and Senate Joint Resolution 67 by Senator Keating. These bills reflect the views of leaders of both major political parties that a party which cannot attract and hold young as well as older voters has no future.

Resort to an amendment to the Constitution rather than a statute rests upon the theory that a minimum voting age is a "qualification" to be determined by State law under article 1, section 2 of the Constitution and the second sentence of the 17th amendment to the Constitution, insofar as elections of Members of the House of Representatives and the Senate are concerned. In a Senate report on a similar proposal in the 83d Congress, it was said that "the age at which an individual may be qualified to vote is determined by State law." Since there are only two States-Georgia and Kentucky which have granted the right to persons 18 years of age and over, the effect of the proposed amendment would, therefore, be to supersede age qualifications to vote in the other 48 States. The proposal, like the 15th and the 19th amendments, does not confer the right of suffrage on persons who are under 21 years of age; its effect is to forbid denial or abridgement by the United States or any State of the right to vote by any citizen above the age of 18 years. Similar proposals have been introduced on many previous occasions. This proposal appears to be in proper form for the object intended. The subcommittee may, however, wish to consider whether it should integrate the voting age of the proposed amendment with section 2 of amendment 14 which provides in part that when the right to vote in certain elections is denied to any of the male inhabitants of a State "being 21 years of age, and citizens of the United States," except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representations in the State shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens "21 years of age" in such State. If this difference in treatment between the two provisions is not eliminated at this time it will leave the Constitution open to varying constructions; on the one hand that there was no intention to change the 14th amendment; and on the other, that there was a repeal by implication. In the interests of clarity, therefore, the intention of the Congress should be made plain beyond dispute.

Other than that, the proposal raises an important matter of policy upon which educators may be able to cast more light than lawyers. The question is whether our contemporary educational system, augmented by modern communication media has progressed so far as to provide a sufficiently informed electorate in the present age group 18 through 20. In this connection, it is claimed that students are better educated today and that the recent Army experience of many young men in that age group has invested them with greater maturity and a higher sense of citizenship, and developed a more profound interest in political affairs and the proper administration of government. This may well be true. Of even greater value, it seems to me, is the experience of the State of Georgia which has permitted 18-year-olds to vote for many years. Testifying in support of an amendment to the Constitution similar to the one before us, ex-Governor Arnall described how the 18-year-old voting law had operated in his State since it went into effect:

"It was approved in 1944 and we have had many county, municipal, State, and national elections. We have observed that the young people express a very intelligent viewpoint when they vote. They appreciate the privilege and they exercise it very wisely. As a matter of fact, I do not believe today in my State there is any political party or any political faction or anyone interested in public affairs who would suggest that 18-year-old voting be done away with. It has met with widespread support and widespread approval * * *. It has been my experience in watching youth voting in my State that the young people evaluate the issues and the candidates. They exercise a very informed opinion, not just some hearsay."

At prior hearings of the proposed amendment, Senator Humphrey expressed the view that extending the suffrage to 18-year-olds would broaden the base of democracy and encourage participation of people at an age when they are enthusiastic in government and politics. In his opinion, citizens between the ages of 18 and 21 are more inteersted in politics and better informed of political issues than they are later on when they become preoccupied with earning a living and other matters.

S. Rept. 1075, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1 (1954).

7 Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, on S.J. Res. 127, 82d Cong., 2d sess., 66-67 (1952).

8 Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, on S.J. Res. 53 and S.J. Res. 64, 83d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 3-4 (1953).

There is still an additional factor today which favors the proposed amendment. H.R. 7144 and S. 1883 are pending in the Congress to give the right to vote in Federal elections to citizens in the District of Columbia who are above the age of 18. These bills have the support of the President. There is every reason to believe that citizens between the ages of 18 through 20 in the various States of the Union are as qualified to vote as persons of the same age in the District of Columbia. At the same time, it should be noted that voting qualifications have traditionally been left for the States to determine, and it may be that each State is in a better position to judge the age qualifications of its voters than are people who do not live and reside within the State. For this reason the administration, while thoroughly believing in the competence of 18-yearolds to discharge their civic responsibilities as voters, is of the view that this judgment should continue to be left to the States.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Senator, I think I would like to read parts of the statement and because it is quite a long statement I will try to merely summarize some other points in it perhaps.

Senator KEFAUVER. Very well.

Mr. KATZENBACH. I am privileged to appear before this subcommittee which has as its continuing concern the examination, evaluation, drafting and recommendation of proposals to amend the Constitution. As you well know, it is no easy task to improve on the language of the Founding Fathers for the purpose of correcting one problem without creating even more difficult problems which few, if any, may foretell. For this reason, constitutional scholars and statesmen have always stressed the need for exercising careful deliberation and considerable restraint before amending the Constitution.

I think this is particularly true where the proposals affect the Office and election of the President and Vice President, and the right to vote in such elections-proposals which go to the heart of our political system.

The various measures to amend the Constitution before this subcommittee fall into several categories:

1. Abolishing the electoral college and establishing a different system of electing the President and Vice President.

2. Providing for a nationwide presidential primary system in place of the nominating convention.

3. Outlawing the poll tax.

4. Granting the right to vote to citizens over the age of 18.

I would like to consider these proposals in that order.

Among the more important proposals to amend the Constitution are those to abolish the electoral college entirely and to alter the manner in which votes are cast by it for President and Vice President. Although there seems to be considerable sentiment for abolishing the electoral college as being obsolete and undemocratic, there is little unanimity as to how this should be done.

For example, under Senate Joint Resolution 1, the "direct election" plan introduced by Senator Margaret Chase Smith and four other cosponsors, the President and Vice President would be elected by a majority of the popular votes cast for both offices. If no person received a majority of the total number of votes cast for President, a runoff election to choose the President would be conducted 28 days thereafter. A similar provision would control upon the election of the Vice President.

Senate Joint Resolution 23, introduced by Senator Mansfield with Senator Keating as cosponsor, is another bill which provides for the

election of candidates for President and Vice President by popular vote.

Senate Joint Resolution 12 offered by Senator Mundt and five cosponsors would retain the electoral college, but electors would be elected by the people within single-elector districts established by the State legislatures. Under this so-called district plan, one elector would be chosen in each district, and in addition two for each State, so that each State would have a number of electors equal to the number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress. The districts are required to be compact, contiguous in territory, and are to contain as nearly as practicable the number of persons entitling the State to one Representative in Congress.

Most of the bills provide for proportional division of the electoral vote, and of these several provide for election by a majority of the House of Representatives and Senate sitting in joint session if less than 40 percent of the electoral vote is cast for a candidate for the presidency or vice presidency. There are other minor variations of these plans which need not be cataloged for our purposes today.

The Department of Justice does not favor any of these proposals. Instead it submits for consideration the more moderate proposal to amend the Constitution contained in Senate Joint Resolution 132 which President Kennedy introduced as Senator near the end of the 85th Congress.

Senator KEFAUVER. I do not think Senate Joint Resolution 132 of the 85th Congress has been printed in the record, so we will put it in the record at this point.

(S.J. Res. 132 of the 85th Cong. follows:)

[S.J. Res. 132, 85th Cong., 1st sess.]

JOINT RESOLUTION Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States providing for the election of President and Vice President

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

"ARTICLE

"SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during a term of four years, and together with the Vice President, chosen for the same term, be elected as provided in this Constitution. No person constitutionally ineligible for the office of President shall be eligible for that of Vice President of the United States.

"Each State shall be entitled to cast for President and for Vice President a number of electoral votes equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which such State may be entitled in the Congress. Such electoral votes shall be cast, in the manner provided by section 2 of this article, upon the basis of an election in which the people of such State shall cast their votes for President and for Vice President. The voters in each State in any such election shall have the qualifications requisite for persons voting for members of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.

"The Congress shall determine the time of such election, which shall be the same throughout the United States. Until otherwise determined by the Congress, such election shall be held on the Tuesday next after the first Monday in November of the year preceding the year in which the regular term of the President is to begin.

70784-61-pt. 2- -6

"SEC. 2. In such election within any State, each voter by one ballot shall cast his vote for President and his vote for Vice President. The name of any person may be placed upon any ballot for President or for Vice President only with the consent of such person. The electoral votes which each State is entitled to cast for President and for Vice President shall be cast for the persons who in such election in that State receive the greatest number of votes for President and Vice President, respectively, except that if the person for whom any State casts its electoral votes for President is an inhabitant of that State, its electoral votes for Vice President shall be cast for the person not an inhabitant of that State who receives the greatest number of votes for Vice President.

"Within forty-five days after the election, or at such time as the Congress shall direct, the official custodian of the election returns of each State shall prepare, sign, certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate, a list of all persons for whom votes were cast for President and a separate list of all persons for whom votes were cast for Vice President. Upon each such list there shall be entered the number of votes cast for each person whose name appears thereon, the total number of votes cast for all such persons, and the name of the person for whom the electoral votes of such State are cast.

"SEC. 3. On the sixth day of January following the election, unless the Congress by law appoints a different day not earlier than the fourth day of January and not later than the tenth day of January, the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the vote shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, and the person having the greatest number of votes for Vice President shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electoral votes. If no person has a majority of the whole number of electoral votes for President or Vice President, then from the persons not exceeding three, having the highest number of electoral votes for such office, the Senate and the House of Representatives sitting in joint session shall choose such officer immediately, by ballot. The vote of each Member of each House shall be publicly announced and recorded. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of three-fourths of the whole number of the Senators and Representatives, and the person receiving the greatest number of votes shall be chosen.

"SEC. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate and the House of Representatives may choose a President or a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any person who, except for his death, would have been entitled to receive a majority of the electoral votes for President or for Vice President.

"SEC. 5. The first, second, and third paragraphs of section 1, article II, of the Constitution, the twelfth article of amendment to the Constitution, and section 4 of the twentieth article of amendment to the Constitution are hereby repealed. "SEC. 6. This article shall take effect on the tenth day of February following its ratification, but shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress." Senator KEFAUVER. Go ahead, sir.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Senate Joint Resolution 132 is similar to most of the proposals before this subcommittee to the extent that it also contemplates abolishing the electoral college. It differs to the extent that it would retain the present system of electoral votes and the existing allocation of such votes to each State.

Moreover, it would not change the present system of counting all of the electoral votes for the candidate who received the greatest number of votes in any State. It would, however, require that the electoral votes which each State is entitled to cast for President and Vice President shall be cast for the persons who in such election in that State receive the greatest number of votes for President and Vice President. As has been indicated, unlike many of the bills before this subcommittee, Senate Joint Resolution 132 would not abolish the unit-rule method of awarding all of the State's electoral votes to the candidate

who receives even the most minute plurality of the State's popular

vote.

Various arguments have been advanced in favor of proportional division of electoral votes. For example, it is said that the unit rule makes it mathematically possible for a President to be elected even though he has fewer popular votes than his leading opponent.

It is also claimed that the importance of the large politically doubtful States are overemphasized, thereby giving presidential candidates from those States a definite advantage over rivals from other States in the struggle for the nomination, and diverting the attention of candidates and campaign funds to those pivotal States. Related to this argument is the further contention that the unit rule encourages the control of presidential campaigns by small, highly organized and disciplined pressure groups within the large pivotal States, with the result that disproportionate concessions must be made to them by the major parties.

Another argument made by some is that States which are predominantly one-party States are perpetuated in this condition because where the outcome on a statewide basis is clear beyond doubt, the voter has little incentive to participate in the election contest.

In addition, the unit rule, it is said, tends to create a landslide psychology which may distort popular sentiment and exaggerate a mandate, as for example when Landon received fully 39 percent of the popular vote in 1936, but merely 12 percent of the electoral vote. While some of these arguments undoubtedly have merit, they must be balanced against important considerations on the other side. The chief and overriding objection against proportional division of electoral votes is that it would encourage the development of splinter parties.

In its report of such proposals in 1957, the Committee on Federal Legislation of the New York County Lawyers' Association rejected the proposal that the electoral college be abolished and that in the election of the President and Vice President, each candidate shall share the votes of each State on the basis of the popular vote.

Urging that the existing electoral system promoted the preservation of the two-party system, the committee noted by way of comparison that "the spectacle of certain other nations which have a multiparty system is scarcely reassuring."

In this connection, the committee pointed out that the proposal permitting election of the President with 40 percent of the total vote could easily lead to a three-party system because only slightly more than one-third of the vote would be necessary to elect.

Also, the committee observed that this proposal would tend to invite minority candidates into a race who would take away part of the voting strength of the major parties and cut down their power. While conceding the theoretical possibility that of two candidates for President, the one with the lesser number of popular votes may receive a majority of the electoral votes, the committee concludes that on balance this was not a sufficient reason to shift from the existing two-party system to the risky multiparty system.

Prof. Edward S. Corwin, a distinguished student of the Constitution and I might say the first professor of constitutional law that I ever had, at Princeton, and one whom I admire greatly.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, he is a very eminent scholar.