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It is contended that there was insufficient evidence to implicate Daniel in the conspiracy. But we think there was enough evidence for submission of the issue to the jury.

There is, however, no evidence to show that Daniel participated directly in the commission of the substantive offenses on which his conviction has been sustained," although there was evidence to show that these substantive offenses were in fact committed by Walter in furtherance of the unlawful agreement or conspiracy existing between the brothers. The question was submitted to the jury on the theory that each petitioner could be found guilty of the substantive offenses, if it was found at the time those offenses were committed petitioners were parties to an unlawful conspiracy and the substantive offenses charged were in fact committed in furtherance of it.R

it is difficult to exclude that situation from the established definitions of conspiracy; yet the theory which permits us to call the aborted plan a greater offense than the completed crime supposes a serious and substantially continued group scheme for cooperative law breaking. We observe so many conspiracy prosecutions which do not have this substantial base that we fear the creation of a general impression, very harmful to law enforcement, that this method of prosecution is used arbitrarily and harshly. Further the rules of evidence in conspiracy cases make them most difficult to try without prejudice to an innocent defendant." Annual Report of the Attorney General for 1925, pp. 5-6.

But we do not find that practice reflected in this present case.

5 This question does not arise as to Walter. He was the direct actor in some of the substantive offenses on which his conviction rests. So the general sentence and fine are supportable under any one of those. See note 1, supra.

"

The trial court charged: .. after you gentlemen have considered all the evidence in this case, if you are satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time these particular substantive offenses were committed, that is, the offenses charged in the first ten counts of this indictment if you are satisfied from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the two defendants were in an unlawful

Daniel relies on United States v. Sall, supra. That case held that participation in the conspiracy was not itself enough to sustain a conviction for the substantive offense even though it was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court held that, in addition to evidence that the offense was in fact committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, evidence of direct participation in the commission of the substantive offense or other evidence from which participation might fairly be inferred was

necessary.

We take a different view. We have here a continuous conspiracy. There is here no evidence of the affirmative action on the part of Daniel which is necessary to establish his withdrawal from it. Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 369. As stated in that case, “Having joined in an unlawful scheme, having constituted agents for its performance, scheme and agency to be continuous until full fruition be secured, until he does some act to disavow or defeat the purpose he is in no situation to claim the delay of the law. As the offense has not been terminated or accomplished he is still offending. And we think, consciously offending, offending as certainly, as we have said, as at the first moment of his confederation, and consciously through every moment of its existence." Id., p. 369. And so long as the partnership in crime continues, the partners act for each other in carrying it forward. It is settled that "an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without

conspiracy, as I have heretofore defined unlawful conspiracy to you, then you would have a right, if you found that to be true to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, to convict each of these defendants on all these substantive counts, provided the acts referred to in the substantive counts were acts in furtherance of the unlawful conspiracy or object of the unlawful conspiracy, which you have found from the evidence existed." Daniel was not indicted as an aider or abettor (see Criminal Code, § 332, 18 U. S. C. 550), nor was his case submitted to the jury on that theory.