The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy

activity agreement alternative analysis Anthony Downs approach assume assumption bargaining benefits calculus Chapter choose coalition collective action collective choice collective decision-making collective decisions collectivization conception consider constitutional choice contract decision-making costs decision-making rules democracy developed direct democracy discussion dividual economic economist ethical exist expected costs expected external costs external effects full side payments function gains game theory Gordon Tullock imposed imputation individualistic institutions interdependence costs interest investment issues Kantian Knut Wicksell lective legislative logrolling marginal costs maximizing minority moral n-tuples normative operation optimal organization Pareto Pareto criterion Pareto-optimal participant parties political process position possible preferences problem purely rational individual redistribution representative result road repair rule of unanimity sector secure seems simple majority rule simple majority voting single social solution suggested tend tion trade unanimity rule utility variables voluntary vote-trading voters voting rules welfare economics welfare economist