This is responsible government. The people at any time can express themselves on the issues and on the man they wish to lead them. There are some defects in the system, as, for instance, the lack of safeguards against the excessive power of the minority through "splinter" parties, a factor that caused the French recently to revamp their system.

But whether we should adopt a modified form of the parliamentary system or modernize our electoral system, certainly there is need for a thorough examination by Congress of this whole question so that by constitutional amendment we may be relieved of our present system of irresponsible government.

(The following is reprinted from the Washington Post, Dec. 11, 1960:)

ELECTING A PRESIDENT STILL AS UNCERTAIN AS EVER

(By J. R. Wiggins, executive editor, Washington Post)

The President of the United States began concentrating troops in and about Washington to be prepared for any emergency. The Louisville Courier-Journal announced that 100,000 unarmed citizens would march on the Nation's Capital to maintain their rights. Congressmen of both parties stormed that they would fight before they would compromise. It was asserted that 145,000 disciplined troops were ready to go into action.

In the words of at least one major historian, the country was "on the verge of civil war." One Member of Congress tearfully predicted to another that "we shall be cutting one another's throats in this Chamber before the 4th of March." That was the situation following the disputed Hayes-Tilden election of 1876. It arose out of the uncertainties produced by the Nation's method of electing a President. The immediate crisis was surmounted by the appointment of an extraordinary commission to settle the disposition of disputed electoral votes. Hayes finally was declared elected 185 to 184 electoral votes, although Tilden had a popular majority of 4,300,590 to 4,036,298.

"DEPENDENT" PRESIDENCY

At the next sitting of Congress, the great crisis was fresh in the minds of Senators and Representatives, but every attempt to amend the fundamental election process failed-as every subsequent attempt has failed. Legislators who had peered into the very abyss over which the election process suspended the country could not bring themselves to alter that apparatus.

Nor have they been able to do so since. The Presidency still remains dependent upon the uncertain operation of an electoral system that never operated exactly ás intended.

Uncertainty continues to this day as to what Congress, gathered to count the electoral vote, can do if a State withholds its vote entirely. There also is uncertainty as to how far the Federal Government can go in punishing fraud or delay participated in by the chief officials of a State.

VARIOUS PANACEAS

There has been a variety of solutions to these difficulties. In 1821 (and again in 1881), Congress used the curious formula of declaring, by resolution, a contested result both ways, concluding by saying that in either case the total result would be the same.

In the Hayes-Tilden dispute, the electoral commission emphatically declined to go behind the formal certification of the elected officers of the States. As Edward Stanwood put it in his book on the Presidency (1912) :

"Since the electors of President and Vice President are State officers whose appointment is certified by the Governor; who meet, discharge their one duty, and adjourn, within the State and under State authority, it follows that a fraud perpetrated with the connivance of the chief officers of a State is subject to no effective revision."

The uncertainties produced by another close popular election vote and another hard contest for an electoral majority have renewed examinations of the electoral college. The popular vote cast last month seems likely to be the closest since the Cleveland-Harrison race of 1888 (5,540,309 to 5,439,853).

The electoral vote is, of course, yet to be decided, but it seems unlikely to rival the 185-to-184 vote of 1876. The electoral system which gives to each State the number of votes it has in Congress and leaves the casting of those votes (so

far as Federal law is concerned) to the whim of the individual electors makes the electoral vote, at this point, beyond ascertainment.

THE MORTON PLAN

The hazards of this system were abundantly foreseen before the worst elec toral crisis of our history, in 1876. In 1873, Senator Oliver P. Morton attempted a comprehensive revision of the whole process.

He wished to have the President elected by direct vote of the people, by congressional districts, one vote to a district, with the person having the highest vote in each State obtaining two presidential votes from the State at large. The person getting the most presidential votes was to be President. In cases of a tie within a State, the votes "at large" would be divided.

Further, Congress, by the Morton plan, would have had "the power to provide for holding and conducting the elections of President and Vice President, and to establish tribunals for the decision of such elections as may be contested." It was a proposal for making presidential elections national elections in every sense and direct elections as well, except for his ingenious "at large" device, which was designed to preserve the proportionate strength of the smaller States that existed under the old system. Its most unusual contribution, however, was the utter elimination of the electors with their undefined degree of discretion. (except where State law defines it).

AGAIN IN CONGRESS LAP

Congress wasn't ready for so sweeping a reform in 1873. It was no more ready for it in 1877, in the wake of a national commotion that verged on civil war. Nor was it ready for milder improvements, dozens of which were put forward in the session that commenced in October 1877.

Will it be ready for substantial modification of the electoral college now, after an election whose precise results have been kept in uncertainty for weeks?

No more now than in 1876 does anyone know how much discretion an elector has in many States. Nor are authorities any better informed of what happens. if a State chooses to certify no electors before the day when the President of the Senate reads off the electoral tally.

It is to be said in the system's behalf that in spite of the constant threat of crisis, no real crisis has developed since the "crime of "76." The reproach of frustrating the popular will also lies against the system for the second Cleveland race (he got 5,540,000 votes to 5,439,853 but received 168 electoral votes to 233), but even that contest did not disturb the Nation's peace.

LEGAL LOOPHOLES

Failure of States to certify their vote has been a more frequent defect than most citizens realize. In the very first national election, New York's Legislature could not agree on electors and so the New York vote was not cast. The Con-federate States cast no electoral votes in 1864. Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia had no electoral votes in 1868. In 1872, the votes of Arkansas and Louisiana were rejected.

Present law provides for certification of the electors but does not provide any legal remedy in case a State does not present its votes. It is unclear what might be done if a partisan State government simply refused to certify a victory for an opposing party. (It has been suggested that disqualification of the State for the next election might be an effective penalty that would induce a State to act.)

RECENT EFFORTS

Reforms given most consideration in recent years have included the proposal of Senator Karl Mundt, Republican, of South Dakota, who put forward in substance the old Morton plan of 1873 with the States choosing their electors as they choose their Senators and Congressmen.

Another proposal, the Lodge-Gossett resolution plan, would abolish the electors and divide the electoral votes that the States have under the present system in proportion to the popular vote.

The Mundt plan would maintain the hazards of the independent electors; but both plans would preserve the advantage that small States otherwise would lose through direct election according to popular vote.

"It is to be hoped," wrote Edward Stanwood in summarizing the 1876 contest, "that the patriotism of the American people and their love of peace may never again be put to so severe a test as was that to which they were subjected in 1876 and 1877."

The hope remains, but the Congress of the United States is yet to do anything to make the hope any brighter than it was 90 years ago.

(The following is reprinted from the New York Times Magazine, December 18, 1960:)

A NEW COURSE FOR THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

(By James MacGregor Burns1)

Tomorrow, groups of electors will meet in the various State capitals of the Union to cast their ballots for President of the United States of America. In Washington, at 1 p.m. on January 6, page boys will carry the sealed ballots, packed in mahogany boxes, to the rostrum of the House of Representatives and officials will solemnly count them before a bored joint session of Congress, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson will then be officially declared the next President and Vice President of the United States.

And so once again we will see America's oldest political "puppet show"-the electoral college-in action. For, after a century and a half of almost ceaseless criticism, it is still a fixture of our political system.

Most Americans, regardless of party, are agreed on the failings of the electoral college. It is unfair, inaccurate, uncertain, and undemocratic. Unfair, because the presidential candidate losing a State by even a close margin forfeits all of that State's electoral votes. Inaccurate, because in most elections the winner's electoral votes are inflated grotesquetly out of proportion to his popular vote. Uncertain, because Presidential electors are not legally bound to vote for the candidate who carries the State. And undemocratic, because if no candidate wins a majority of the electoral college the verdict is rendered in the House of Representatives, where each State delegation, no matter how large, casts but a single vote in choosing among the three top candidates.

If Americans are so widely agreed on the defects of the electoral college, why has it not been reformed? Because it is, actually, more than a mere puppet show. It is deeply mired in the power politics of the Nation's parties, groups, and sections. What looks like an ungainly mechanical contrivance affects who get what out of our political system and when and how they get it.

The political conflict surrounding the electoral college can be seen most clearly if we consider the major reforms that have been advanced and why various groups oppose them.

(1) Direct popular election.-Under this plan the whole electoral college system would be abolished and the President would be elected directly by a plurality of all the voters in the Nation.

This reform has no chance of adoption because of opposition from the small States. They are opposed because they would be deprived of their present electoral college advantage of having at least three electors (equal to their two Senators and one Representative) no matter how small their population. Under this setup, they have a greater percentage of the electoral college vote than they would have of the popular vote. And they could probably muster enough strength among themselves to defeat the constitutional amendment necessary for reform, since passage of an amendment requires the support of legislatures or conventions in three-quarters of the States.

This reform is also opposed by those who believe in our basic constitutional scheme of having national elections conducted by States. These opponents do not want the President directly elected by a popular national majority because it smacks too much of naked majority rule.

(2) District system. This proposal would retain the electoral college but would do away with the present system under which the electors of each State vote as a unit. Under the present system each party nominates a group of electors equal in number to the State's Congressmen and Senators. The people then vote on a statewide basis for either party's slate of electors.

1 Professor of political science at Williams College, author of "Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox."

Under the district system electors would be chosen by congressional districts in each State, except for two electors (equivalent to the two Senators) who would still be selected on a statewide basis. Thus, a State would pick two at-large electors and the voters in each congressional district of the State would choose one Presidential elector who would be pledged to vote for a specific candidate.

This plan stands little chance of success because of the historic conflict between conservative, rural, mainly Republican forces and liberal, urban, mainly Democratic groups. The latter would flatly oppose it because many congressional districts, as a result of gerrymandering (the careful rigging of district lines for partisan advantage by State legislatures), underrepresent labor and liberal and urban-in short, Democratic-voters. It is bad enough, these Democrats assert, for Congress to be gerrymandered to overrepresent conservatism. Why should Presidential elections be gerrymandered, too?

(3) Proportional representation. This scheme, which has received wide support in Congress in recent years, would abolish the present "winner-take-all" arrangement in the electoral college. Instead, each candidate would receive exactly the same proportion of electoral votes as he received of the popular vote in each State.

This plan has as little chance as the district system, and for much the same reason. Liberals feel they have a great stake in the present winner-take-all device, for they believe that it compels presidential candidates to try especially hard to carry pivotal Northern States. To carry these States such candidates must appeal to various groups, such as labor, Negroes, or Jews, who are believed by politicians to hold the balance of power in the States and who tend to be liberal. In short, the electoral college forces the parties, whether Democratic or Republican, to choose liberal candidates for the Presidency and to present a liberal platform.

Conservatives dislike the winner-take-all system for the very same reason the liberals like it. Southerners are especially hostile. "Is it fair, is it honest, is it democratic, is it to the best interest of anyone, in fact," demanded a Texas Congressman a few years ago, "to place such a premium on a few thousand labor votes, or Italian votes, or Irish votes, or Negro votes, or Jewish votes, or Polish votes, or Communist votes, or big-city-machine votes, simply because they happen to be located in two or three large, industrial, pivotal States?"

This criticism leaves the liberals cold. Since congressional districts are gerrymandered in a conservative direction, they argue, why should not the electoral college be "gerrymandered" in the opposite direction, through the increased influence of the liberal blocs? Liberals grant that the two types of gerrymandering push President and Congress further apart in what should be the cooperative job of governing the Nation. But they see no reason to close the gap at the expense of making the President as conservative as Congress tends to be.

How these opposing forces become stalemated over electoral college reform was well illustrated in 1956, the last time Congress seriously considered a basic overhaul of the system. To make the story rather intriguing, at least from our vantage point today, the main advocate of electoral reform was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and the main adversary was Senator John F. Kennedy from the same State.

Lodge himself was not in the Senate then; he had lost his seat in the Upper House to Kennedy 4 years earlier. But Lodge had become so identified with the proportional representation reform that his sponsorship and his earlier arguments carried great weight in the debate.

And the proponents of Lodge's plan had immensely strengthened its prospects by combining it, in one ungainly package, with, the district system reform. Under the proposed constitutional amendment State legislatures would have the power to choose either the proportional representation method or the district method.

By March 1956, when the Senate began debating electoral college reform, this package proposal was being sold as a cure-all to a variety of groups. Southern Democrats were told it would give them greater influence in their party (because of the big electoral percentage that Democrats would rack up in the South). Conservatives were promised that northern voting blocs would be curbed (by ending the winner-take-all device).

Independent voters were told that third parties would be treated more fairly (because they would get their due share, however small, of the electoral vote). Many liberals felt that, at least, the dangerous failings of the electoral college

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would be ended. So wide was the support for the package proposals that 53 Senators cosponsored it on the floor.

Strongly backed by Paul Douglas of Illinois, Herbert Lehman of New York, and other Senators from Northern states, Kennedy spearheaded the counterattack against the package proposal. Did the Massachusetts Senator believe at that time that someday he might be the beneficiary, as a Presidential candidate of the winner-take-all system?

Possibly, but it is more likely that he was thinking of the forthcoming 1956 campaign, since he had some hope of being Adlai Stevenson's running mate. Certainly he could not have dreamed that the present system would save him from a razor-thin victory that might well have paralyzed our government during a critical transition period. What he did know in March 1956 was that the opposition's package proposal threatened the influence of the urban vote in the electoral college and hence the prospects of any liberal Democratic contender for the Presidency.

Kennedy and his backers routed the opposition. The bill not only failed to gain the necessary two-thirds support in the Senate but also failed to retain the support of 10 of the original sponsors-9 Republicans and 1 Democrat.

The outcome was a tribute to Kennedy's emerging skills as a political leader, but it also proved that even a package reform, attracting many Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans, could not pass the Senate. And if it had, it would probably have failed to gain two-thirds support in the House, where city Representatives could have stopped it.

The lesson is very clear: there is little hope for a major overhaul of the electoral college. The opposing groups are simply too strong. Each of them gets enough out of the present system to be willing to settle for it when the chips are down. And even if some group was outvoted in Congress, it could always thwart a constitutional amendment in over a dozen State legislatures.

Does this mean that no change is possible? Not at all. In place of a major overhaul, the machinery of the electoral college needs two simple but vital repairs if it is not to become badly jammed someday and throw our whole system of government into a crisis.

The defects in the machinery are, first, the ambiguous role of the Presidential electors themselves; and, second, the constant threat that no presidential candidate may receive a majority in the electoral college and hence the election will go into the House of Representatives.

The modern role of Presidential electors is supposed to be clear cut. Originally intended to be high-minded men who would seek the best President without a lot of politicking, they were soon converted by the political parties into rubber stamps for the winning party in each State. If the rubber stamps today were really dependable, they might serve satisfactorily as automatic registering devices. The problem is that they are not always willing to be rubber stamps.

The trouble started in 1820 when one William Plumer of New Hampshire voted in the electoral college for John Quincy Adams, even though pledged to vote for his opponent, James Monroe. Plumer's reason was an impeccably patriotic one; only George Washington, he said, "deserved a unanimous eleetion." He got away with it-and set a precedent for future electors to ignore their pledges.

Evidently no one took advantage of the precedent for a great many years; but in 1948 one Preston Parks of Tennessee got himself chosen as candidate for elector by both the Democratic Party in the State and by the States' Rights Party. Vehemently opposed to President Harry S. Truman's civil-rights program, Parks warned that if elected he would vote for the States' Rights candidate, J. Strom Thurmond, and not for Mr. Truman. Truman defeated the Dixiecrats in the State overwhelmingly-but Parks ignored the popular mandate and voted for Thurmond as he had said he would.

Parks "revolt." Profs. Austin Ranney and Wilmoore Kendall have concluded, "did not, of course, affect the actual outcome of the electoral college's decision: had it done so, it would presumably have raised issues of an extremely dramatic character. But the next Parks' revolt might affect the outcome, and it is well for students of the American political system to keep themselves reminded that the electoral college, however innocuous in the typical election, involves areas of indeterminacy that are potential dynamite."

It is high time to get rid of this dynamite. Some progress has been made. State parties, according to a Supreme Court decision, now have the right to require electors to promise to vote for the party's nominee. But this is only a