CASES ADJUDGED

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

AT

OCTOBER TERM, 1945.

SWANSON v. MARRA BROTHERS, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 405. Argued February 1, 1946. Decided April 22, 1946.

1. A longshoreman in the employ of a stevedoring company, while on a pier and engaged in loading cargo on a ship lying alongside in a harbor, was struck by a life raft which fell from the vessel and injured him. Held, he has no right of recovery against his employer under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50; O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36, differentiated. Pp. 2, 7. 2. By legislation subsequent to the Jones Act and the decision in the Haverty case, Congress has expressed its purpose to restrict the liability of the employer under federal statutes to injuries to his employees occurring on navigable waters or inflicted upon an employee who is either a master or a member of a crew of the vessel, injured in the course of his employment as such. P. 5. 3. The effect of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of March 4, 1927, 33 U. S. C. 901 et seq., is to confine the benefits of the Jones Act to the members of the crew of a vessel plying in navigable waters and to substitute for the right of recovery recognized by the Haverty case only such rights to compensation as are given by the Longshoremen's Act. P. 7.

4. Since the Longshoremen's Act is restricted to compensation for injuries occurring on navigable waters, it excludes from its own terms and from the Jones Act any remedies against the employer for injuries inflicted on shore. P. 7.

Opinion of the Court.

328 U.S.

5. It leaves the injured employees in such cases to pursue the remedies afforded by the local law, which this Court has often held permits recovery against the employer for injuries inflicted by land torts on his employees who are not members of the crew of a vessel. P. 7.

6. It leaves unaffected the rights of members of the crew of a vessel to recover under the Jones Act when injured while pursuing their maritime employment whether on board or on shore. Pp. 7-8. 149 F. 2d 646, affirmed.

Petitioner, a longshoreman in the employ of respondent stevedoring company, sued to recover under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, for injuries suffered while on a pier and engaged in loading cargo on a vessel lying alongside in the harbor. The District Court dismissed the complaint. 57 F. Supp. 456. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 149 F. 2d 646. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U. S. 710. Affirmed, p. 8.

Abraham E. Freedman argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Charles Lakatos.

Joseph W. Henderson argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was George M. Brodhead.

Opinion of the Court by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE, announced by MR. JUSTICE BLACK.

Petitioner, a longshoreman in the employ of respondent stevedoring company, while on a pier and engaged in loading cargo on a vessel lying alongside in the harbor of Philadelphia, was struck by a life raft which fell from the vessel and injured him. The question for decision, which was reserved in O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U. S. 36, 43, 44, is whether petitioner may maintain a suit against his employer to recover for the injury, under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U. S. C. § 688.

Petitioner, after having sought and received compensation for his injury under the state employers liability

act of Pennsylvania, brought the present suit in the District Court for Eastern Pennsylvania "pursuant to the Maritime Law as modified by Section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920" (the Jones Act). He alleged as the cause of the injury respondent's breach of duty in failing to provide a safe and seaworthy vessel and appliances and a safe place for petitioner to work, and in failing to make the life raft secure and to make adequate inspection of it. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that there could be no recovery under the Jones Act by one not a seaman for an injury suffered by him while on shore. 57 F. Supp. 456. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. 149 F. 2d 646. We granted certiorari, 326 U. S. 710, because of the novelty and importance of the question presented.

The Jones Act provides in pertinent part:

"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the commonlaw right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply. .

The Act thus made applicable to seamen, injured in the course of their employment, the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., which give to railroad employees a right of recovery for injuries resulting from the negligence of their employer, its agents or employees. Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375; The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U. S. 110, 118.

We have held that a stevedore who was injured while storing cargo, and while on but not employed by a vessel lying in navigable waters, was authorized by the Jones Act to bring suit against his employer to recover for injury caused by the employer's negligence. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U. S. 50; Uravic v. Jarka