3. This arrangement would make every nook and cranny of the land an area of contest. Specifically, a Democratic vote would be worth something in Vermont and a Republican vote would be worth something in Georgia. Two examples of the lack of participation demonstrate the point in question. Louisiana and Minnesota each have 10 electoral votes. In Louisiana approximately 63,000 votes were cast theoretically for each one of the 10 In Minnesota 153,000 votes were cast for each one of the 10 electors, theoretically. In Georgia, 61,000 votes were cast theoretically for each elector. In the State of Wisconsin, which has the same number of electoral votes, 145,000 votes were theoretically cast for each elector.

electors in the 1960 election.

The general lack of participation in the South, it is felt, reflects the uselessness of voting for the opposition. Generally speaking, all votes cast for the Republican Party have been lost in the South. If, however, each of the two larger parties is to share in the electoral vote, then, although still a minority, the voters who have a disinclination to vote for the leading party in the State would go to the polls and vote and thus have a substantial influence on the outcome of the national election.

It is interesting to note at this point that in the 1960 election, in the States not carried by the Democratic Party, slightly less than 14 million votes went for naught and approximately 19 million votes for the Republican ticket likewise went for naught. The tabulation attached as to the 1960 election shows these votes would have had a substantial influence on the outcome of the election. 4. With further reference to minorities, this proposal would further liquidate the imbalance in power to be found in organized minorities. A perfect example is in the 1960 election in New York State. There the Liberal Party nominated the same electors as the Democratic Party and polled 406,176 votes. Actually, the Republican Party as a party polled more votes than the Democratic Party as a party in New York State. The Liberal Party more than made up the difference. This vote represented approximately 52 percent of the total vote and was worth 45 electoral votes, whereas under the foregoing proposal, even if pledged to the same candidate, this vote would be worth exactly the same percentage of the electoral vote as it is of the popular vote and be the equivalent of approximately 21⁄2 electoral votes.

It is hoped that the adoption of this proposal would tend to encourage the members of minority groups to gravitate to one or the other of the larger parties, not necessarily as a group, but based on the same kind of an appraisal as a member of the majority decides which political party shall receive his support. The situation outlined in item 4 will, with a little reflection, bring about the realization that in the 1960 election this relatively small group can say quite truthfully and forcefully that it is responsible for the President's election. No group other than a great consolidated majority should be able to say such a thing. It is no more than duty and decency that steps be taken to relieve the President of the United States of this sort of direct or implied pressure.

5. This proposal would tend to diminish fraudulent practices. When one engages in fraud, naturally one must weigh the possible gain against the possible cost or risk. To influence the outcome of an election in a given State under present conditions, particularly with a State having a large electoral vote, the gain is worth possibly the costs and hazards of being caught. With this change, corruption in a few areas, or even a large area, would no longer be worth the whole State's electoral vote. It would be worth only that portion of the electoral vote of that State which results from corrupt or fraudulent practices. This would tend to create a hazard of being caught of such magnitude as to be almost certain for the potential practicer of fraud to feel that it is not worth taking the chance.

6. This proposal, as indicated, would liquidate the power of minorities, irrespective of what they are-religious, race, creed, color, location, type of employment, or what not-for their power and influence would be diminished to exactly whatever percentage they are of the popular vote in the State wherein the vote is cast. As indicated, this would be reflected in the type of campaign conducted for the presidency. Of almost equal importance would be the fact that it would find reflection immediately in the influence of these groups in national conventions. The national convention would thus come closer to reflecting a national movement for a candidate rather than minority maneuverings which quite frequently constitute the difference between a nomination and a defeat in the convention.

7. It is realized that there are other smaller parties frequently on the ticket in the various States and it is anticipated that the question will be raised as to why these parties should not share. The practical answer is that under present conditions they must increase their strength within a given State until they are the leading party within that State to get any electoral vote and then they get all. Under what is proposed here, they would be one step nearer to sharing. They can build their popular appeal up to a point where they stand No. 2 in any given State. They will share in the electoral vote in that State. Accordingly, under this proposal, their position is improved, not worsened.

8. It is felt that the proposal to have presidential electors elected from or in each congressional district and then two from the State at large is a decided improvement over the present system. However, it only diminishes the area of evil that there is in the present system. It just makes the area of contest that much smaller, and the vote cast in a congressional district or in a State for the two electors at large who lose is of no avail any more than it is now. This suggestion will add greatly to the temptation to gerrymander following each census where a State's representation in the House changes. The temptation to gerrymander for seats in the House is so great as to be rarely if ever resisted. The temptation will be infinitely greater when we add the influence it will have on presidential elections to the influence it has on the complexion of the House of Representatives. "Suitable legislation to restrain gerrymandering" is too general a phrase. It must be spelled out, and even then its effectiveness is seriously doubted.

70784-61-pt. 2-5