under which all of a State's electoral votes went to the party which won a plurality of the popular votes statewide. When some States began to adopt the unit vote, the others soon followed suit, as explained by Jefferson in 1800: "All agree that an election by districts would be the best, if it could be general; but while 10 State choose, either by their legislatures or by (unit rule popular vote), it is folly and worse for the other 6 not to follow." A Senate committee report in 1826 said, "When the large States consolidate their votes to overwhelm the small ones, those, in their turn, must concentrate their own strength to resist them. A few States may persevere, for some time, in what they believe to be the fairest system, but when they see the unity of action which others derive from the (unit rule)*** they cannot resist the temptation of following the same plan."

By 1804, 7 of 10 "popular election" States cast their electoral votes under the unit rule; by 1824, 13 out of 18. By 1836 the district plan had vanished from the scene. From 1836 to the Civil War, electors were chosen by the unit rule in all States except South Carolina, where the State legislature chose the electors. The only exceptions to the unit rule system since the Civil War occurred in Florida in 1868 and Colorado in 1876, when the choice was by legislature; and in Michigan in 1892 when the district system was employed.

The State legislatures retain the power, however, to specify any method of choosing presidential electors. Following the 1960 election there was a suggestion on the floor of the Louisiana House of Representatives that the legislature might revoke the election of Kennedy-pledged electors and name a new slate of unpledged electors because of displeasure over President-elect Kennedy's refusal to take a stand on the New Orleans school desegregation controversy.

"MINORITY" PRESIDENTS

Fourteen times since the founding of the United States a President has been chosen who did not receive a majority of popular votes in the election.

In some cases, a President was elected who had received a smaller number of votes than his closest opponent. In 1824 although Andrew Jackson received more popular and electoral votes than did John Quincy Adams, the election fell into the House of Representatives, which elected Adams.

In 1876, although Samuel J. Tilden polled 247,448 votes more than Rutherford B. Hayes, returns from four States were contested and an electoral commission created by Congress decided the contested returns in favor of Hayes so that he won by one electoral vote.

In 1888, although Benjamin Harrison trailed Grover Cleveland by 90,728 popular votes, Harrison received 233 electoral votes to Cleveland's 168 and was elected President.

In 1960, although Mr. Kennedy scored a clear victory over Nixon in the electoral college, complications in the vote cast in Alabama made it difficult to determine whether he or Nixon actually won the popular vote. (For further discussion of the problem involved, and the method of reckoning used in this study, see p. 409.)

The following table shows the percentage of the vote received by candidates in the 14 elections in which a popular vote "minority President" was elected:

Source: Library of Congress, Historical Statistics of the United States, and Congressional Quarterly Records.

CRITICISMS OF CURRENT SYSTEM

The following major objections have been made to the current electoral college system, under which the entire electoral vote in a State is given to the candidate whose electors have won a plurality of the popular vote:

It has permitted the election of at least three Presidents who actually trailed their opponents in the popular votes.

The Founding Fathers never intended that the individual States would cast their electoral votes en bloc. Under the unit rule, minority popular votes are not reflected in a State's electoral votes. This is particularly unfair, critics say, in large States where some sections are urban and industrial, others rural and agricultural, some Republican, some Democratic. Senator Thomas Hart Benton (Missouri) said in 1824, "To lose their votes is the fate of all minorities, and it is their duty to submit; but this is not a case of votes lost, but of votes taken away, added to those of the majority, and given to a person to whom the minority is opposed."

In large States which are fairly evenly divided between the parties the unit system inflates the bargaining power of splinter parties and pressure groups. The current system, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge said in 1950, "not only permits but actually invites the domination of presidential campaigns by small, organized, well-disciplined pressure groups within the large so-called pivotal States." The stress on large blocs of electoral votes under the unit system limits the choice of presidential candidates to men from large States.

The unit system puts a premium on fraud because juggling of a few votes can swing the electoral votes of an entire State, as Republicans claimed in Illinois and Texas following the 1960 presidential election.

The unit system leaves no incentive for a heavy voter turnout in supposedly "safe" States.

The current electoral system gives the legislatures the power to direct any method they wish of selecting presidential electors-by popular vote statewide or in districts; by vote in the legislature itself; by vote, for example, of a State highway commission, a political party's State committee, or any single person the legislature might appoint. Moral coercion has forced the State legislatures to authorize a vote of the people in the respectives States, but the possibility of gross abuse of power by State legislatures is always present.

There is no legal way to force an elector to vote for the candidate to whom he pledged himself before his election. In a close election, a few electors might be bribed, or simply choose to change their candidate, and the choice of the President thus altered. (From 1820 through 1956, however, only seven of the 13,481 electoral votes cast were cast contrary to "instructions." The most recent was a Nixon elector in Oklahoma in 1960 who voted for Senator Harry F. Byrd, Democrat of Virginia.)

If, under the current system, the election is thrown into the House of Rep resentatives because no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes, an archaic and totally unrepresentative system goes into operation. Each State has a single vote, in total disregard of its population. Furthermore, the votes of equally split delegations are not counted at all.

Only good fortune has prevented a gross distortion of the public will, scandalous frauds or flagrant abuse of power by State legislatures, by presidential electors or by the House of Representatives under the current electoral system.

DEFENSE OF CURRENT SYSTEM

The current electoral system has been defended as follows:

With minor amendments, it has successfully withstood the test of almost two centuries. Kennedy, in defending the current system in 1956 Senate floor debate, said it was one "under which we have, on the whole, obtained able Presidents capable of meeting the increased demands upon our Executive* * *. No urgent necessity for immediate change has been proven," Kennedy said. "It seems to me that Falkland's definition of conservatism is quite appropriate 'When it is not necessary to change, it is not necessary to change.'"

Only once, in 1876, did a man who actually had a majority of the popular vote fail to win the Presidency. The other "minority" Presidents were opposed by men who also failed to win an absolute majority. The winners of the electoral vote in those years might have, and probably would have, won in a runoff election between the two highest men.

70784-61-pt. 2——8

By weighting the composition of the electoral college to give adequate representation to the small and sparsely settled States, the authors of the Constitution helped to reconcile these States to the idea of federation. (Critics of the current system answer that the unit system of casting electoral votes has removed all advantage for the smaller States.)

Under any system of electoral reform which preserves the Federal system, through according each State two extra electoral votes, the electoral vote may go to a man who has not received a majority of the popular vote. The only alternative would be a direct popular vote for President, which is opposed on other grounds.

The choice of a President has fallen into the House of Representatives only twice (in 1800 and again in 1834), a remarkably low average.

The unit rule's "winner take all" feature discourages the growth of splinter parties, the bane of democratic growth in some European countries.

It is proper that the urban centers in the great States should have an especially strong voice in the choice of a President, in order to counterbalance the rural and conservative influence evident in the composition of a Congress where Members are elected from often conservatively gerrymandered districts. "It is not only the unit vote for the Presidency we are talking about," Kennedy said in 1956, "but a whole solar system of governmental power. If it is proposed to change the balance of power of one of the elements of the solar system, it is necessary to consider the others."

The current system's exaggeration of the winner's majority may not be an unmitigated evil. After a bitterly fought election campaign, such as that of 1960, the appearance of nationwide backing for the winner of the electoral vote, and the elimination of doubt about the certainty of his election, may help him win general acceptance of his assumption of the powers of the Presidency.

REFORM PROPOSALS

Since January 6, 1797, when Representative William L. Smith, of South Carolina, introduced in Congress the first proposed constitutional amendment to reform the electoral college system, hardly a session of Congress has passed without the introduction of one or more resolutions of this character. According to statistics compiled by the Library of Congress, 109 such amendments were introduced between 1889 and 1946 and another 99 between 1947 and 1960.

DISTRICT PLAN

The district plan of choosing electors was the most popular reform proposal in the early years of the Republic. James Madison said of it in 1823 that it "was mostly, if not exclusively, in view when the Constitution was framed and adopted." It was proposed at one time or another by most of the State legislatures, passed by the U.S. Senate more than once and failed to pass the U.S. House by a 92-54 vote, just short of the required Constitutional two-thirds majority, in 1820. Following World War II the district plan was embodied in the plans offered by ex-Representative Frederic R. Coudert, Jr. (Republican, of New York 1947-59), Senator Karl E. Mundt (Republican, of South Dakota) and others.

The Mundt-Coudert proposal would preserve the office of elector but provide that electors be chosen in the same manner as Representatives and Senators. The presidential candidate with a plurality in each electoral district, the lines of which would be set by the State legislature, would receive the vote of its one elector. The presidential candidate with a plurality in a State would receive the electoral votes equal to its two Senators. High man would win, but if no candidate received a majority of the electoral vote, the new Senators and Representatives-sitting jointly and voting as individuals-would choose the President from the three candidates having the largest electoral vote. A plurality on the first roll call would be sufficient to elect. In response to criticisms that the electors might represent gerrymandered districts, Mundt added a provision to his plan providing that the elector districts shall "be composed of contiguous and compact territory, containing as nearly as practicable the number of persons which entitles the State to one Representative in the Congress."

Mundt reintroduced his resolution (S.J. Res. 12) January 5, 1961, with Senators Strom Thurmond (Democrat, of South Carolina), John L. McClellan (Democrat, of Arkansas), Roman L. Hruska (Republican, of Nebraska), Thruston B. Morton (Republican, of Kentucky, the Republican National Chairman), and William A. Blakley (Democrat, of Texas) as cosponsors. Companion resolutions were introduced in the House by Representatives Harold B. McSween

(Democrat, of Louisiana) (H.J. Res. 54) and D. R. (Billy) Matthews (Democrat, of Florida) (H.J. Res. 125).

Arguments for district plan

Proponents of the district plans advance the following arguments in its favor: Under the district system, popular vote results would tend to be reflected more accurately in electoral vote results than under the current system. Electoral vote results would not be distorted-and the majority of the winner exaggerated-by the practice of awarding all of a State's electoral votes to the winner of a plurality of popular votes.

The district system would encourage the minority party in currently one party States, especially in areas where the minority party's strength is great enough so that it would have hope of carrying one or more districts. On the other hand, splinter parties would not be encouraged because they would have little hope of winning in an entire electoral district.

It would no longer be possible for localized bad weather, vote frauds, or other accidental circumstances to swing the entire electoral vote of a State.

The district system would give equal weight, based on population, both to rural and urban, predominantly Republican and predominantly Democratic districts. Allegedly undue influence of minorities in urban areas of large States would be reduced.

The system would tend to equate the political pressures on the President with those felt by Congress since they would be elected by relatively identical constituencies.

The system would remove the mode of choosing presidential electors from control of the 50 State legislatures.

The system would force the parties to look to small as well as large States in choosing candidates.

The district system would mark a return to the system contemplated chiefly by the Founding Fathers.

Arguments against district plan

Opponents offer the following objections to the district plan:

The State legislatures might gerrymander the lines of the elector districts. The district plan might concentrate presidential campaigns in marginal congressional districts and minimize the influence of minority groups by isolating them in individual districts. This fear was reflected in a January 1, 1961, statement by Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, who warned Negroes of "any scheme" to change the electoral college, saying that past reform efforts had been "designed to cut down the voting strength of Negro citizens in large northern cities." Election of a "minority President" would still be possible under the district plan because of the extra two electoral votes given each State.

Splinter parties might concentrate all their efforts on a few elector districts in an effort to elect enough electors to swing the balance of power in a close national election.

There might be little advantage in substituting the statewide unit rule of the current system for district-wide unit rule under the district system. (Proponents answer the district system would reduce the chance of a minority to control the outcome and that the more numerous the electing sections, the fairer the representation.)

THE PROPORTIONAL METHOD

The proportional method of dividing each State's electoral votes has been incorporated in 71 constitutional amendments proposed since 1947, including the well-known Lodge-Gossett and Daniel-Kefauver amendments. (Full names of the authors: Ex-Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (Republican, Massachusetts, 193743; 1947-53); ex-Representative Gossett (Democrat, Texas, 1939-51); ex-Senator (currently Governor) Price Daniel (Democrat, Texas, 1953-56); and Senator Estes Kefauver (Democrat, Tennessee).

The proportional method was first proposed by Representative Levi Maish (Pennsylvania) in 1877. Maish proposed that each State's electoral votes be divided proportionately, but rounded off to whole numbers. Later in 1877 Representative Jordan E. Cravens (Arkansas) introduced a plan almost identical to the Lodge-Gossett plan, providing for a proportional division of the State's electoral votes out to the third decimal place.

The Daniel-Kefauver amendment, as it was debated by the Senate in 1956 and also in its current form (S.J. Res. 17, introduced January 5, 1961, by Ke

fauver), would abolish the office of elector but retain the electoral vote, equal to the number of Senators and Representatives from each State, as a counting device. Each candidate would receive the same proportion of the electoral vote as his share of the State's popular vote with fractional votes carried to three decimals. High man would win. If no candidate received 40 percent of the electoral vote, the new Senators and Representatives-sitting jointly and voting as individuals-would pick the President from the two candidates having the largest electoral vote. A majority of the combined votes of the House and Senate would be needed to elect. Similar resolutions were also introduced in the 87th Congress by Senators Olin D. Johnston (Democrat, South Carolina) (S. J. Res. 2), George A. Smathers (Democrat, Florida) (S. J. Res. 9), Thomas J. Dodd (Democrat, Connecticut) (S. J. Res. 4) and Leverett Saltonstall (Republican, Massachusetts) (S. J. Res. 28), and in the House by Representatives Charles E. Bennett (Democrat, Florida) (H. J. Res. 25), Joe M. Kilgore (Democrat, Texas) (H.J. Res. 46′), Frank E. Smith (Democrat, Mississippi) (H.J. Res. 116), and John D. Dingell (Democrat, Michigan) (H.J. Res. 112). Some of these proposals require a majority rather than a plurality of the electoral vote over 40 percent for election.

Arguments for proportional method

Proportional distribution of electoral votes would tend to reflect more accurately the popular strength of the various candidates. Minority party votes would not go uncounted as they are under the unit system. The electoral vote count would conform far more closely to the actual popular vote.

The two-party system would be encouraged in currently one-party States because each citizen's vote would have some effect on the total national outcome.

State legislatures or individual electors would no longer have the power to frustrate the will of the people.

The proportional method would weaken the influence of organized minorities in pivotal States because their influence would be measured by their numbers rather than by their bargaining power.

Accidental circumstances and fraudulent voting or vote counting would be less likely to defeat the choice of the people, because the entire electoral vote of a State will no longer hinge on a few questionable votes.

The mode of electing a President would be set on a uniform and permanent principle. The State legislatures would no longer be able to tamper with the system. The outmoded office of elector, and the abuses which it invites, would be abolished, and the people would feel they had a more direct voice in the choice of a President. At the same time the Federal principle would be preserved through the extra two electoral votes for each state.

Arguments against proportional method

It would still be possible for the electoral vote to elect a man who lost in the popular vote. If the system had been in effect in 1880, it is probable that Winfield S. Hancock would have been elected, although he actually trailed James A. Garfield in the popular vote. Likewise, in 1896 William Jennings Bryan would probably have scored an electoral victory over William McKinley, even though he received 4 percent less of the popular vote than McKinley.

Proportional distribution of electoral votes might conceivably lead to pressure for proportional representation in Congress. Most Members are currently chosen in single-Member districts, a system which discourages the growth of splinter parties, gives the major parties an incentive to absorb dissident groups, and makes the elected representatives directly responsible to a geographically delimited group of constituents. Proportional distribution of electoral votes might encourage small parties to seek the same for congressional elections, with House delegations divided according to the number of popular votes received by the various parties in the State. (Proponents say there is no similarity between the proportional method of dividing electoral votes for President and proportional representation in the legislative branch.)

Proportional distribution might weaken the power and authority of the major parties because it would be relatively easy for minority powers to win electoral votes. (Proponents say that the minor parties would not be motivated to seek electoral votes because they would still have not hope of winning, and that since the Kefauver amendment requires a plurality over 40 percent rather than an absolute majority in the electoral college, the chance of an election being thrown into the House would be less than under the current system.)