of rage that would arise all over the country if a district's Representative was to be taken from it, and given to the entire State. And yet it would be just as fair to use the general ticket for Representatives as it is for their counterparts in the electoral college.

I submit that the number of persons which entitles a State to one Representative in the Congress should entitle the same group of people to one member of the electoral college.

What have been the effects of the general ticket system of choosing electors? I suggest these:

(1) It excludes from the Office of President of the United States all men, no matter how able and outstanding they may be, unless they come from a State with a large bloc of electoral votes.

(2) By the same token, the dominant forces in the large, pivotal States which are responsible for the nomination and election of our Presidents have inordinate influences at the White House and in the executive branch of our Government.

Senator KEATING. Who has inordinate influence?

Senator MUNDT. The dominant forces in the large pivotal States are responsible for the nomination and election of our President. Senator KEATING. Of course, there are exceptions to that. Senator MUNDT. There are exceptions.

Senator KEATING. I am informed-I have nothing to do with it— but I am informed that the dominant forces in the State of New York at present do not have an overriding influence in the White House. I do not know anything about that.

Senator MUNDT. I think you are, perhaps, mixing up in your mind the prominent people with the dominant forces behind the prominent people.

Senator KEATING. I did not know that was what the Senator referred to.

Senator KEFAUVER. Can the Senator from New York tell us who the dominant forces are in New York?

Senator KEATING. There seems to be some conflict between the dominant forces as to the dominant forces which are more dominant. Senator KEFAUVER. Or less dominant.

Senator KEATING. Or less dominant.

Senator MUNDT. A cursory reading of the major party platforms and the speeches of their presidential candidates gives proof that they are directed almost entirely at the dominant elements in these large States.

(3) It invites fraud in the large States that are crucial and where the vote is expected to be close. The results in Illinois, Texas, and Missouri in the last election brought forth charges of vote frauds. The effect of such vote fraud is statewide under the general ticket. A fraudulent vote, undetected, counts just as much as a valid vote in the statewide total.

By utilizing the district system, if fraud would still prevail, it could influence simply the electors coming from that specific electoral district. It would, therefore, minimize the impact of fraud and, consequently, tend to minimize the importance of anybody coming forth.

(4) Although the Constitution gives each State the same numerical representation in the electoral college that it has in the whole Con

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gress, by using the general ticket for electors, we have formed a constituency for the President which is altogether different from that which elects the Congress. The great difference between these two constituencies is that almost all Representatives are elected in single member districts while their counterparts in the electoral college are elected in multimember districts consisting of entire States. This situation permits voters of a State, voting straight party tickets, to produce one result in the electoral college and an altogether different result in the House of Representatives at the same election. The effect of all this is that we have what I have called a presidential United States and a congressional United States that are, politically speaking, two different countries within one national boundary.

(5) Many critics of the present system contend that the electoral college is an archaic institution, outmoded by our tremendous improvements in transportation and communications, and that it is incompatible with modern democratic principles. In the main, these charges are based on either a misunderstanding of the electoral college, or on deliberate intentions to change the structure of our constitutional system and change our Republic into something radically different.

(6) Another criticism of the electoral college is in the contention that presidential electors are in no way bound to vote for the presidential candidate of the party on whose slate they were elected. This is coupled with the contention that the Founding Fathers intended the electors to be free agents. Both these contentions are without basis in fact. On the contrary, there is overwhelming evidence that from the very first it was clearly understood that the elector's function was to express the view of those who had chosen him.

Since 1820, a total of 14,018 presidential electors have been chosen. Of these only eight are alleged to have voted contrary to the views of those who named them. In no case did any of these votes affect the outcome of a presidential election. In 1820, one elector did not vote for James Monroe. In 1948, a Tennessee elector voted for Thurmond, the States rights candidate, instead of for President Truman, but he had announced before the election that he would do this. The last case was in the 1960 election when a Republican elector in Oklahoma voted for Senator Harry F. Byrd instead of Richard M. Nixon.

It is said, too, that the Founding Fathers had no notion of political parties. But, in the very first election, Alexander Hamilton, leader of the Federalists, saw to it that John Adams would not run equally with Washington, as both men were being voted for as President. In fact, Washington received 69 votes and Adams only 34.

An outstanding authority on the Constitution, the late Chief Justice Charles C. Nott of the Court of Claims, has stated flatly that the notion that the framers of the Constitution had no plan in mind for electing a President different from that which is in force is completely in error. In the Encyclopedia Americana Judge Nott wrote:

It is said by some of the commentators, and indeed it is now generally believed, that the electoral colleges were intended to be "deliberative bodies." In one sense this is true-in the legal sense. The electors are not ministerial or administrative officers; they do not perform a specific work in a way determined by higher official authority; in legal contemplation the responsibility of their action rests upon themselves. But the framers of the Constitution never supposed that the electors would disregard the political pledges upon which they

were chosen, or that the American people, either directly or through their State legislatures, would blindly choose electors to evolve a President out of their inner consciousness. On the contrary, they contemplated the successful candidates receiving the votes of "a majority of the whole number of electors," and they required the electors to vote "in their respective States," and to vote on the same day. If they had framed a provision requiring all of the electors to convene at the seat of government in one body, and there in their own way and time proceed to choose a President, there would be good reason for saying that actual deliberation was intended; but they did not give to the electors one single power of attribute by virtue of which they could deliberate * * *

The idea that it was ever intended that the electors should nominate the candidate for whom they themselves should vote is a myth which has been unthinkingly reiterated by most eminent writers, but which does not rest upon a single fact * * * He who supposes that the framers (of the Constitution) intended that 13 different bodies should convene in 13 different places at one time for one object and for 1 day, and that object the selection of the executive of a nation, confesses a most superficial knowledge of the greatest constructive statesmen of their century and of the great work which they deliberately planned and built.

As originally introduced several years ago, the Mundt-Coudert amendment provided that a State's electors corresponding to its Representatives in Congress should be elected from congressional districts and the two corresponding to its Senators should be elected statewide, as Senators are elected. Critics, most of them supporters of the status quo, objected strongly and with justice that the use of congressional districts was open to criticism since in some States district lines had been unfairly drawn by whatever political party controlled the State legislature, a practice long known as gerrymandering.

To meet this criticism the amendment, as now proposed, provides for the setting up, as I have previously stated, of electoral districts to be composed of

compact and contiguous territory, containing as nearly as practicable the number of persons which entitled the States to one Representative in the Congress.

Our amendment, if adopted, would require State legislatures to follow this constitutional directive. If they failed to do so Congress would have the power to step in and see to it that fair and equitable districts for electors are established.

It is altogether likely that these nongerrymandered electoral districts would at least sharply curtail the practice of setting up unfair congressional districts since it would be extremely difficult for a State legislature to justify one set of districts for electors and another for Representatives.

Senator KEATING. May I interrupt there?

Senator MUNDT. Yes.

Senator KEATING. You would not force them to do that; in other words, they could have separate districts.

Senator MUNDT. Precisely.

Senator KEATING. Your point is it would act as a moral force then to have them the same.

Senator MUNDT. Yes, it would place a good example before them, you are quite right; we would not force them.

There is another often-raised objection to the present system of electing a President. It is the provision that if no candidate receives a majority of the electoral votes when they are counted in Congress that the House of Representatives shall choose immediately a President from among the candidates with the three highest numbers of

electoral votes. The vote in such a case-the last time it occurred was in 1824-is by State; each State delegation having one vote. In the event a State's House delegation is evenly divided its vote is not recorded. A majority of the States is required for election.

The objection to this system is that it is grossly unfair to the larger States, giving New York, California, and Pennsylvania no greater voice than Alaska, Delaware, and Nevada despite the great population disparities.

Senate Joint Resolution 12 cures this situation. It provides that in the event no presidential candidate has a majority of the electoral vote that

then from the persons having the three highest numbers on the list of persons voted for as President, the Senate and the House of Representatives, assembled and voting as individual members of one body, shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President; a quorum for such purpose shall be three-fourths of the whole number of Senators and Representatives, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary for a choice; if additional ballots be necessary, the choice on the fifth ballot shall be between the two persons having the highest number of votes on the fourth ballot.

The Constitution also provides that if no candidate for Vice President has a majority that the Senate shall choose him from among the two candidates with the highest electoral vote total. Senate Joint Resolution 12 provides that both Houses in joint session and voting by the head, as for President, shall select the Vice President from among the candidates with the three highest numbers of electoral

votes.

So I point out that while we equalize the rights of individual citizens to vote for President, we recognize the validity that bigger States should have more authority if it comes to be decided in the House of Representatives, so in that direction we are fair and equitable to the big States by giving them more authority than they have now.

Our system of electing a President has, generally speaking, served us well during the 172 years since our Republic was established. It has never failed to give us a President.

Through no fault of the Founding Fathers, it has, however, become distorted through the use of the general ticket system. Most of the framers of the Constitution, it should be pointed out, went on record. favoring a district system for choosing electors, as the fairest method of expressing the popular will.

Senate Joint Resolution 12 is, in my opinion and the opinion of the many who support it, the only simple method by which each voter in every State will have the same voting weight in electing a President. It is the only one among the various electoral reform proposals which have been offered which will bring about a needed reform without a basic change in our constitutional system. It alone leaves control of the election machinery in the States, where it belongs.

It is the office and person of the elector, and nothing else, that maintains the intrastate character of presidential elections. Interstate candidacies are legally unknown and unprecedented under the Constitution, and would remain so under Senate Joint Resolution 12. Now, party nominees for President and Vice President are extralegal, outside the law. They achieve constitutional status only when votes are cast for them in the electoral college. If we abandon the office and person of elector we will of necessity establish interstate candidacies

which, in turn, will open the door for ultimate Federal control of elections, including the qualifications of voters. Few Americans will favor such a change.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Mundt, we thank you very much for a well-prepared statement, which has been forcefully and persuasively presented.

The Chair recognizes that you have great knowledge in this field, and Senate Joint Resolution 12 is a very important proposal.

There are a good many questions that I am sure Senator Keating and others would like to ask you. Could you appear sometime later on for a full discussion?

Senator MUNDT. I shall be happy to return and try to answer any questions that you want to ask at that time.

Senator KEFAUVER. Then we will put the colloquy immediately following your statement.

(Pursuant to the above discussion, Senator Mundt appeared before the subcommittee on June 8, 1961. This portion of the hearings of that date follows:)

Senator KEFAUVER. The committee is glad to have Senator Mundt back with us. Senator Mundt has previously testified at some length in support of the resolution of which he is the principal sponsor, Senate Joint Resolution 12.

Since your earlier appearance here, Senator Mundt, we have heard the testimony of your cosponsors, Senator Morton of Kentucky and Senator Hruska of Nebraska, and Senator Thurmond is scheduled to be here today.

I am glad you have come back, Senator Mundt, because some of your colleagues on the Republican side took Senator Morton to task rather briskly on some points in connection with your resolution.

Senator MUNDT. Senator Morton of Kentucky?

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes. Senator Keating and Senator Case of South Dakota had some searching questions, in which they indicated that they did not see the resolution in the same light that you do.

Senator MUNDT. I am sorry that I have not had a chance to see that testimony, Mr. Chairman, because I might have some comments to make about it.

Senator KEFAUVER. I can tell you the points they made.
Senator MUNDT. Yes; I would appreciate that.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Keating and Senator Case made, first, the point that your resolution requires election districts so as to get away from the gerrymandering which we now have in congressional districts. They expressed great doubt as to how you were ever going to get the legislatures to adopt election districts which would contain approximately the same number of voters. They pointed out that although that should be done as to congressional districts, that it had not been done, that Congress has no power over getting the legislatures of the States to do anything, and that the only alternative would be for Congress to attempt to do it itself for the various States, and that would be a very doubtful and unwise invasion of States rights.

That was their first argument.

Senator MUNDT. May I have the others and then I shall try to answer them.